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ABSTRACT 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to seek answers to the two core research questions: 
how has popular nationalism been instrumental in China’s Japan policy vis-à-vis its 
domestic politics since the end of the Cold War? And, how and to what extent has the 
Chinese government managed popular nationalism in foreign and domestic policy 
practices? 
Using Japan as an empirical subject, this thesis explores and investigates the complex 
interactive relations between popular nationalism, in particular emotions and 
sentiment, and foreign policy and domestic politics in post-Cold War China. The 
work takes a constructivist view, which popular nationalism, foreign policy and 
domestic politics are seen as mutually constituted. Taking two recent diplomatic 
frictions between China and Japan as case studies, the thesis critically examines the 
mutually constitutive effects of popular nationalism on China’s Japan policy in 
respect to its domestic politics. In addition, the work’s pioneering studies on the new 
‘inward outcry’ syndrome in Chinese nationalism further highlights the mutual 
constitutive relations among popular nationalism, foreign policy and domestic 
politics.  
This thesis argues that the popular nationalism plays a dynamic role in shaping 
China’s Japan policy. On the one hand, popular nationalism may instrumentalise to 
serve China’s domestic and international objectives. On the other hand, popular 
nationalism has to be delicately managed in order to maintain social stability, 
amicable relations with Japan, and increasingly, China’s international image and 
reputation.  
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Notes	  on	  Chinese	  and	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Adherent to common practice in China and Japan, Chinese and Japanese 
names are presented with surname first throughout this work. Pinyin is used as the 
primary Romanisation systems for the Chinese names and places; however, original 
spelling in quotations and references stands unchanged. The Wade-Giles system of 
Romanisation is used for some names, places and organisations long familiar in the 
West. Examples include Jiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi in Pinyin), Nanking (Nanjing), 
and Kuomintang (Guomindang). Original Chinese characters are provided at first 
instance along with English translations for Chinese concepts, ideologies and phrases; 
and for book, newspaper and magazine titles in references. 
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Introduction	  	  
 
The relationship between China and Japan has always been a fascinating and complex 
subject in general and International Relations (IR) in particular. It is fascinating 
perhaps because, as two close neighbours separated only by a narrow strip of water 
(一衣带水的邻邦), China and Japan have enjoyed a close relationship dating back 
centuries to ancient civilisations. And yet, despite their sharing culture and 
philosophical teachings, the contemporary relations between these two Asian 
neighbours could not be more antagonistic, with two prolonged and bloody war 
fought in the past hundred years or so. It is complex perhaps because the Sino-
Japanese relationship in the post-Cold War era has displayed a strange phenomenon. 
The Chinese recently characterised this dichotomous trend as “cold politics, hot 
economics” (政冷经热). Despite being one of the most important trading partners 
mutually, and ever deepening economic interdependence, the political relations 
between the two countries remain very unstable and fragile. Moreover, several key 
issues left from the history of recent conflicts remain unsolved and post a genuine 
threat to this fragile political relationship. These unsolved bilateral issues from history 
have been a major source of frequent diplomatic frictions. Furthermore, the 
unyielding confrontational stances and positions on these issues have led to mistrust, 
estrangement between the two governments and a decline in mutual affections 
between the two societies. In general, Sino-Japanese relations in the post-Cold War 
era fluctuated up and down like a graph depicting the Dow Jones Index, with short 
burst ups and downs at two ends and a long slump in the middle (2001-2006). 
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Another interesting Post-Cold War phenomenon inside China that has been widely 
noted by scholars is the apparent rise of Chinese nationalism as a product of post-
Cold War structural changes (Duara, 1996; Zheng, 1999; Deans, 2004; Gries, 2004; 
Zhao, 2004a; and Hughes, 2006). Many experts argue it was this revival of 
nationalism in China, and in Japan, has to some extent concomitantly affected the 
bilateral relations in the post-Cold War era (Rose, 2000; Kokubun, 2003; Gries, 2005; 
He, 2006; and 2007). According to some observers, the end of the Cold War in the 
late 1980s had dismissed Communism as a credible political ideology. Meanwhile in 
China, Deng’s economic reform that started some ten years ago had already 
undermined Communist ideology in economic sense. The end of the Cold War and 
the Tiananmen crackdown further challenged Communist ideology in political terms. 
As a result, the CCP government fell back to nationalism to promote a new consensus 
on China political identity on domestic level; and to forge a sense of nationalistic 
unity in society in order to confront the tough international environment after 
Tiananmen. This state-led1 nationalism met with a new strain of nationalism that had 
evolved at grassroots level prior to Tiananmen crackdown became what is known as 
popular nationalism in today’s China.  
 
Several Chinese experts like Whiting (1995), Gries (2005) and Rozman (2002) assert 
this rising popular nationalism in China is responsible for cultivating negative images 
and stereotypes of Japan. This in turn, gives the Chinese public a strong mindset of 
competitiveness rivalry with Japan. Moreover, Callahan (2010) and Shambaugh (2008) 
construe that Chinese popular nationalism today contains a mixture of positive and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This term is borrowed from Zhao (2004a). 
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negative imaging that characterises popular nationalism by a pride/victim complex.2 
Callahan argues, “China’s national aesthetic entails the combination of a superiority 
complex and inferiority complex. Rather than being opposites, in China, pride and 
humiliation are interwoven, separated only by a fine line and can easily trade places” 
(2010: 9). This pride/humiliation complex is the core of Chinese popular nationalism 
dynamics. The contrasting images of the century of shame and humiliation in the past, 
and China’s rapid economic growth and rising international profile shape this 
pride/humiliation complex, hence the dynamics of Chinese nationalism. It is also a 
critical element in understanding the mutually constitutive dynamics between Chinese 
popular nationalism and its foreign/domestic policy. 
	  
Objectives,	  Questions	  and	  Definitions	  
Considering the important queries about the role of popular nationalism in China’s 
domestic and foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, this thesis sets out to 
systematically study the complex dynamics of Chinese popular nationalism and its 
role in China’s foreign and domestic policy considerations. This thesis seeks to 
answer two fundamental questions: 
I. How has popular nationalism been instrumental in China’s Japan policy vis-
à-vis domestic politics? 
II. How and to what extent has the Chinese government managed popular 
nationalism in foreign and domestic policy practices? 
In order to answer these two research questions, the following research problems will 
be addressed: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Callahan calls it pessoptimism.  
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i) The manner, condition, and the extent to which popular nationalist 
pressure/sentiment in China is responsible for Beijing’s policy actions 
to Japan.  
ii) The impact and implication of popular anti-Japanese nationalism on 
China’s domestic politics and on foreign policy. 
iii) The scope, and the extent to which Chinese popular nationalism is 
managed. 
Whilst not discrediting other aspect of nationalism as a concept, this work, however, 
only aims to explicate nationalism as a “ideational” determinant or factor. It explores 
the dynamic interactions between Chinese popular nationalism and its foreign vis-à-
vis domestic politics. Through the lens of popular nationalism, the work also attempts 
to break down the barriers between domestic and foreign policy in order to analyse 
their mutually constitutive relations.  
 
Japan represents the empirical subject in this study. The rationale for choosing Japan 
as the empirical subject of Chinese foreign policy is two fold. First, Japan, better than 
any other countries, represents the pride/humiliation spirit of Chinese nationalism 
today. Due to historical animosity, unsolved diplomatic issues, Japan has been the 
principal target of popular nationalism in China. Hence, by using Japan as the 
empirical case, the popular nationalism dynamics can be best explored. Second, Japan 
also best serves to analyse the role of popular nationalism in China’s foreign and 
domestic politics. From foreign policy perspective, as mentioned earlier, relations 
between China and Japan have been unstable since the end of the Cold War. An 
increase in diplomatic friction arising from frequent resurrections of unsolved 
bilateral issues places Japan regular in the eyes of the Chinese public and policy 
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makers. On domestic level, not does only Japan feature predominately in Chinese 
popular nationalist discourse, by defeating Japanese invaders in the long struggle War 
of Resistance, the CCP has also seen victory over Japan a significant foundation bloc 
of its political legitimacy.3 Therefore, I believe, by using Japan as the empirical 
subject in this work, it offers best possible specimen on which Chinese popular 
nationalism dynamics may be analysed. 
 
Before setting out to this work, the definition of “popular nationalism” needs to be 
clarified. Considering its complexities and intersubjectivity, and for clarity and 
relevance, this study limits the definition of “nationalism” as follows: 
 
A psychological condition or state of mind that sentiments of belonging, and unites a 
collective group of people (nation), whose members share a common identity (national 
identity) based on distinctive geographical, historical, cultural and emotional 
elements—“Self” vis-à-vis “Others” (Guibernau, 1996: 47). 
 
Joseph M. Whitmeyer claims that “virtually all scholars of nationalism agree that 
popular nationalism has become much more widespread and important in the world 
since 1800 than it was previously” (2002: 322).4  He defines popular nationalism in 
contrast to elite nationalism.  He identifies that elites are  
 
The people with attributes that lead them to be ranked higher and accorded more 
prestige and respect than ordinary people.  These attributes include being politically or 
administratively powerful, being rich or propertied, having a title or high official rank, 
being well-educated, being a star, and so forth…When non-elite member of a set of 
people exhibit nationalism, I call it popular nationalism. [emphasis in the original] In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Chapter Three for more discussion on this. 
4 See also Wiebe (2001). 
	   6	  
the historical development of different forms of nationalism, nationalism among the 
elites—such as aristocrats, merchants, or intellectuals—typically appears before 
popular nationalism does (Whitmeyer 2002: 322).  
 
According to Whitmeyer’s definition, popular nationalism is the ordinary people who 
express nationalism that are passed down by the elite class. In other words, for 
Withmeyer, popular nationalism is actually state-led nationalism from the top. Thus, 
the word “popular” here only indicates the type of person who exhibits nationalism, 
as popular nationalists do not develop nationalistic ideas. Whilst agreeing to 
Withmeyer that the elite class or government is an important agent for promoting 
nationalism, this work would like to argue that his definition too narrow. In contrast, 
this study sees popular nationalism as nationalistic feelings or movement originating 
at the grassroots level and spread or reinforce at the same level. Therefore, it can also 
be called grassroots nationalism. It is worth noting that by defining popular 
nationalism originated at grassroots level, it does not disregard the fact popular 
nationalism may have significant inputs from the state-led nationalism. In fact, as 
Chapter Two will demonstrate, Chinese popular nationalism in the post-Cold War era 
is a perfect representation of grassroots nationalism with significant state incarnation.  
 
In addition, the work believes popular nationalism dynamics as a complex system of 
shared belief and perceptions that can both be utilised by nationalists to put pressure 
on governmental decision-making process (internal and external); and by the state to 
serve its domestic and foreign policy purpose. Here, popular nationalism is not a static 
concept, but an ever-evolving belief system that sits in the middle between domestic 
politics and foreign policy. 
 
	   7	  
Theoretical	  Assumption	  
This thesis proposes a Constructivist assumption to the key concepts, namely popular 
nationalism, domestic politics and foreign policy. Popular nationalism is treated as 
ideational belief system towards an other—out-group member. This system of belief 
or perception is formed by a collection of shared subjective knowledge, such as 
culture, history, and interests. Nationalism is seen here as presenting a set of 
preferences and judgements with respect to one’s own and other nation states. 
 
The thesis also adopts the stance of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). It recognises that 
in order to open foreign policy’s “black box”, ideational elements such as nationalism, 
culture, history, need to be taken into account. Moreover, it emphasises the 
importance of domestic determinants to foreign policy. The work is taking a view that 
domestic politics and foreign policy thus have a mutually influential relationship. On 
the one hand, foreign policy outcomes are heavily influenced by events that are 
primarily ‘domestic’. On the other hand, foreign policy significantly impacts upon 
domestic politics. Furthermore, the thesis concur with FPA that domestic political 
influence on foreign policy is multi-dimensional, containing both “inputs” and 
“constrains”. 
 
The analytical point of departure for this work is popular nationalism. It aims to 
empirically explain how popular nationalism dynamic operates in China’s recent 
Japan policy vis-à-vis its domestic political considerations. Exploring two recent 
diplomatic frictions in bilateral relations as case studies, it seeks to demonstrate 
popular nationalism, as an ideational factor, affecting not only China’s foreign policy, 
and also domestic policy, such as the need to maintain social stability and public order. 
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Moreover, the work would also argue that foreign policy directions, such as recurrent 
diplomatic friction with Japan; and domestic politics, such as the patriotic education 
campaign in the 1990s, in return constantly shape the system of shared sentiments in 
Chinese popular nationalism. 
 
In short, the principal theoretical assumption of this work is that popular nationalism 
and domestic politics are mutually constitutive to foreign policy.  
 
Empirical	  Scope	  and	  Contributions	  
The primary empirical research scope draws on the causal role of Chinese popular 
nationalism in shaping China’s Japan policy since 1989. Here Chinese popular 
nationalism is limited to its manifestations of anti-Japanese sentiments. The analysis 
begins with a focus on anti-Japanese nationalist movement as a reaction to bilateral 
diplomatic frictions. By looking at how the Chinese state handles anti-Japanese public 
sentiment vis-à-vis its subsequent action/inaction towards Japan, the work attempts to 
interpret the potency of popular nationalist action in China’s Japan policy 
considerations. However, the study does not stop at this linear level, it also considers 
the domestic policy implications with regards to this anti-Japanese popular 
nationalism. In this regard, this thesis utilises the “state” as the principal agent 
responsible for foreign policy and domestic politics. In the case of China, the 
definition of “state” is limited to the nucleus of Chinese government’s decision-
making body, which typically consists the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo 
and its Central Committee, the Foreign Affairs Office of the Central Committee 
(FAO), the State Council’s Foreign Affairs Small Leading Group, and Ministry of 
Foreign Affair (MFA). In order to avoid repetition, several terms are used throughout 
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the thesis to represent the “state”, including Beijing, the CCP government, the leaders, 
the leadership, and the central government. 
 
The study introduces two highly visible bilateral issues between China and Japan to 
test the assumption of mutually constitutive relations between Chinese popular 
nationalism, and foreign, domestic policy. The two selected cases are the 2005 anti-
Japanese protest and the Diaoyu Islands dispute. The case studies are selected on the 
reasons of relevancy and the comparativeness. Firstly, both cases are highly relevant 
to the post-Cold War Chinese popular nationalist discourse insofar as they struck a 
nationalist chord, and aroused strong nationalistic impulses within China. Secondly, 
as both cases contain a study on a popular nationalist movement on different issues 
which happened at different points in overall bilateral relations, they can be compared 
in terms of the scope of the nationalist movement, and the strength and directions of 
state’s responses. Moreover, the two selected cases also represent the two main 
characteristics of the unsolved bilateral issues and the stem of which anti-Japanese 
sentiment evolved from. Whilst the 2005 anti-Japanese protest is predominantly a 
ideational/emotional issue, which is closely related to wartime history and clashing 
historical recognitions in two countries, the Diaoyu Islands dispute is a more tangible 
issue that very much touches the question of sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
 
The selection of these two qualitatively different case studies in contemporary Sino-
Japanese relations is intended to ensure that this thesis can adequately address not 
only whether the dynamics of popular nationalism matters in China’s foreign policy, 
but equally to examine why, how, when, and to what extent it matters when it comes 
to handling highly sensitive bilateral issues that already have a strong nationalistic 
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connotation. To achieve this, the empirical study seeks to explain the following set of 
questions: 
i) How does Chinese popular nationalism respond to frictional issues in 
Sino-Japanese relations? 
ii) When, and under what circumstances does popular nationalism 
become most salient factor affecting China’s policy choices regarding 
Japan? 
iii) Under what conditions, does popular nationalism exhibit its double-
edged sword effect? 
iv) How and by what means does the Chinese state manage popular 
nationalism in balance with its external effects and internal 
implications? 
 
Not only does this thesis show nationalism matters for China in Sino-Japanese 
relations, but it also furthers this notion, by breaking down the barriers between 
domestic and foreign policy, to identify the specific external-internal conditions and 
time context that determine the nationalist effect. In other words, the thesis explicitly 
argues popular nationalism matters in China’s Japan policy, but in a dynamic and 
multi-dimensional way (external-internal coconstitution). It uses two case studies to 
demonstrate the impact of popular nationalism during specific periods, and under 
particular conditions, presents different yet critical challenges to Beijing’s policy 
decisions.  
 
Overall, the results of this academic enquiry are expected to make a supplementary 
contribution to the already extensive sources in the field of Sino-Japanese relations 
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and Chinese nationalism. The work seeks to compliment the current literature of Sino-
Japanese studies by comprehensively exploring an important ideational determinant 
(popular nationalism) as oppose to material factors. Furthermore, by using the term 
“popular nationalism dynamic”, it means that the research not only analyses popular 
nationalism as a determinant in China’s domestic and foreign policy, but at the same 
time, it also examines how the CCP government manage this popular nationalism 
both online and in the real world. More critically, this up-to-date study also 
discoveries a new effect of Chinese popular nationalism on the government that has 
yet to be picked up by the current literature, namely the “inward outcry syndrome”. 
This effect, its significance and the government’s response are evaluated in length in 
Chapter Five. In short, the thesis expects to add to the current popular debate of 
Chinese nationalism by presenting a systematic analysis of the dynamic nature of 
Chinese popular nationalism, and more crucially, by testing this dynamic in empirical 
cases in Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
Research	  Design	  and	  Thesis	  Structure	  
This qualitative study employs an interpretive approach to documentary analysis, 
supplemented by limited number of interviewing as the main methods. As it is not 
possible to gain access to the inner working circle of the decision makers in China, 
and for such a contemporary issue, nor is it possible to obtain classified policy 
directory documents, the basis of primary sources therefore derives from: a) 
publically available official documents, such as official publications, annual reports; b) 
relevant information in various published forms, including official speeches and 
remarks, press statements, media reports and commentaries via newspapers, 
magazines and the Internet. The latter, in particular, are a crucial source of 
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information considering the contemporary nature of this research. Media reports in 
Chinese language, both via official channel, such as the People’s Daily, China Daily, 
Xinhua News Agency, and commercial platforms, such as Global Times, and various 
Internet information portals are widely used to reflect the state’s official position vis-
à-vis public opinions. In addition, as the Internet has become a major platform for 
Chinese popular nationalism to prosper, relevant weblogs, forums and messages are 
also consulted. 
 
Secondary sources chosen from relevant literature in both English and Chinese 
languages are also essential to deepen knowledge and understanding required to 
tackle this complex research problem. They help to form background information, 
construct the theoretical framework, and support arguments.  
 
Additionally, during a six-week fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2009, semi-
constructed interviews with several prominent Chinese scholars were conducted.  
Unfortunately, due to the secrecy surrounding Chinese politics in general and foreign 
policy in particular, plus the sensitive nature of popular nationalism, I was not able to 
establish any direct contact with government officials. As a result, contents of the 
interviews will not be treated as concrete evidence, but only as supplementary 
supporting materials presenting a point of view.  
 
This thesis is subsequently divided into six chapters. The first chapter constructs the 
theoretical framework, in which the core assumption of the thesis is discussed. 
Chapter Two presents an overview on the evolution of Chinese nationalism. In 
particular, it assesses the characteristics of Chinese popular nationalism today. 
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Chapter Three offers a background of the dynamics, trends and issues in Sino-
Japanese relations during the post-Cold War period. Chapter Four and Five apply the 
core assumption into the two selected cases, the 2005 anti-Japanese protest and the 
Diaoyu Islands dispute, respectively. Chapter Six concludes the empirical findings 
and reflects the implications of this thesis and prospects of future research on this 
subject. 
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Chapter	  One:	  Nationalism	  and	  Foreign	  Policy—A	  
Dialectical	  Paradigm	  
	  
 This chapter aims to build a theoretical linkage between the two core elements of my 
research; namely, nationalism and foreign policy. Adopting a framework that draws 
broadly on Constructivist and Foreign Policy Analysis approaches, this chapter 
demonstrates how the relationships between nationalism and foreign policy on the one 
hand, and domestic politics and foreign policy, on the other, can be theorised as being 
mutually constitutive. Thus, the ‘dynamism’ in nationalism-foreign policy follows a 
dialectical paradigm, in which nationalism may act as both an important domestic 
determinant and instrument in foreign policy decision-making processes.  In other 
words, not only may nationalism shape foreign policy outcomes, but it may also be 
instrumentalised to influence other domestic determinants (such as public opinion), 
and hence create the context for determining foreign policy. 
 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section provides a basic 
understanding of nationalism as a socio-political concept. It must be stressed that this 
thesis is not merely focused on ‘nationalism’ per se, but rather seeks to emphasise 
how this important concept can play a dynamic role in a government’s foreign policy-
making. Background knowledge of nationalism is nevertheless still vitally relevant to 
this study, as it helps one to understand how nationalism produces and reproduces 
within a society, and ultimately, how nationalism shapes one’s—general public and 
decision-makers—perceptions toward other states. The section on nationalism is 
illustrated through a review on identity-building in the post-Socialist states in Central 
and Eastern Europe. As China had experienced similar, albeit less dramatic political 
	   15	  
turmoil in 1989, it shows how new national identity is constructed, and how the 
impetus on nationalism served to consolidate political legitimacy after the collapse of 
Communism.  
 
This thesis focuses on the dynamics of popular nationalism in shaping China’s Japan 
policy. As presented in the introduction, this work undertakes the assumption that 
popular nationalism, foreign policy and domestic policy are all mutually constitutive. 
The second section on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) offers essential theoretical 
understanding on socio-ideational and domestic aspects of foreign policy. It opens the 
route by which foreign policy may be studied in respective to its socio-ideational, 
domestic, and cultural “inputs” and “constraints”.  
 
The third section on Constructivist approach provides the theoretical rationale to bring 
the three elements, namely popular nationalism, foreign policy and domestic politics, 
together into one interwoven, mutually constitutive dynamic.  
 
The final section of this chapter deals with the methodological aspects of my research, 
and it presents how and why interpretive methods are adopted in this study to analyse 
the dynamic interactions between popular nationalist movement, foreign policy and 
domestic implications. In addition, the section also details the scope of this research 
and the way it was conducted. 
	  
1.1	   Nationalism:	  identity	  of	  a	  nation/state?	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Despite prolific studies on the subject, ‘nationalism’ is still a somewhat loosely 
defined term. It is certainly true that nationalism emerged in Europe and the Americas 
during the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries, alongside the developing principle of 
national sovereignty (Tonnesson and Antlov, 1996: 2). As it will be illustrated below, 
several prominent scholars of nationalism have used different approaches to 
demonstrate how nationalism connects with concepts such as ‘nation’, ‘national 
identity’, and ‘nation-state’. 
	  
1.1.1	   Nationalism	  Unpacked	  
 
Anthony D. Smith, an acclaimed scholar on nationalism, defines nationalism as “a 
movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a 
population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 
‘nation’” (1991: 73). His studies on nationalism have focused on the ethnic origins of 
nations (Smith, A. D., 1986). Perhaps most importantly, Smith makes a subtle 
distinction between pre-modern ‘ethnie’ and the modern nation. For Smith, ‘ethnies’ 
refers to pre-nationalist ethnic groups, which are:  
 
named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, 
elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of 
solidarity, at least among their elites. [A nation, by contrast, is] a named human 
population which shares myths and memories, a mass public culture, a designated 
homeland, economic unity and equal rights and duties for all members (1995: 56-7).5 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See also his National Identity (1991:14). 
	   17	  
Essentially, Smith’s view on nationalism is that all modern nations have ancient ethnic 
origins and were not invented or imagined. As Tonnesson and Antlov point out, 
Smith’s ethno-culturalist approach roots nationalism in pre-modern ethnies. Thus, 
 
An ethnie becomes a nation by acquiring its own sovereign state (Germany, Poland, 
Cambodia), or a dynastic state establishes a bureaucratic culture into which its subjects 
are absorbed (China, France). In some cases it works both ways (Norway, Korea, 
Vietnam) (Tonnesson and Antlov, 1996: 15).  
 
For the ethno-culturalist, what distinguishes one ethnie/nation from another are 
language, religion, customs, symbolic places, and more importantly, a shared history. 
These elements have long been embedded in popular imagination as signs of 
difference between various groups of people. The main significance of Smith’s ethno-
culturalist approach is that it allows us to see nations as having their own national 
forms, and more significantly, as being based on distinctive historical memories.  As 
the subsequent chapters will show, history is an essential element for conceptualising 
effectively Chinese nationalism. In particular, Chinese nationalistic sentiment toward 
Japan is a product of the memories of Chinese people, as being the victims of the 
Japanese invasion and occupation.  
 
In contrast, perhaps the main criticism directed against Smith by Tonnesson and 
Antlov is that he “elevates the ethnic nation—the nation built around one ethnic 
core—to a pre-eminent form, and that he exaggerates the collective pervasiveness of 
ethnic and national identities” (1996:12). The problem here is that while his emphasis 
on ethnicity and history are certainly important for understanding nationalism, his 
‘ethnies to nation-state’ assumption cannot explain non-national ethnic groups, or 
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multi-ethnic nation states. Moreover, he also fails to offer any explanation regarding 
how and under what conditions these ethnies, as he has labelled them, are transformed 
into nations, constituting a legal-political community with a defined boundary, and 
integrated into the international system. This is relevant to my research because China 
is a multi-ethnic society and my research is not focused on ethnic nationalism, but on 
the state nationalism, where the term ‘Chinese nationalism’ implies the nationalism for 
the state of People’s Republic of China. More will be said about this below. 
 
A second approach to nationalism is the modernist approach represented by Elie 
Kedourie (1993), Benedict Anderson (1991) and Ernest Gellner (2006). The main 
assumptions of this approach are that:  
 
nationalism [is] a modern phenomenon; no national identities existed before the 
American and French Revolutions. Modern forms of state surveillance, industrial 
production and capitalist marketing depend upon the homogenization or partitioning 
of inconsistently organized societies into a standardized system…The modern nation-
state not only represents popular sovereignty but also registers and disciplines its 
citizens through laws and education. (Tonnesson and Antlov, 1996: 13-4) 
 
The foundation of Gellner’s argument, as presented in his book Nations and 
Nationalism (2006), is the distinction between the agrarian and industrial stages of 
human history. He thought of modernity as a distinctive form of social organization 
and culture, and considered nationalism to be a function of modernity (Breuilly 2006: 
xx). In contrast to Smith, Gellner denies the existence of nationalism in agrarian 
societies, situates the nationalist phenomenon primarily in the early stages of 
industrialization, and believes that it may fade away in more “mature, homogeneous” 
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industrial societies (2006: 45-6). In explaining the differences between agrarian and 
industrial societies, Gellner believes that in agrarian societies there was always a 
cultural gulf between the ruler and the ruled. High (literary) and low (non-literary) 
cultures existed simultaneously, with the high cultures being normally larger than any 
individual state, and the low cultures generally much smaller (2006: 8-18). He notes 
that:  
  
[i]n the agrarian order, to try to impose on all levels of society a universalized clerisy 
and a homogenized culture with centrally imposed norms, fortified by writing, would 
be an idle dream. Even if such a programme is contained in some theological 
doctrines, it cannot be, and is not, implemented. It simply cannot be done. The 
resources are lacking (2006: 17). 
 
Industrial society, by contrast, requires a homogeneous system of education that 
merges high and low culture, either by imposing the high culture on the population or 
by upgrading a low culture to a high culture. It is during this homogenization process, 
Gellner believes, that nationalism is generated (2006: 19-37). It is important to note 
that in Gellner’s view, the main difference between an agrarian society and an 
industrial one is the access to education. In agrarian society, Gellner stresses, only the 
powerful have access to education, thus ethnic division does not present a problem. 
However, when the cultural homogenization required by industry sets in, uneven 
access to power and education between groups that lend themselves to ethnic 
demarcation creates a problem. 6  This, in turn, “gives rise to nationalism and 
determines its form. If some groups have little access to both power and education, 
they will form their own nationalisms in opposition to their rulers” (Tonnesson and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In Gellner’s chapter on ‘industrial society’, he deals almost exclusively with culture, as opposed to 
industrial developments. He simply assumes that educational, and hence cultural, homogenization 
reflects industrial need.  
	   20	  
Antlov, 1996: 4). Gellner seems, implicitly, to define industrial society as a society 
with a standardised system of education.7 
 
Although Gellner’s analysis has clearly established a prerequisite—a modern, 
industrialised society—for the birth of nationalism, he does not provide any useful 
information as to when the transition from agrarian to industrial society occurred in 
various parts of the world (Tonnesson and Antlov 1996: 5). His readers may be left 
with the assumption that twentieth-century African and Asian nationalism is a kind of 
delayed repetition of what happened in Europe when it was industrialised. As the 
thesis will present in Chapter Two, the evolution of Chinese nationalism differs from 
that of European nationalism, since modern Chinese nationalism largely evolved from 
the period of history when China was defeated and occupied by Western Imperialist 
powers, a period dubbed by the Chinese as the ‘century of shame and humiliation’. It 
is therefore not always the case that European nationalism is a model that can be 
applied everywhere in the world.  
 
In contrast to Gellner’s model, Benedict Anderson (1991) offers an alternative 
modernist approach to nationalism by launching a sophisticated diffusionist [emphasis 
in the original] theory. He deals with the spread of nationalism geographically, from 
the Americas and Europe to its adaptation in the rest of the world. In his Imagined 
Communities, Anderson (1991) argues that the nation is a cultural construct, not in the 
sense of building on ethnical or historical tradition, as Smith put it, but in being 
collectively imagined by all those going to the same kind of school, viewing or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 He holds that industrial society has a “school-transmitted culture, not a folk-transmitted one”. 
Moreover, “[t]he agrarian age of mankind is a period in which some can read and most cannot, and the 
industrial age is one in which all can and must read” (Gellner, 1983: 34, 36, and 77). See also Smith’s 
support of Gellner’s emphasis on mass education (1995:91-2). 
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listening to the same media, sharing the same mental map of the nation and its 
surrounding world, or visiting the same museums. In other words, there is nothing 
immanent or original about the nation. It is a construct, similar everywhere, only using 
different symbols. A nation is merely an imagined community.  
 
Unlike Gellner, who finds it best to abstain from a formal definition of the term 
‘nation’, Anderson defines it as ’an imagined political community—and imagined as 
both inherently limited and sovereign‘ (1991: 6). One should note that to regard a 
community as ‘imagined’ does not mean it is ‘imaginary’. In pre-nationalist societies 
there were two main dominant cultural systems: the religious community and the 
dynastic realm: “The religious communities were not territorial but were held together 
by sacred languages, and the dynastic realm was linked to a dynasty, not to an ethnic 
group or nation” (Tonnesson and Antlov, 1996: 7). Anderson (1991) believes that the 
vehicle that carried the spread of nationalism is print capitalism, and whereas Gellner 
focuses on education, Anderson’s focus is on the media.  
 
Whilst it is essential to gain a good understanding of these three important approaches 
to ‘nationalism’, it is imperative to explain why these theories of nationalism are 
relevant to the present research? To what extent, if any, they can be fitted into the case 
of Chinese nationalism?  
 
Smith’s ethno-culturalist approach emphases the importance of shared history in the 
evolution of nationalism. This is attractive as it allows us to approach the development 
of nationalism in any given country from the angle of its own history. Socialist 
historian Eric Hobsbawm sees nationalism as having played a progressive role in an 
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earlier historical phase when populations fought for freedom from autocratic and 
imperial rule (1990: 164). China, the ancient Middle Kingdom, enjoys a particularly 
long history stretching back many thousands of years.  The modernist approaches of 
Gellner and Anderson, by contrast, largely neglect the pre-industrial period. In other 
words, they believe that the pre-industrial period has little influence on the formulation 
of nationalism. Nationalism is not seen to be the result of an historical evolution; 
rather it is a by-product of industrialization, through mass education (Gellner date), or 
through the spread of print media (Anderson date). The problem with this approach is 
its disregard of historical facts; only the narrative matters. Nations are thus in danger 
of losing whatever is left of their history. For modernist theorists, national histories are 
merely “developmental stages” (Tonnesson and Antlov 1996: 15). Despite 
overlooking the importance of history, modernist approaches do provide some relevant 
arguments, which may be applied to Chinese nationalism. For example, Gellner’s 
emphasis on the evolution of nationalism through mass education is useful when 
considering the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) post-Cold War 
nationwide campaign of patriotic education.  
 
The following section addresses the concept of national identity and its transformation 
in the case of several post-Socialist states following the ending of the Cold War, as 
this work believes that China in the post-Mao era shares some elements of national 
identity articulation with these post-socialist states. 
 
1.1.2	   ‘Who	  Are	  We?’-­‐the	  Case	  of	  Post-­‐Socialist	  States	  
 Following the ending of the Cold War, the fundamental changes in Russia and other 
Eastern European states such as Poland, Ukraine and Belarus, generated a body of 
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scholarship centred around post-Socialist nationalism. For many newly independent 
states in Central and Eastern Europe, notions of national identity have been articulated 
through historiography and literature (Prizel 1998: 3). Although, China, unlike 
Ukraine and Belarus, has had a relatively long independent statehood and freedom of 
sovereignty, the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution and later the Tiananmen Incident 
had fundamentally challenged the legitimacy of communist ideology, hence the 
legitimacy of the ruling CCP. When the central government realised that holding onto 
classic communist beliefs would be no longer possible to survive, it was in desperate 
needs to find an alternative upon which its legitimacy could be relied. Similar to other 
Eastern European states, the CCP soon located nationalism and national identity as 
the glue that gives coherence and sense to its new ideas and policies, including 
foreign policies.8 
 
If one looks closely into the political transformation of the ex-communist states in 
former central and eastern Europe, the original challenge to Soviet-style rule was not 
driven by nationalism, but by the desire of intellectuals to recreate a liberal, 
democratic civil society (Tismaneanu 1992). However, “nationalists soon came to 
dominate the process of transition and turned nationalism into the “political coin of 
the realm” in post communist Europe…Thus, the collapse of communism generally 
resulted not in the immediate triumph of tolerant, liberal democracy, but in a clear 
victory for nationalism over universalist ideology” (Prizel 1998: 6). In his book 
National Identity and Foreign Policy, Prizel (1998) attempts to bridge the link 
between nationalism/national identity and foreign policy, and to examine such 
interactions in three major states in central and eastern Europe; namely, Poland, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Detailed discussions on Chinese nationalism after Tiananmen will be presented in Chapter Two. 
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Russia and the Ukraine. As national identity by definition reflects a nation’s 
characteristics against an other, so it follows that national identity is a product of 
contact or comparison between at least two distinct groups, namely, us and other. 
Hence, “the conduct of foreign policy – namely, the relations a state has with foreign 
states – has a strong dialectical relationship with national identity, the cornerstone of 
nationalism [emphasis added]” (Prizel 1998: 8).  
 
According to Prizel, the emotional sense of nation and national identity “plays a vital 
role in forming a society’s perception of its environment and is an extremely 
important, if not driving, force behind the formation of its foreign policy because 
national identity helps to define the parameters of what a polity considers its national 
interests at home and abroad” (1998: 14). A state’s national identity is very much a 
result of how it interprets its history. Here history can be understood as a series of 
collective memories, in which beliefs and perceptions accumulates over time. Since 
collective memories of a society, much like those of individuals, are inconsistant and 
selective, the national identity is subject to transformation or munipulation by those in 
charge of the nation. Thus the transformation and manipulation of collective 
memories will often lead to a fundamental redefinition of national identity and, with 
it, the parameters of a state’s national interest, and ultimately, its foreign policy 
directions. In contrast, although, all nations derive their sense of identity from 
common ancestry, langugage, religion, geographic location, history, cultural practices 
and so on, it is the acceptance or rejection of ‘the other’ that allows states to develop a 
sense of national uniqueness. In other words, a set of unique national characteristics 
often shapes a state’s outlook on the world and forms its policies vis-à-vis its 
neighbours. More importantly, it is believed and illustrated in history that contacts, 
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preferablly prolonged contacts or war with an other, will often help to establish an 
identity. 9  In the case of China, due to the painful experiences under foreign 
occupation, one of the important values of Chinese nationalism is its rejection of 
imperialism and hegemonism, as China saw itself as a benign power vis-à-vis Western 
countries.  
 
In short, the dialectical relationship between national identity and foreign policy can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
[N]ational identity serves not only as the primary link between the individual and 
society, but between a society and the world. Foreign policy, with its role as either the 
protector or the anchor of national identity, provides the political elite with a ready tool 
for mass mobilisation and political cohesion (Prizel, 1998: 19). 
 
State socialism resulted in distinctive forms of national identity during the Soviet 
domination in the Eastern Bloc. In various ways, and at various levels, socialist 
regimes attempted to reconstruct identities, to redefine the sense of “self” and “other”, 
in a manner that accorded with the building of socialism. Kaiser (1997) notes that 
nationalism was an important issue for the communist authorities. The ideology of 
Marxism-Leninism noted that under conditions of developed socialism, with class 
antagonisms and international inequality eliminated and individuals socialised towards 
an international communist community, national identity would give way to an 
international Soviet identity:  
 
The history of nationalism under communist rule is thus sometimes stereotyped as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Bloom illustrates that England and France initially forged their national identity as as result of the 
Hundred Years War, which fostered in England the notion of the “Island of Virtue” and in France the 
national symbol of the “Maiden of Orleans” (1990: 65).  
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enforced removal of ethnocultural ties and national allegiances under an authoritarian 
state, since such nationalism was seen as alien to the project of creating an international 
fraternity of socialist states. (Young and Light, 2001: 944).  
 
Many scholars in this field have noticed that, during the Cold War, states in Central 
and Eastern Europe were forced to lose their own national characteristics, instead, they 
were encouraged to see themselves as firmly part of a “socialist-bloc”, with the West 
being regarded in terms of a hostile enemy or “other” (Young and Light, 2001: 944; 
Kratochwil et. al., 2006; and Verdery, 1993). As mentioned before, “collective 
memories” that constitute national history are an integral component of a national 
identity. The redefinitions of such identities within socialist states also required the 
construction of new national histories. Thus, under Soviet influence, pre-socialist 
historical trajectories in many Central and Eastern European states were discredited, 
and new national histories sought to present the achievements of state socialism as an 
historical inevitability. In many Soviet republics and Poland, the post-World War II 
national identities can be characterised by the politics of resentment, and state-
sponsored xenophobia towards the West. This, for example, legitimised Russia’s 
pursuit of an aggressive foreign policy with regard to the West (Prizel, 1998: 412-3; 
Young and Light, 2001: 945).  
 
The relatively stable sources of identity under socialism were disrupted or even 
demolished in the post-1989 period following the collapse of state socialism in Central 
and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union from 1991. Post-socialism presented 
governments and populations of these states with a very new and uncertain context: 
the rapid and yet dramatic processes of political and economic reform. In this context, 
Verdery (1999) argues that post-socialist change needs to be seen as more than 
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establishing democracy and a market economy. Instead it involves an entire reordering 
of people’s lives and “word of meaning” in these ex-Communist states. In terms of 
national identity, post-socialist states needed to redefine both internal and external 
consumption: that is, “who are we?” and “how do we want others to see us?” (Young 
and Light, 2001: 947).  
 
Literature on post-sociaist states tends towards two main trends in terms of redefining 
national identity, and subsequently foreign policy directions. The first trend 
concentrates on talk of a “return to Europe” and the re-orientation towards the West 
(Young and Light, 2001: 947). States like Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, 
which have historical ties with the West, showed a great desire to rejoin Europe 
following their democratic reforms. For example, Verdery (1993) carefully examines 
the ways in which post-socialist governments in Romania de-Sovietise its national 
identity. Verdery claims that the Romanian government first identified the old Soviet 
regime as the authority that had destroyed all other bases of political organisation and 
Romania’s own image and characteristics (1993: 182). Second, as she points out, the 
Romanian government skillfuly potrayed Romania as the victim of Soviet domination 
in the Cold War and emphasised the unjust suffering of the population (Verdery, 1993: 
196).  
 
The Ukraine’s experience is quite different. Prizel’s study of post-socialist national 
identity transformation in Ukraine demonstrates both pro-Russia and anti-Russia 
elements. He claims that due to a lack of a unifying national mythology and heroes, 
and as a result of close ties with Russia, most Ukrainians did not welcome calls for a 
new distinct Ukrainian political and culture awareness, especially in foreign affairs 
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and language policy. Furthermore, in the case of Ukraine, the use of nationalism, with 
Russia as the “other”, not only did not galvanize the population but actually deepened 
the regional division across Ukraine (Prizel, 1998: 372-3). As a result, Ukraine’s 
political elites initially were in favour of an assertive and nationalistic foreign policy, 
which stood strong against Russia, in order to establish and consolidate domestic 
political legitimacy following independence. Then, after realising the need to maintain 
favourable relations with Moscow, Ukainian leaders Kravchuk and later Kuchma 
appeared to have shifted Ukraine’s foreign policy back towards Russia, and away from 
nationalistic sentiments (Prizel, 1998: 378-401). 	  
 
Finally, Leshchenko’s 2004 article on post-Soviet nation-buiding in Belarus presents 
the most pro-Russian case of national identity formation and foreign policy. She 
argues that Belarus, perhaps simliar to Ukraine, witnessed both a failed and a (so far) 
successful nation-building project. Analysis of the causes of failure of one nation-
building strategy and the success of the other, within the same society, offers a deeper 
understanding of the strength and limitations of nation-building as a political 
instrument (Leshchenko, 2004: 334). These two projects are defined as “National” and 
“Soviet”.  
 
Immediately following independence, the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) – the main 
proponent of the “national” project –encouraged the government and public to get rid 
of the terms “Soviet” and “Socialist”, and promoted new state symbols and the use of 
Belarusian grammar. However, attempts to move Belarus away from Russian 
influence failed due to two main factors. First, the Belarusian language was 
insufficiently developed in the Soviet era, and was regarded as being an “inferior rural 
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vernacular” (Goujon, cited in Leshchenko 2004: 335).  Secondly, and perhaps most 
crucially, Soviet and Russian influences have been deeply rooted in Belarusian 
history. “[B]y dismissing the Soviet period as a tragic mistake, the BPF implicitly 
suggested that people should dismiss large parts of their own lives. Thus instead of 
streaming its version of national identity into the existing social outlook, the BPF 
inflicted a clash in popular mentality” (Leshchenko, 2004: 337). This eventually led to 
the unpopularity of the BPF and reconciliation of Soviet identity since 2001, which 
Leshchenko believes has largely been successful thus far (2004: 341-5).  
 
The above analysis on post-socialist nationalism has emphasised the importance of 
collective memory and the notion of ‘other’ in national identity construction. The 
construction of Chinese nationalism also heavily relied on these two elements. As it 
will be discussed in the next chapter, Chinese nationalism was evolved in the ‘century 
of shame and humiliation’. From the outset, therefore, the purpose for Chinese 
nationalism was to unite the nation and fight against the ‘others’ like Britain, Japan 
and the United States. Moreover, the collective memory of the “century of shame and 
humiliation” in general, the brutality of the Japanese invaders in particular made an 
important attribution to China’s anti-Japanese popular nationalism today.  
1.2	   Foreign	  Policy	  Analysis	  (FPA)	  
 
The earlier section focused on how nationalism is seen to separate us from other. This 
section primarily focuses on conducting relations with others. ‘Foreign policy’, in 
non-academic community, is an uncontentious, albeit vital aspect of the world of 
politics. In the field of International Relations (IR), however, the definition of 
‘foreign’ remains highly debatable (Hill 2003: 1).  For much of the post-Cold War 
era, the dominant discussions in the discipline of IR were about the changes in the 
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structure of the international system: the decline of bipolarity, and its replacement, a 
unipolar system or a drift towards multipolarity (Smith et al., 2008: 2). Moreover, in 
the past twenty years, the influence of non-state actors such as nongovernmental 
organisations and terrorist groups, has grown significantly. This has a considerable 
impact on how states nowadays conduct foreign policies. It is against this backdrop 
that a reconsideration of foreign policy has taken root among academics (Hill, 2003: 
2).  
 
1.2.1	   Definition	  
	  
To put it simply, Christopher Hill defines foreign policy as “the sum of official 
external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international 
relations” (2003: 3). The study of foreign policy is about understanding how 
sovereign communities10 perceive and react to one and another, and how sovereign 
entities shape and are shaped by the international environment around them. 
Fundamentally, it is about asking a set of questions as ‘who acts, under what 
influences, for whom and with what effect?’ It is attempting to step into “the shoes of 
the decision-makers, and enter their world,” and to see through their eyes (Smith et al., 
2008: 1). Following this set of questions, a classic definition of foreign policy is 
provided by Walter Carlsnaes:  
 
[Foreign policy entails] those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated 
goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 By using the term ‘sovereign communities’ and ‘sovereign entities’, I wish to stress that it is not 
necessary for the state to be the exclusive agent in foreign policy. Other entities and organisations have 
had a more prominent role in foreign policy in the post-Cold War international system than ever 
before. I concur that the analysis of foreign policy has traditionally focused on the state as the central 
foreign policy actor, though, it does not mean accepting the core assumptions of realism. 
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acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed towards objectives, 
conditions and actors—both governmental and non-governmental—which they want to 
affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy (Carlsnaes, 2002: 335). 
 
For Carlsnaes and many IR scholars, the processes of globalisation that gained pace in 
the post-Cold War era created a web of interdependence that undermined the state’s 
ability to control its own fate.  It can also be argued that, at the same time, the 
processes of globalisation made the state more central than ever in international 
affairs, as populations continued to look to the state to mitigate the effect of 
globalisation. Thus, “globalisation and interdependence have not withered away the 
importance of statecraft, but these processes have made it more complicated” (Smith 
et al., 2008: 3). For the analysis of foreign policy, this effect has made the mutually 
influential interactions between sovereign entities and the international settings much 
more intricate. Policy towards one particular state or in one area of international 
system may have wider and increasingly more complex implications in elsewhere. For 
example, by posturing a tougher stance towards Japan, China may not only damage its 
enormous bilateral trade with Japan, but it will undoubtedly also raise strong 
suspicions about the intentions of China’s rise to regions beyond the Asia-Pacific.    
 
 A second area where foreign policy is of growing relevance is in terms of its 
contribution to how the behaviour of international actors is understood. Just as the 
international system can be studied according to various IR theories, foreign policy 
too can be analysed in the same theoretical framework.  
 
1.2.2	   FPA	  Framework	  	  
Foreign Policy Analysis seeks to explain foreign policy, or foreign policy behaviour. 
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It takes as its “theoretical ground the human decision makers, acting singly and in 
groups that make foreign policy” (Hudson, 2008: 28). By analysis is meant not just 
the necessary breaking down of foreign policy into its constituent parts, concepts and 
processes, and the examination of the impact of its various environments. It also 
attempts to draw out deeper meaning than appear on the surface. In context of foreign 
policy, it is seeking to explain and understand action in terms of the way actors 
(mainly the state) constantly redefine themselves through interaction with others. The 
interplay, Hill proclaims, indeed overlaps, between “the domestic and the external 
sources of behaviour is central to any modern understanding of what foreign policy 
does, just as the interplay between the interior and exterior worlds is the way in to 
understanding an individual’s behaviour” (2003: xix). Understanding how foreign 
policy decisions are arrived at and implemented, and with what eventual 
consequences and implications, is not a straightforward matter. FPA provides a 
framework for studying the interplay between individual state actors and the 
international system; and between domestic and external politics.  
 
The principal theoretical ground that characterises FPA is twofold. First, FPA helps to 
explain or understand decisions taken by human decision makers with regard to 
entities external to their nation-state. This is the ‘explanandum’, or that which is to be 
explained in FPA (Hudson, 2007: 4) Thus, theoretical and empirical studies on 
foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) have long been central to FPA (Snyder et. 
al., 2002; Rosenau, 1980; Hollis and Smith, 1986). Usually, such decisions lead to 
attempts to influence directly targeting at external entities, but they may sometimes 
include decisions that target the domestic audience, which, in turns, have 
ramifications for foreign entities. As the case studies in this thesis will show, there is a 
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valid argument that, since the end of the Cold War, China’s perceived rise of popular 
nationalism has affected Beijing’s domestic policy considerations as much as its 
Japan policy. Moreover, foreign policy analysts may look at more than one decision 
concerning the matter, and may also focus on the different stages of decision-making, 
from problem recognition, framing, and perception to more advanced stages of 
prioritisation, contingency planning, and option assessment (Hudson, 2007: 4). 
Second, FPA seeks to identify factors that influence the decision-making process and 
more critically, the foreign policy decision makers, collectively termed as ‘explanans’ 
of FPA (Hudson, 2005: 2; Hudson, 2007: 5). Together with the ‘explanandum’, FPA 
scholars take a view that the explanation of foreign policy has many factors (Hudson, 
2005: 2). As a result of the complex nature of foreign policy in general and FPDM in 
particular, for FPA scholars, it is essential to identify and explain any influential or 
determinant factor, external or internal, that affects the foreign policy decision-
making and hence policy outcome. As a result, reflecting the diverse, comparative and 
multidisciplinary nature of the field, FPA integrates a variety of information across 
different levels of analysis, and spans numerous disciplines of sciences, from 
economics, sociology to geography and human psychology. It has been suggested 
that, “of all subfields of IR, FPA is the most radically integrative [emphasis in the 
original] theoretical enterprise” (Hudson, 2007: 6).  
 
As the theoretical framework of FPA focusing on human decision makers, FPA places 
a strong emphasis on agent-oriented theory with an actor-specific orientation 
(Hudson, 2007: 6). It aims to open up the ‘black box’ of foreign policy to the level of 
individual human decision makers and places human behaviour under study. For 
instance, to explain the nationalism’s influence on China’s Japan policy, FPA is 
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interested in somehow finding out the answers as to ‘whether’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ the 
behaviour of the group of individuals that are directly involved policy making being 
affected by popular nationalism. By the same token, Hudson has noted that only the 
specific decision makers (or actors) involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis in their 
respective states could explain that crisis (Hudson, 2005: 3). 
1.2.3	   Level	  of	  Analysis	  	  
One of the most interesting debates in social science during recent years has 
concerned the relationship between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ (McAnulla, 2002; Wendt, 
1987 and 1999; Friedman and Starr, 1997; and Cerny, 1990). In its simple terms, the 
debate has been about whether agents (those who are capable of action, or actors) are 
shaped by structure. Structure, broadly speaking, are “the set of factors which make 
up the multiple environments in which agents operate, and they shape the nature of 
choices, by setting limits to the possible but also, more profoundly, by determining 
the nature of the problems which occur there, by shaping our very life-worlds” (Hill, 
2003: 26). It is worth noting that structure exists at all levels, from the family to the 
international system. In foreign policy, structure does not only refer to the 
international system. As Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (1986) excellently 
demonstrated in their work, domestic system, bureaucracy and social structures are all 
of vital importance to the foreign policy making process. Moreover, FPA generally 
does not treat structures as static and concrete entities. Hill has suggested that 
structures are “as much conceptual as concrete entities because they often represent 
processes, or patterns of interaction” (Hill, 2003: 26). Furthermore, since structures 
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are constantly influenced by agents, they are always not regarded as fixed units with 
precise and easily definable qualities.11  
 
Agents, for their part, are the entities capable of decisions with actions in any given 
context. They may be a single individual or collectives. Their decisions may be made 
by conscious intentions or by behaviour that at least in part does not result from 
deliberation. In the context of foreign policy, decision-making choices may be 
restricted, and may also result from misperception and miscalculation during the 
assessment and evaluation phases.12 As discussed in the previous section, FPA is more 
interested in human actions in foreign policy decision-makings, as opposed to the 
state under realist assumptions in IR theory. Therefore, I concur with Hill that the 
term ‘actor’ is preferable to that of ‘agent’ (Hill, 2003: 27). In the case of China, for 
instance, actors in China’s foreign policy decision-making generally consist of the 
Politburo Standing Committee and the Foreign Affairs Small Leading Group. 
 
The problem with the structure and agency debate in IR theory, as introduced by 
Alexander Wendt, is the one originating from two truisms: “(1) human beings and 
their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform 
the society in which they live; and (2) society is made up of social relationships which 
structure the interactions between these purposeful actors” (1987: 337-8). If one 
follows his line of thought on human beings in society, the problem is that we lack “a 
self-evident way to conceptualize these entities and their relationship” (Wendt, 1987: 
338; see also Hollis and Smith, 1991: 393-4). This appears to be an ontological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Fuller treatment on the dynamic relations between structure and agency are provided in ‘Towards A 
Constructivist Approach’ section. 
12 See Jarvis (1976), an excellent and comprehensive study on perception and misperception in 
international politics. His later works (1986; and Jarvis et al., 1985) went further to investigate the 
psychological impact on perception and judgement in FPDM.  
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problem of how to clearly conceptualise one entity, namely, structure or agency. In 
other words, according to Wendt, it seems that conceptualisation of structure cannot 
exist separately from that of agency, and vice versa.  Although quite a number of 
well-developed theoretical threads in IR covering the phenomena such as institutions, 
systems, group dynamics, domestic politics, attempts at integrating multiple 
theoretical points-of-departure are typically absent or even resisted (Hudson 2002: 4). 
In the context of FPA, it can be argued that the ‘level-of analysis problem’ occurs 
when many theoretical efforts posit that phenomena can be best explained by a focus 
on a certain level of analysis, either domestic politics or the international system. In 
order to address this concern, FPA scholars have conducted extensive research into 
both micro and macro levels of analysis, with some even integrating the two together 
(Zhao, 1996).  
 
Dual-­‐Aspect	  Setting13	  
The groundbreaking work in FPA by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin views foreign policy 
decision makers as “operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated 
internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision-makers” 
(Snyder et. al., 2002: 75).] Decision-makers operating within this dual-aspect setting 
must simultaneously play a ‘two-level game’. Robert Putnam (1988) has likened the 
decision makers to players simultaneously playing on two linked game boards: the 
game board of domestic politics and the game board of international politics. What 
happens in international politics cannot fail to have an effect on domestic politics; 
outputs of domestic politics certainly have an impact on international politics. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The term is borrowed from Snyder et. al. (2002).  
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Similarly, James Rosenau (1967), regarded as the pioneer of FPA14 and the first 
academic to conceptualise the domestic sources of foreign policy, also agreed that 
scholars shall systematically and scientifically break down the divide between internal 
and external factors in analysing a nation state’s behaviour. Furthermore, he added 
that to “recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors 
is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which 
one predominates over the other” (Rosenau, 1966: 98). It must be stressed that in this 
dual-aspect setting, there is a two-way flow arising from the distinction between the 
foreign and the domestic. In other words, as Hill puts it, “foreign policy has its 
domestic sources, and domestic policy has its foreign influences” (2003: 39). 
 
Within this dual-aspect setting, numerous research pathways were developed to 
theorise all aspects of foreign policy decision making (FPDM), such as small groups 
dynamics (Snyder et al., 2002; Janis, 1982; Hermann, 1978; and Vertzberger, 1990), 
organisational and bureaucratic processes (Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Halperin, 1974; 
and Allison and Halperin, 1972), and psychological and societal settings of FPDM15 
(Sprout, H. and Sprout, T., 1956; and 1965; Jarvis et. al., 1985; Jarvis, 1986; and 
Cottam, 1977). These works are very significant in terms of having laid a sound 
theoretical foundation for FPA practitioners to build their empirical studies upon. 
Nonetheless, as this research is not wholly centred on the theorisation of FPA, more 
prominent concentration will be placed on the three theoretical elements that appears 
to routinely be faced by foreign policy decision makers; namely domestic politics-
foreign policy, action-reaction-interaction,16 and national/culture-foreign policy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 According to Hudson (2008: 14). 
15 Hudson (2007: Ch 3) provides a good summary of the literature on group decision–making: small 
group dynamics and bureaucratic politics.  
16 This term is borrowed from Snyder et. al. (2002: 55). 
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1.2.4	   Domestic	  Politics	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  	  
 
If war is the continuation of politics by other means, pace Clausewitz, then it is 
certainly also the case that many times foreign policy is simply that continuation of 
domestic politics by other means (Hudson, 2007: 125) 
 
Foreign policy decision makers often have to face many different directions at once. 
Arguably, one of the most critical aspects for decision makers is how to deal with the 
‘inside’ of their own community. One may even further this argument, as did Hudson, 
to say that the decision makers serve their own state, and ultimately are responsible 
for their own constituents ‘inside’, as opposed to the ‘outside’ for which they have no 
formal responsibility. In other words, the root of foreign policy is a domestic one, “the 
domestic and the foreign…literally make no sense except in relation to each other”17 
(Hill, 2003: 219). On the one hand, foreign policy outcomes are heavily influenced by 
events that are primarily ‘domestic’. For example, during the Cultural Revolution, 
China was in a complete self-imposed isolation from diplomatic ties with most other 
sates, due to the irrational Communism rhetoric being filled in the whole country. On 
the other hand, foreign policy significantly impacts upon domestic politics. The latter 
chapters will demonstrate how easy it is for domestic-based popular nationalism to be 
erupted in China as a result of diplomatic frictions with Japan. Domestic politics and 
foreign policy thus have a mutually influential relationship. This section deals with 
these two interdependent dimensions and discusses the general relationship between 
the domestic and the foreign. Since this research focuses on foreign policy, the main 
attention is therefore focused on the domestic influences on foreign policy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This is not, however, to say that they are identical. 
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What does the notion of ‘domestic influences’ refer to? Here, Hill remarks that it is 
important to distinguish between the different ways in which the “domestic 
environment impinges on foreign policy” (2003: 220). For Hill, the term ‘domestic 
sources’ implies that the domestic sphere provides both inputs and constraints for 
foreign policy. However, it is arguable whether ‘inputs’ or ‘constraints’ depend on the 
points of view of the foreign policy decision makers. For instance, if the decision 
maker agrees with the lobbyist on a particular issue in foreign policy, then it can be 
said that a domestic lobby has successfully managed to convey the opinion across to 
the decision maker and has made ‘inputs’ in foreign policy decision-making. Equally, 
same scenario may also be interpreted as the strong domestic lobby on this particular 
foreign policy has put ‘constraints’ on foreign policy makers, limiting their freedom 
of manoeuvre and policy choices. Strong opinions of the French farmers, inhibiting 
any wish the French government might have to reform the Common Agricultural 
Policy of the European Union (EU), is a well-known example. Contrary to Hill’s 
claim, which ‘input’ and ‘constraints’ need to be specified separately (2003: 220-1), 
this thesis takes the position that rather than distinguish domestic ‘inputs’ from 
‘constraints’, it is more important to investigate the dynamic interactions between 
domestic and international politics. Laura Neack nicely summarises this double-sided 
nature of foreign policy18:  
 
Foreign policy is neither fish nor fowl in the study of politics, but an empirical subject 
matter straddling the boundary between the internal and the external spheres of a state. 
Such policy is conducted in complex internal and international environments; it results 
from coalitions of active actors and groups situated both inside and outside state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Hill also notes: “Foreign policy is at hinge of domestic politics and international relations” (2003: 
23). 
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boundaries; its substance emanates from issues of both domestic and international 
politics; and it involves processes of bargaining and compromise affecting the interests 
of both domestic and international groupings (Neack, 2003: 8-11). 
 
The domestic-foreign paradigm in FPA makes four important assumptions. First, 
scholars of FPA argue that the nature of domestic influence on foreign policy is multi-
dimensional; single-factor explanations rarely convince where multiple actors and 
levels of activity, such as decision-making, are involved. Studies of domestic 
influences on foreign policy cover all aspects of domestic politics, but most notably 
bureaucratic and organisational structures (see for example, Allison and Zelikow, 
1999; Halperin, 1974; and Allison and Halperin, 1972); the media and public opinion 
(e.g. Craig, 1976; Risee-Kappen, 1991; Jordan and Page, 1992; Hoge, 1994; Robinson, 
1999; Soroka, 2003; Frensley and Michaud, 2006; and Mor, 2006); and culture and 
identity in foreign policy (Hudson 1997, 1999; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; 
Katzenstein, 1996; Schafer, 1999; Hudson and Sampson; Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; 
and Nabers, 2009). Hill explains, “the internal affairs of most transnational actors are 
too robust to be dominated by one pressure group, or set of stake-holders” (2003: 221). 
Consequently, when looking into the impact of the domestic on foreign policy, one 
needs not only to identify multiple factors, but also to seek to answer why and how 
these factors impact on foreign policy.  
 
Secondly, in order to capture the inextricability of foreign and domestic concerns 
from the viewpoint of the policy maker, FPA believes that decision makers are always 
faced with these two sets of concerns, and that the two sets of concerns continually 
interact. As discussed above, foreign policy decision makers work in a dual-aspect 
setting, where they are seen as playing politics simultaneously on two levels, the 
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domestic and the international (Putnam, 1988). Therefore, foreign policy must be 
understood as a continuous stream of domestic inputs, no less than international.  
 
Furthermore, the notion of a stream of domestic input in foreign policy goes well 
beyond the image of decision makers simply juggling two balls, domestic issues and 
international politics. Ideational factors such as culture, values, and identity also 
shape the perception of the policy maker; hence, they subsequently impact foreign 
policy. Finally, no foreign policy can be implemented without a domestic grounding. 
In other words, it cannot be taken for granted that domestic support will ultimately 
sustain foreign policy. If the support for a foreign policy, either in domestic politics or 
among the general public, weakens, it will damage the political administration of the 
regime at the very least, and may even lead to the complete change of the domestic 
political landscape.  The United States’ prolonged involvement in Vietnam, and Tony 
Blair’s recent unpopular war in Iraq proved domestically unsupported foreign policy 
decisions may destabilise the domestic political landscape. 
 
Having identified the proximity of domestic actors to foreign policy decision-making 
positions, it is then worth observing how cohesive or fragmented each actor is. Joe 
Hagan (1993) has developed the variable of regime fragmentation, in which he 
classifies regimes according to the degree to which a regime is plagued by divisions. 
For example, his scale classifies as least fragmented (or most cohesive) those that are 
dominated by a single leader and classified as most fragmented those regimes that are 
a coalition of autonomous political groups with no clear dominant group. Thus, 
Hagan finds that the more fragmented the regime, the more constraints it faces in 
foreign policy (Hudson, 2007: 129). Helen Milner (1997) supports Hagan’s argument, 
	   42	  
as she too believes that divided regimes are less likely to be able to cooperate 
internationally.  
 
In addition to proximity and cohesiveness, Hudson further notes that the size of the 
domestic actor in question and the degree of difference in viewpoint between the 
domestic actor and the regime’s foreign policy are also essential factors for 
determining the relative influence of a domestic actor on foreign policy (2007: 129-
130). The bigger the size of domestic public opinion and the greater the difference in 
view point, the greater the degree of influence of domestic considerations may place 
over the external issue at hand. For instance, broader society may generally be located 
distant from the state’s foreign policy decision-making core, and public opinions may 
often not so homogenous. That said, the size of the general public is however 
enormous. Therefore, if the public generates a largely cohesive opinion, which has a 
great degree of difference from that of the decision-maker, over a particular foreign 
policy, it then becomes a powerful force that is likely to significantly affect the 
decision-making and/or the outcome of the policy in question. In other words, public 
opinion may have considerable weight over foreign policy, if it is strong and unified, 
despite being far away from the decision-making institution. 
 
A final dimension to the study of the characteristics of domestic attributes to foreign 
policy is how active a particular foreign policy actor has been on a given foreign 
policy issue. Large, powerful domestic actors can be totally disinterested in a 
particular foreign policy (Hudson, 2007: 130). Similarly, it is perfectly conceivable 
that for many foreign policy decisions, the general public may remain largely 
disinterested hence inactive to which policy direction the regime may take. This 
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brings out another fundamental conceptual belief in FPA, which is that the relations 
between foreign policy and its determinants never remain static, and are constantly 
evolving through interactions over time and over different issues. Similar to the 
theoretical foundations of Constructivism, this thesis has taken the view that these 
factors, being foreign policy, domestic politics, identity or international system, are 
not static concepts, but mutually constituted with one another. In order to analyse this 
complex relationship, it is time to introduce the second of the three paradigms, 
namely action-reaction-interaction theory.  
 
The domestic ‘inputs’ and ‘constrain’ to foreign policy are important to the 
understanding of the role of popular nationalism in shaping foreign policy decisions. 
Nationalistic sentiment and public opinions, this study argues, would place pressure 
on decision makers to adopt a tougher stance and policy, otherwise, the nationalistic 
public opinion, as shown in Chapter Five, could quickly turn against the state.  
 
1.2.5	   Action,	  Reaction	  and	  Interaction	  	  
 
Actions in foreign policy are perhaps the most valuable and tangible subjects for FPA 
scholars. They are often the starting point for researcher to open up the ‘black box’ of 
foreign policy. This is because there is always a great degree of secrecy surrounding 
issues concerning foreign policy, thus it is nearly impossible for FPA researchers to 
witness the whole decision-making process. Moreover, in authoritarian states like 
China, it is unfeasible for researchers to establish a direct personal contact with the 
decision-maker. The decision-maker in question may not necessarily need to come out 
and explain rationales behind foreign policy actions. As a result, it is usually the case 
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for FPA scholars to use actions, reactions and interactions as the point of departure to 
interpret and understand foreign policy.  
 
Snyder et. al.—being regarded as one of the first [originally published in 1962] and 
most comprehensive works on FPA—observed that:  
 
we believe that those who study international politics are mainly concerned with the 
actions, reactions, and interactions among political entities called national states. 
Emphasis on action suggests process [emphasis original] analysis, that is, the passage 
of time plus continuous changes in relationship—including the conditions underlying 
change and its consequences. Since there is a multiplicity of actions, reactions, and 
interactions, analysis must be concerned with a number of processes [emphasis 
original] (Snyder et. al., 2002: 55). 
 
Foreign policy actions take many forms, such as declarations, formal agreements, 
diplomatic meetings, official visits, financial assistance, armed conflicts, and so on. In 
general, action arises from the need to establish, to maintain and to regulate contact 
between states. It represents a planned attempt—rather than random behaviour—to 
achieve certain aims.19 Snyder et. al. noted the components required for actions to 
exist; namely actor(s), goals, means and situation (2002: 58). They went further to 
explain:  
 
[t]he situation is defined by the actor (or actors) in terms of the way the actor (or 
actors) relates himself to other actors, to possible goals, and to possible means, and in 
terms of the way means and ends are formed into strategies of action subject to relevant 
factors in the situation. These ways of relating himself to the situation (and thus of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For theories of action, see Parsons and Shils (1953). 
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defining it) will depend on the nature of the actor—or his orientations” (Snyder et. al., 
2002: 58).  
 
Reactions take the same form, only they are viewed as responses (Snyder et. al., 2002: 
55-6). Here, two concepts need to be clarified further. First, ‘the situation’, coined by 
Snyder et. al., represents the setting and circumstance that decision-makers may be 
faced upon in FPDM. Not only does this include the policy issue itself, but it may also 
incorporate the projected action as well as the reasons for the action by decision-
makers. Understanding the way decision-makers as actors define their situation is the 
key to the explanation of why the state behaves the way it does (Snyder et. al., 2002: 
59). In order to comprehend how decision-makers define their situation, it is therefore, 
according to Snyder et. al., necessary to analyse decision-makers (actors) in the 
following terms: (a) what are their rational perceptions towards objects, conditions 
and their counterparts (decision-makers from other states in context)?; (b) what do 
they aim to achieve from the outcome—the foreign policy objectives, and how are 
these objectives established?; (c) what are the likely impacts of the possible courses of 
action—the estimated significance of the projected action; (d) what are the norms, 
common practices, and ‘standard of acceptability’ for dealing the issues in question 
(Snyder et. al., 2002: 59). 
 
Snyder et. al. identified three features of the orientation of foreign policy decision-
makers: perception, choice, and expectation (2002: 59). It can be argued that these 
features are outcomes of the analysis involved in defining the situation. Perception 
arises from both policy makers’ assessment of objects and conditions; and the norms 
and ‘standard of acceptability’, which incorporates cultural norms. Policy choices are 
first and foremost dependent on foreign policy objectives and the significance of the 
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perceived courses of action. Moreover, the application of norms and common 
practices may also narrow the number of alternative choices (Snyder et. al., 2002: 59). 
Finally, decision-makers’ expectations can be identified by assessing the foreign 
policy objectives and the likely impacts of foreign policy actions. Within this context, 
nationalism, being an ideational factor, helps policy makers to contract a distinctive 
set of perception towards another state, which in turn helps to shape policy 
orientations (e.g. friends or foes).  
 
It should be stressed that the action-reaction-interaction suggests that sequences of 
action and interaction are not always linear and closed. This implies that, first, there 
may be more than two states involved in a certain foreign policy issue. Actions and 
reaction of all participants may or may not have a reciprocal relationship (Snyder et. 
al., 2002: 55). For instance, if state A acts, states B and C then respond to state A, 
therefore, state A has a reciprocal relationship with both states B and C. There is 
nevertheless no interaction between states B and C. Second, as previously 
demonstrated, not only is this paradigm applicable to interstate relations, but it may 
also explain intrastate relations, between domestic politics and foreign policy within 
one state. In other words, it is worth exploring actions, reactions and interactions in 
both interstate and intrastate relations when analysing foreign policy. FPA may apply 
this paradigm at various levels of analysis, be it at international level, where the state 
as a whole being the actor, or at state level, where individual decision-makers being 
the actor. Third, this thesis examines how internal actions, reactions and interaction 
between domestic politics, identity and foreign policy provide the conditions in which 
foreign policy decision-makers conduct their interstate action and reactions. This 
assumption is central for the construction of the thesis’s theoretical framework, which 
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attempts to combine two dialectical paradigms, namely nationalism-domestic politics, 
and nationalism-foreign policy by adopting a constructivist approach.  
 
1.2.6	   Culture	  and	  Foreign	  Policy	  	  
During the Cold War period, the effects of culture and national identity on foreign 
policy were arguably overlooked in favour of ‘realpolitik’ and ideological struggle.  
Intense rivalry between the two superpowers possibly dwarfed ideational factors in 
foreign policy (Hudson, 2007: 103).  Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a 
great increase of academic interest in cultural and identity politics, with many works 
focusing on both theoretical and empirical studies of cultural and ideational influences 
in foreign policy (e.g. Hudson, 1997; 1999; and 2007; Huntington, 1993; and 2002; 
Pye, 1991; Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; and Katzenstein, 1996).  This sudden 
flourishing of cultural studies within the broader discipline of Political Science 
(Inglehart, 1988) and more particularly FPA, placed national identity and culture as 
important factors among the considerations that shape foreign policy decision-making.  
As deliberated in previous sections, when one inquires about the process of foreign 
policy decision-making and the determinants of foreign policy outcomes, one simply 
cannot ignore the fundamental socialisation that political leaders receive in their 
respective national culture. This socialisation, as Hudson expresses, “filled with 
history and legend, heroes and enemies, successes and failures, God and luck, form[s] 
much of the basic architecture of political belief systems” (2007: 103). Hence, it is 
simply not feasible for one to interpret Chinese foreign policy without an adequate 
understanding of Chinese culture and history, for example. For this thesis, it is 
unachievable to research China’s relations with Japan without a good reference to the 
deep traditional Confucian cultural influence on China’s self-perceived position in the 
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world vis-à-vis the resentment held by many in the country against Japan due to the 
antagonist contemporary history between the two states. 
 
Cultural differences affect behaviour in most parts of our social life, including foreign 
policy decision-making. Most scholarly studies on culture are to be found in fields of 
anthropology, sociology and other related disciplines. Early attempts by IR scholars to 
examine the national cultural character’s impact on foreign policy before the end of 
the Cold War attracted criticisms, most notably by Lucian Pye, who asserted that 
culture quickly becomes “the explanation of last resort” (1991: 504), whereby the 
scholar only ascribes ‘cultural differences’ to anything that cannot be explained by 
existing theories of FPA. This is merely stating the existence of cultural differences 
and what the differences are, but it fails to explain why differences occur, as actual 
reasons for the differences had never been properly theoretically addressed in FPA.20  
It is against the backdrop of the actor-specific theory gaining increasing popularity in 
FPA (Hudson, 2005) and the general political condition of the post-Cold War world, 
that cultural research has been incorporated into the studies of foreign policy.21  
 
Culture as a sociological concept, can be very straightforward and yet extremely 
elusive.  It is a straightforward concept because everyone has experienced interactions 
with someone who does something differently from one’s own actions, due to a 
diverse cultural background. Different customs, different traditions, different ways of 
meeting people and doing things and so on, are all very tangible and real.  In contrast, 
culture becomes rather elusive when one attempts to clearly define it in a theoretical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Pye argues that the explanations such as “the Chinese act that way because that is the Chinese way” 
are never explanations at all (1988: 6). 
21 The first book in the post-Cold War era exclusively on theoretical research agenda of culture and 
foreign policy is Hudson (1997). 
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sense:  “The difficulty is not so much centred on what to include in such a definition, 
but rather what to exclude [emphasis in the original]” (Hudson, 1997: 2).  If one takes 
the assumption that the human mind is subjective and that cultural difference is one of 
the most primary and significant factors to differentiate this subjection, culture can 
thus be anything and everything in one’s mind.  Culture may be “any interpersonally 
shared system of meanings, perceptions, and values” (Jacquin et. al., 1993: 375). 
Studies on culture have long been a prominent sub-field in anthropology and 
sociology.  Numerous scholars have attempted to conceptualise culture,22 and all 
definitions seem to emphasise culture as shared patterns of meanings embodied in 
common knowledge and symbols that are historically transmitted to distinct human 
groups by means of language.  It is through this system of meanings, namely culture, 
that people adapt to the structure of their lives and conduct interpersonal activities.  
Fundamentally, culture, like nationalism, is not a static concept. On the one hand, it 
constitutes an in-group characteristic structure under which people interact with both 
inside and outside. Culture on the other hand is constantly redeveloped and 
reconstituted by these interactions.  When it comes to explaining foreign policy, 
however, such a general definition of culture can hardly contribute towards a useful 
and practical theoretical framework of analysis, because indeed all human activity—
including foreign policy—becomes both “a product of and a component of culture” 
(Hudson, 1997: 3).  In order to identify and analyse the impact of culture on foreign 
policy, one must deconstruct culture as a social concept. 
 
First and foremost, culture is a system of shared meanings.  Social anthropologist 
such as Clifford Geertz provided ways to interpret this system of shared meaning—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See for example for some definitions of culture, Geertz (1973); LeVine (1973); D’Andrade (1984); 
and Triandis (1994). 
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how is it constructed, perpetuated, and modified—through detailed observations as a 
result of being embedded into the society in question.23  Because meanings are shared 
through interpersonal expressions, such as conversations, media, art, writing and 
music, Geertz argues that it is essential to understand all of these so called “symbols” 
from the in-group perspective (or thick description, to adopt Geertz’s description), as 
opposed to observing as an outsider24 (1973: 3-33). When comparing certain social 
phenomenon from one culture to another, cultural differences are discovered.  
Consequently, the interface between culture and foreign policy can be established 
through studying and comparing shared meanings (culture) in foreign policy and 
foreign policy making.  Rather than accepting preferences, beliefs and perceptions in 
international relations, as Realist scholars, a new generation of scholars asks how they 
are formed (Hudson, 1997: 10).  For example, researchers in Chinese foreign policy 
and nationalism have often noted juxtaposed and yet contradictory meanings of 
national identity widely shared in contemporary Chinese society. On the one hand, the 
pride of 5000 years of glorious civilisation, and the humiliation of being victim at the 
hand of Western and Japanese imperialism on the other. As fuller discussion will be 
offered later, this profound shared system of meanings forms the core value for 
Chinese popular nationalism. 
  
Second, foreign policy is a formal affair of one state with another. From a cultural 
perspective, foreign policy is at the frontline of cultural clashes, as relations with out-
groups easily expose cultural differences. In the aforementioned us v others debate on 
national identity, “out-groups serve simultaneously as source of national identity (we 
are not like them) and as a threat to national identity (we must resist becoming like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See his famous study on Balinese cockfight (Geertz, 1973: 412-454). 
24 Particularly, see the discussion on two boys winking (Geertz, 1973: 5-7). 
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them)” (Hudson, 1997: 11). The cultural divide constantly occurs in the state’s 
relations with other states; thus, the temptation and rationale to theorise one state’s 
culture with how it performs in international relations is fairly strong.   
 
Finally, culture indicates our preferences, tells us what to want, to prefer, to desire. It 
represents a social value. Understandings of culture may help researchers to interpret 
certain predictable behaviour. For example, the Chinese strongly hold Confucian 
values, including the Doctrine of the Mean (中庸 or the Middle Way), and The Ethic 
of Reciprocity (never impose upon others what you do not choose for yourself).  
These core cultural references have greatly influenced China’s foreign policy 
strategies for over 50 years. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence25 put forward 
by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1954 epitomise the Confucian rule of Ethic of Reciprocity. 
Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character26 strategy on foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, 
to observe calmly, keep a low profile, and try not to become the leader, is attributed to 
the Doctrine of the Mean. In addition, China’s tendency to passing moral judgement 
upon other states and to claiming the moral high ground in international affairs could 
also be argued to be in line with Confucian teachings on virtue and morality 
supremacy rule.  
 
Due to the elusive nature of being anything and everything, in practice, it is rather 
difficult to first prove the causal link between cultural variables and foreign policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 They are 1) mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territory integrity; 2) mutual non-
aggression; 3) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; 
and 5) peaceful coexistence.  
26 The 24 characters are: 冷静观察，站稳脚跟，沉着应付，韬光养晦，善于守拙，决不当头 
(observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; 
be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership). 
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outcomes.  It is then not always possible to directly observe cultural effects on foreign 
policy. Yaacov Vertzberger sums up this problem perfectly: 
 
It is extremely difficult to positively prove the casual links, direct and indirect, between 
societal-cultural variables and foreign-policy-related information processing.  The 
difficulty in directly observing societal-cultural effects, however, does not prove the 
opposite, that is, that societal-cultural influences are minor or negligible (Vertzberger, 
1990: 261). 
 
Holsti’s work (1970) on national role conception made an important contribution in 
solving this problem by expanding the cultural syndrome onto a national level. It 
describes how a nation’s leader conducts activities with respect to foreign relations 
through the articulated vision of both his/her nation’s and the subjected nation’s role 
in world affairs that the leader holds. This vision, Holsti argues, corresponds to deep 
cultural beliefs about the nation.  However, it is not until the rise of Constructivism in 
IR that the theoretical bridge between identity, culture and foreign policy has been 
neatly constructed.27  
 
1.3	   Towards	  A	  Constructivist	  Approach	  
 
Having deconstructed several principal concepts for this research, this section 
explores the core theoretical assumption of this thesis. The section will first discuss a 
Constructivist approach towards FPA, and why it provides a logical theoretical 
assumption from which to engage this research. By adopting a Constructivist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Vendulka Kubalkova’s edited volume (2001) for a well-structured study on introducing 
Constructivism into Foreign Policy Analysis.   
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approach, this study argues, the primary elements of the thesis, namely popular 
nationalism, foreign policy and domestic politics, may be theoretically connected.  	  
It is well documented that an academic split between FPA and IR occurred in 1950s, 
when scholars of foreign policy and international relations went their separate ways 
(Kubalkova, 2001b: 19). Whilst IR placed structure—the anarchic nature of 
international system—as the prominent feature of consideration, FPA was more 
interested in the agent—decision-making bodies—in international politics and 
traditionally downplayed the importance of structure.   
 
Since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, with the ending of the Cold War, 
Constructivism as a new approach was introduced to IR, which seeks to break down 
the FPA/IR divide.28 Mainstream Constructivists disapprove of the way FPA/IR split 
developed (Palan, 2000), as they strongly argue that agent and structure “should never 
be torn apart nor should one be given priority over the other” (Kubalkova, 2001b: 19).  
In other words, mainstream Constructivism renounces favouritism towards either the 
structure or the agent. Instead, it stresses that emphasis should be placed on processes 
of social construction. As a result, unlike Realism, which focuses on material 
capability or “brutal facts” (Brown, 2001), Constructivism seek “social facts”, which 
depend for their existence on “what we believe about them, and indeed whether we 
believe in them at all” (Houghton, 2007: 28). Moreover, Constructivists believe that 
social meaning is the principal concept in IR. In other words, the question of “how 
facts are interpreted?” is far more important than the facts themselves. Essentially, 
sovereignty, power, and material capability have no meaning for Constructivists until 
an interpretation and perception is placed upon them. The most crucial elements in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Nicolas Onuf was first to introduce the term “Constructivism”.  See Onuf (1989). 
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human society are human beings, as it is they who have the capacity to change 
meanings (by altering interpretations). Human beings or agents do not exist in 
isolation from the structures they create (Onuf, 1989). To put it simply, in a 
mainstream Constructivist world everything depends on what individuals or states 
make of it (Wendt, 1992; and Palan, 2000).   
 
In his influential volume Social Theory of International Politics (1999), Alexander 
Wendt defines Constructivism as follows: 
 
Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the 
following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international 
political theory; (2) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than 
material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these 
social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or 
domestic politics (Wendt, 1999: 193). 
 
The core assumption of Constructivism is that agents and structures are mutually 
constitutive.  Human beings (agents) evolve within the society (structures) they have 
created; the society advances along with the evolution of human beings.  In IR terms, 
states (agents) exist and develop within the international system (structure) that 
progresses through actions and interactions between states.  While not denying the 
importance of material factors, ontologically speaking, Constructivists believe that the 
social world is being made by people who in turn are made, thus the world is seen as a 
never-ending construction project (Kubalkova, 2001c: 58-61).   
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But how are the interpretations done? What elements do we use to decode actions? 
This brings another central assumption for Constructivism; that is “ideas matter”, in 
particular collective ideas and norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). This is an 
important assumption to demonstrate the co-constitution of structure and agency.  
Ideas and ideational factors are critical for Constructivists. It is through the 
construction of both identities and interests that mutual constitution occurs (Houghton, 
2007: 29). Here, for Constructivists, ideas or ideational factors can be any 
determinants that are influential to our perception and belief system. While 
nationalism, for example, may be taken as an ideational factor as a whole, it may also 
be deconstructed into various smaller ideas or norms, such as culture, philosophy, 
religion, history and so on. Objectives and actions in international politics, 
nonetheless, cannot be understood in isolation from these ideational factors. Concepts 
such as sovereignty and national interests thus, are not objectively given, but must be 
interpreted through ideas.   
 
Following this line of assumptions, it is not difficult to understand mainstream 
Constructivists’ argument that material forces by themselves have no intrinsic 
meaning, and their meanings are socially created (constructed) by human beings and 
their ideas (Wendt, 1995; and 1999).  Ted Hopf notes:  
 
Determining the outcome will require knowing more about the situation than about the 
distribution of material power or the structure of authority.  One will need to know 
about the culture, norms, institutions, procedures, rules, and social practices that 
constitute the actors and the structures alike (Hopf, 1998: 173).  
 
	   56	  
For instance, the possession of nuclear weapons by Britain and France has a 
fundamentally different meaning to the US government than such possessions by 
North Korea or Iran.  Material capability on its own explains nothing here.  Although 
the weapons my be identical, the stockpiles in Britain and France are not viewed to be 
as threatening to the United States as those from North Korea or Iran.29  The reason 
for this, Constructivists believe, is that Washington D.C. has constructed a very 
different shared knowledge (identity) for Britain and France from North Korea and 
Iran. It is based on the current international structure and the beliefs and ideas of the 
Americans that a distinct identity; namely allies and enemies, Britain and North Korea, 
respectively. Constructivists, while not denying the existence of material reality, 
believe that it cannot be known outside human subjective knowledge (Zehfuss, 2002: 
25). To sum up, a Constructivist approach to IR holds a subjective ontological 
position, whereby actions and interests in international politics are constituted by 
ideas and identities, not somehow objectively given. 
 
This emphasis on the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge, and ideational 
factors, is also predominantly evident in Foreign Policy Analysis,30 as FPA opens up 
the state as a black box and looks into those personal, ideational, and cultural factors 
affecting foreign policy decision-making that Realist and Liberal theories alike tend to 
overlook.  Kubalkova comments: “it is worth noting that FPA began in earnest by 
introducing certain elements that many constructivists and postmodern scholars would 
later take up” (2001: 27). From the discussions in the previous section on Foreign 
Policy Analysis, it is not hard to discover several constructivist-type concerns in FPA; 
namely, the structure-agency debate, identity and culture in foreign policy. As the aim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This example was first used in Wendt (1995: 73-74). 
30 Houghton (2007) presents that Social Constructivism as an umbrella of theoretical perspectives that 
shares much in common with Foreign Policy Analysis. 
	   57	  
of FPA is to open-up the black box that is the state, from the very beginning FPA has 
always been interested in ideational factors in IR31 (Hudson, 2002: 1). FPA scholars, 
like Constructivists, do not see foreign policy as an objectively given concept, as they 
do not engage foreign policy exclusively at the structural level (as opposed to Realists 
and Neoliberals). Instead they tend to question how to treat the perceptions and 
intentions of those officials who make foreign policy.  To be more precise, they are 
particularly interested in the process of how actors interpret, decide, pronounce, and 
implement foreign policy, and the determinants along the way.  Steve Smith sees 
foreign policy at least “in part a social construction; it is what the actors decide it will 
be” (2001: 38).  He goes on to proclaim “[s]ocial construction and foreign policy 
analysis look made for one another…[and to coin with Wendt’s famous assertion] 
Foreign policy is what states make of it” (Smith, 2001: 38).   
 
It is this shared intersubjectivity that marries Constructivism with FPA, believed to fit 
well in this research on Chinese popular nationalism’s role in shaping China’s foreign 
policy vis-à-vis its domestic politics. Not only does this approach shift the focus onto 
the inextricable link between individuals (decision makers) and their social contexts 
(nationalism and domestic society), but it also broadens researchers’ understanding of 
what foreign policy making is. In other words, in any particular situation, what policy 
makers are doing goes beyond making choices among options, the availability of 
options is socially constructed. Their hands may well have been ‘tied’ by social orders 
before any decision is made: “Foreign policy thus becomes a practice that produces a 
social order as well as one through which individual and collective subjects 
themselves are produced and reproduced” (Doty, 1993: 301). Introducing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See the foundational work by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (2002), originally published in 1962. 
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Constructivism to FPA, it enables the researcher to address the construction of 
subjects themselves, such as identity, national interests, which in turn, improves the 
overall interpretation of policy outcomes. 
 
Not only can a Constructivist approach be adopted in FPA, throughout this work, 
nationalism is also given Constructivist connotations. It treats nationalism as a state of 
mind consisting of a system of beliefs that is socially constructed by collective 
meanings, interpretations and assumptions. Representing the characteristics of a 
nation’s identity, nationalism depends on how one understands and views events and 
agents. Hence, variation exists when nationalism is understood by different people 
from diverse social backgrounds and/or same groups of people through different 
timeframes. Emanuel Alder supports this notion by arguing that a group of people, a 
nation or nations are neither “entirely determined by…forces and constraints”, or 
depended solely on “individual preferences and rational choice. It is also a matter of 
their shared knowledge, the collective meaning they attach to their situation, their 
authority and legitimacy, the rules…” (1997: 321). By adopting Constructivist 
assumptions, nationalism is seen to present a set of preferences and judgements with 
respect to one’s own and other nation states, which may explain patterns of predicable 
behaviours.  As Hopf notes: 
 
Identities are necessary, in international politics and domestic society alike, in order to 
ensure at least some minimal level of predictability and order…In telling you who you 
are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to 
choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors” (Hopf, 
1998: 173-175).  
 
	   59	  
It is nevertheless no surprise that ‘nationalism’, as a hotly debated concept, has 
attracted great attention globally from scholars in political science and sociology.  
Most aspects of the concept have already been thoroughly studied. It is not only 
impossible but also more importantly, academically undesirable to cover all aspects of 
‘nationalism’ in a single research piece. The aim of this thesis is not merely focused 
on ‘nationalism’ per se. Instead it emphasises how this important concept may play an 
instrumental role in government’s policymaking. By “instrumental”, it does not 
necessarily imply a government’s intention to encourage/restrict certain popular 
nationalist sentiment to best serve its overall domestic and/or foreign policies. It is 
worth noting that whilst this study does not deny that nationalism can be 
instrumentalised to serve foreign policy, “instrumentalising nationalism” does not 
always require government’s actions or reflect to government’s intention. In other 
words, as will be demonstrated in latter case-study chapters, nationalism arguably 
does not always follow government’s guidance, nationalist sentiment can both 
improve and hinder foreign policy decision-making positions. The term 
“instrumentalisation” is used throughout to highlight the role nationalism plays in 
foreign policy under the Constructivist microscope.32  
 
Explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states has proved a particularly difficult 
task for theorists of international relations (Smith, 1986). For centuries it relied on an 
analogy between states and individuals in the state of nature, so that an endemic 
tendency to international anarchy resulted from states having 'interests'; systemic, 
determinist theories could therefore explain foreign policy by appealing to such 
notions as national interest and power maximization.  In mainstream IR theories such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 A fuller treatment of Constructivist view on nationalism is presented in respect of Chinese 
nationalism, in next chapter. 
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as Realism and Liberalism, foreign policy is analysed through a positivist/rationalist 
approach, 33 whereby elements such as identity are considered external and prior to the 
process of international politics, only material capabilities are measured significantly.  
Ideational factors are seen as ‘taken’ or ‘given’ in international relations. Mainstream 
Constructivist approaches build a bridge between “realist-liberal traditions and 
rationalist-reflectivist debates” (Wendt, 1992:  384). The benefits of doing this in this 
work, is that it links well the two principal subjects of the study; namely, foreign 
policy (a rationalist concept) with nationalism (a socio-ideational factor).  In turns, it 
constructs a solid theoretical framework that centres on this critical paradigm.  
Paradigm: nationalism has a “double-edged sword” effect on both 
Beijing’s domestic and foreign policy, especially in the post-
Cold War, post-Tiananmen era.   
Assumption: Nationalism and domestic politics thus are mutually constitutive 
to foreign policy.  
	  
1.4	   Interpretive	  Methods	  
 
Having established a set of Constructivist theoretical assumptions to approach this 
piece of research, it is time to answer the second question of methodology—how do 
we go about it?  Analysing contemporary foreign policy, and contentious issues such 
as popular nationalism, faces a major challenge. Without access to official policy 
documents and inner circles of the decision making body, one simply cannot directly 
gauge the intentions and motives for a certain policy decision. Therefore, one needs a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 It is worth noting that rationalist-reflectivist debate is sometimes termed as positivist-interpretive, 
respectively.  See for example Keohane (1988), in which rationalist, and reflectivist are used; and 
Neufeld (1993), in which positivist, and interpretive are used. This thesis sees both sets of terms are 
interchangeable, although positivist-interpretive is preferred.    
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method that can be used to work backwardly. In other words, taking policy outcomes 
as the analytical point of departure, assessing relevant circumstantial evidence, to 
interpret the policy intentions, and identify determinants. Interpretive approach is the 
best methods to adopt in this type of research.  
 
This section argues that, due to the mutually constitutive relations existing among 
nationalism, foreign and domestic policy, traditional positivist approaches to analysis 
possess too narrow a concept of reasoning, which do not fully explore socio-
ideational factors. They are also intangible in practice, due to the reasons listed above. 
Hence, a broader understanding of how foreign policy decisions are taken is needed. 
The objective of this section is to address two important sets of questions. First, what 
is it about an interpretive approach that distinguishes it from the traditional, positivist 
one? Specifically, on what points does an interpretive methodology differ from a 
positivist one?  Second, and most critically, how may an interpretive methodology 
contribute to this particular research project that is supplementary to a positivist 
approach?   
 
Mark Neufeld has pointed out “one of the best ways to distinguish positivist social 
science from interpretive social science is in terms of their respective 
conceptualizations of human consciousness” (1993: 40). One of the most fundamental 
distinctions between positivist and interpretive methods is their respective treatment 
toward the “social world”. Positivistically-minded social scientists, resting on the 
assumptions of “naturalism” (Neufeld, 1993: 40), see no difference between the 
natural world and the social world, where they both contain the same kind of 
regularities independent of time and place. Put simply, positivists treat human 
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consciousness and social actions as they would do in natural sciences—seeking hard 
facts through hard evidences.  As a result, positivist theory holds that the social world 
should be observed in the same way as in the natural world.  In other words, the 
knowledge of the social world must be based on empirical evidence only. Whilst 
positivists do not deny the existence of intersubjective meanings or shared knowledge 
that individuals attach to their behaviour, they nonetheless do not consider them to be 
sufficient for the validation of scientific knowledge about the social world, as they are 
conceived to be publically observable objects or events (Neufeld, 1993: 41-43). In 
essence, this leads positivists to seek “hard evidence” to explain social actions, and 
more often than not they rely on materialistically measurable factors, such as the 
economy, military, and geography. This however, is not possible dealing with an 
ideational determinant such as nationalism. 
 
Although interpretive theorists do not contest the fact that individuals attach 
“subjective meanings” to their behaviour, what they do contest is that the regularities 
of human behaviour which can be observed in the social world “exist independently 
of time and place as they do in the natural world” (Neufeld, 1993: 43). Adherent to a 
mainstream Constructivist approach, interpretive theorists understand that human 
beings are constantly self-interpreting and self-defining.34  Human beings live in a 
world of cultural meanings, which in their own have its source of interpretations of 
that world (Neufeld, 1993: 43). In other words, like Constructivists, interpretive 
methods also pay strong attention to the importance of cultural meanings, or shared 
knowledge on their own, not merely being taken as ‘given’ explanatory factors. What 
distinguishes interpretive methods in social science from interpretation of the natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Giddens (1984). 
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world is that part of the subject matter of social science is itself an interpretation that 
is constructed by and re-constructs social structures.   
 
The main difficulty for positivists in coping with ideational features that have 
intersubjective meanings is that positivist theories are rather rigid, only seeing these 
elements as “intervening variables” in a causal sequence, whereas interpretive 
theories benefit from accepting a more dynamic mutually constitutive relationship 
between social practices, including foreign policy, and ideational meanings (such as 
nationalism) that constitute them.  Hence, it promotes deeper understandings of these 
intersubjective meanings.  As Charles Taylor notes:  
 
Intersubjective meanings, ways of experiencing in society which are expressed in the 
language and descriptions constitutive of institutions and practices, do not fit into the 
categorical grid of mainstream political science. This allows only for an intersubjective 
reality that is brute-data-identifiable. But social practices and institutions that are partly 
constituted by certain ways of talking about them are not so identifiable. We have to 
understand the language, the underlying meanings, that constitute them (Taylor, 1987: 
59).  
 
In short, FPA presents a framework under which the dynamism of the foreign policy 
decision-making (FPDM) can be analysed. Constructivism then offers the link 
between policy-orientated actions and ideational determinants such as nationalism. 
the interpretive methodology finally gives researchers the tool to analyse this 
intersubjective process (i.e. FPDM) involving historically-shaped values and habits of 
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thought as well as emotionally and instrumentally generated criteria (such as popular 
nationalism).35 
	  
1.5	   Research	  Methodology	  
Having established the theoretical framework, the research was conducted under a set 
of methodology to empirically analyse the mutually constitutive relations between 
popular nationalism, foreign policy and domestic politics. 
 
In order to fully investigate popular nationalism’s impact on China’s foreign policy, 
Japan has been chosen as an empirical subject for this study. There are three reasons 
for making this choice. Firstly, as the following two chapters will explain, Japan, 
perhaps more than any other state, has received more than its share of nationalist 
outcry from the Chinese public, partly due to the antagonism endured between the 
two countries for a long period in China’s contemporary history; and partly as a result 
of the Communist government tapping into this anti-Japanese sentiment in its 
constriction of popular nationalism in the 1990s. Secondly, not only does relationship 
between China and Japan exhibit high emotional value, it also nonetheless, carries 
tangible yet sensitive issues such as the unsolved territorial dispute over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Therefore, as witnessed by both countries, anti-Japanese 
sentiment has been a predominant element in Chinese popular nationalism in the past 
20 years.36 Finally, despite vast volume of academic studies on various aspects of 
Sino-Japanese relations, shown in Chapter Three, this research believes due to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Finlayson (2007) for the support of using interpretive methodology in rhetorical political 
analysis. 
36 See Chapter Three for more discussions on anti-Japanese sentiment in Chinese popular nationalism. 
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fluid, fluctuate nature of the bilateral relations, and that of Chinese popular 
nationalism, it is necessary to offer an up-to-date and more comprehensive study on 
particularly the dynamics of popular nationalism in China’s Japan policy and its 
domestic politics. 
 
The contemporary time frame of this study and the secretive nature surrounding 
foreign policy in general, and the Chinese government, in particular, make it 
impossible to gain a direct access of the inner workings of China’s foreign policy 
decision-making. To overcome this problem, the research adopts the aforementioned 
interpretive methods by carefully examining mainly reports by both Chinese and 
Western media, government officials’ remarks, and messages and blogs in online 
public forums in China.  
 
For the two chosen case studies, namely the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstration and 
2010 boat collision incident near the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, more than 
350 pieces information were examined, including foreign ministry spokesperson’s 
remarks, media reports and online posts in popular social networking sites. Because 
of state’s tight control over the media, news reports in China provide valuable 
information for events in foreign affairs of which the official decision-making process 
is not publicly accessible.37 Coverage from official media outlets, such as People’s 
Daily, China Daily and China Central Television (CCTV), usually offer reasonably 
good reflections on government’s stance on a particular internal and external issue. In 
each case study, media coverage following the chorological developments of the 
event was used as primary sources to form a central ‘line-of-pursuit’ around which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For a good up-to-date study on media in China, see Shirk (2011a). 
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analyses were constructed. In order to avoid being overly reliant on one particular 
perspective, the research was conducted bilingually consulting English-based reports 
as well as Chinese ones, producing a balanced narrative to the events. Moreover, 
extensive studies on relevant academic literature were conducted, aiming at providing 
supplementary sources to enhance the general understandings of Chinese popular 
nationalism and Sino-Japanese relations. In addition, where possible, references were 
also made to existing scholarly contributions to the specific cases under study in 
Chapter Four and Five. 
 
In addition, the rapid rise in internet usage in China in recent years has given the 
Chinese public a good platform to get involve in current affair at a level that has never 
been seen before. As the two case studies will elaborate, thanks to the internet, 
Chinese public nowadays not only can spread and follow the development of a 
particular event, more critically, internet users may also share opinion, including 
nationalistic sentiment through this virtual channel. By combining media coverage on 
the two chosen events, with public reactions both online and on the ground (reported 
public protests), the research was able to able present and more importantly, analyse 
the dynamics between public opinion, foreign policy and concerns for domestic 
politics.  
 
Supplementary to these materials, nine prominent Chinese scholars in the fields of IR, 
Sino-Japanese relations were also interviewed for this research project, during the on-
the-ground work in China carried out between July and August 2009. These 
academics were selected by their high levels of expertise in their respective field, and 
availability. Although financial and time restrictions had somehow limited the scope 
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of the field research for this project, hence narrowing the access to potential 
interviewees, it is worth stressing that the role of the several elite academics that were 
interviewed, afford them a significant position in terms of their own insights into, and 
possible influence on, China’s foreign policy making. Thus, albeit with limited 
numbers, the use of these interviews makes a rich source of information that is not 
normally obtainable through written materials. 
	  
1.6	   Summary	  
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to establish the theoretical and methodological 
framework within which the subsequent cases can be studied. The chapter started by 
discussing the two concepts evident in the title of this work, namely nationalism and 
foreign policy. Rather, nationalism is taken here as a dynamic socio-ideational 
concept that characterises a nation’s identity. As stated, nationalism is viewed here as 
a set of dynamic determinants, instruments, and constraints within both domestic and 
foreign policy. It is thus, this thesis argues, more important for the rationale of the 
research to understand nationalism as a social concept that itself is mutually 
constructed by its own society and that of the world. The discussion then moves to 
foreign policy, and in particular the framework for analysing foreign policy—Foreign 
Policy Analysis. FPA provides valuable tools which enable researchers to open-up the 
“black-box” of the state and foreign policy often recognised in IR. Moreover, debates 
on FPA have also discovered similarities in theoretical standings shared between itself 
and Constructivism, and therefore the choice for a mainstream Constructivist 
approach can be justified. 
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Adopting mainstream Constructivist assumptions and interpretive methods allow 
foreign policy and domestic politics to be mutually connected with ideational factors 
such as nationalism, culture and history. Hence the interactions among the three 
elements (nationalism, domestic politics and foreign policy) can be fully explored.   
 
In next chapter, the work departs from general theoretical concepts to the core subject 
of this research project, China. The chapter will assess how Chinese nationalism 
evolved against the backdrop of dramatic external and internal changes. In particular, 
the chapter will study the transformation from state-led nationalism to popular 
nationalism in the late 1980s. In addition, it will also examine the importance of 
pride/humiliation complex in shaping Chinese popular nationalism in the post-Cold 
War era. 	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Chapter	  Two:	  Chinese	  Nationalism	  –	  from	  Elites	  
to	  Grassroots	  
	  
The main aim of this chapter is to provide a concise overview on Chinese nationalism 
and foreign policy. The purpose of doing this is threefold. First, by exploring the 
origins of Chinese nationalism and especially the historical background against which 
nationalism was evolved is imperative for understanding one of the most distinctive 
characteristics of Chinese nationalism today, namely the pride/humiliation complex.38 
Secondly, sudden changes in international political landscape at end of the Cold War 
and the subsequent state-led Patriotic Education Campaign (PEC) in the 1990s marks 
another important transition in Chinese nationalism, when the principal force of 
nationalism transferred from elite reformists of the late Qing Dynasty to grassroots 
citizens of the twenty-first century. Finally, this mixture of pride and humiliation is 
also a significant feature in China’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, as 
China’s national security is closely tied with nationalist insecurities. The 
pride/humiliation narratives have been evidently reflected in Beijing’s practice in 
foreign affairs.   
 
The chapter begins by looking at the birth of Chinese nationalism on the eve of the 
establishment of China’s first proper nation-state. It then fast-forwards to assess the 
impacts of China’s reform policy and the post-Cold War transformations on the 
development of popular nationalism. The central argument on the evolution of 
Chinese nationalism is that the end of the Cold War and the rise of the internet have 
gradually shifted the dominant source of Chinese nationalism today from state/elite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 This term is created from the argument of Callahan (2010). 
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level to the grassroots level. The last part of this chapter discusses the 
pride/humiliation complex that is at the core of Chinese nationalism in the post-Cold 
War era. This thesis argues that it is this double-faced nature that has made Chinese 
nationalism such a dynamic force in both domestic and foreign policy today.  
 
2.1	  Origins	  of	  Chinese	  Nationalism	  
 
Despite Chinese civilizations thousands of years of history, Chinese nationalism did 
not come to light until the later nineteenth, early twentieth centuries. Before the turn 
of the twentieth century, China was a dynastical empire, not a nation-state, as we 
know it. The dominant concept in politics and national identity was a Confucian 
cultural system based on teachings of Confucius. The political legitimacy for the 
Emperor came from the “Mandate of the Heaven” (天意). The Emperor, known as the 
Son of the Heaven or 天子, ruled by his cultural supremacy and virtue. Moreover, 
Chinese emperors believed all land under heaven was universal (天下大同) based on 
Chinese culture (Zhao, 2004a: 41). Traditional Chinese thinking was lacking in “the 
concept of the nation (国家概念). People loved to talk about the land under the 
heaven (天下), showing…the development of China in history was a universe not a 
nation” (Duara, 1996: 31-55). Harrison used the term “culturalism” to describe 
imperial China’s national identity. Harrison also observed that the traditional Chinese 
self-image of culturalism is based on “a common historical heritage and acceptance of 
shared beliefs, not as nationalism, based on modern concept of nation-state” (cited in 
Townsend, 1992: 98). Chinese culturalism emphasised “self-image”, which perceived 
China as the only true civilization, and its cultural superiority was unchallenged.  The 
Imperial Chinese believed that foreign peoples might be military threats but could 
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never challenge China because of their cultural backwardness and could never rule 
China unless in a Chinese way. Townsend notes that Chinese nationalism was 
evolved from traditional culturalism at the turn of the twentieth century, when 
Western Imperialists overpowered China weak infrastructure along with it sense of 
universalism and cultural superiority. For the first time the Chinese people had 
realised that the capability of Western military powers was able to undermine Chinese 
cultural superiority. Culturalism thus, explains not only the Chinese empire’s capacity 
to survive for so long, but also why it fell when a truly competitive foreign culture 
penetrated China.  As Townsend notes: 
 
 Foreign imperialism did not have to conquer the empire to destroy it.  It had only to 
demonstrate that its formidable military power carried an explicit challenge to the 
Chinese view of the world by agents who assumed their own cultural superiority.  With 
culturally-based confidence and identity in doubt from setbacks administered by these 
avowed challengers, and lacking a nationalist base to fall back on, imperial China 
disintegrated (Townsend, 1992: 99). 
 
In the wake of defeats, Chinese elite intellectuals who had good a understanding on 
the political systems of the West began to realise that traditional culturalism, centred 
on cultural superiority and Confucian teachings, was no match for big guns on foreign 
ships.  What China desperately needed was an ideology which could unite the whole 
Chinese nation as single political entity.  Liang Qichao39 and Kang Youwei among 
others desired a strong central government, which could unite and lead the whole 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Liang Qichao, who was highly interested in Western political philosophy, is recognised as the 
pioneer of Chinese nationalism.  He is attributed as the person who led waves of nationalist movement 
against old traditionalists in the Qing government.  Inspired by Liang, in the period between 1842 and 
1911, several nationalist movements had taken place. E.g. the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-
1894), anti-Japanese demonstrations after Chinese defeat in First Sino-Japanese War (1895-1896), the 
Hundred Day Reform (1898), the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), and the 1911 Revolution that 
overthrown the Imperial Qing Dynasty, led by Sun Yat-sen, another prominent nationalist figure. See 
Levenson (1953).  
	   72	  
population as an entity and resist foreign imperial powers. The Manchu Qing 
government, Liang believed, was too weak and corrupted to carry out such a task.  
This defeat and a series of subsequent defeats “paved the way for the eventual 
disintegration of imperial China and let Chinese elite to reject the old culturalism and 
borrow the Europe concept of nationalism that would provide a new basis for the 
China’s defence and regeneration.” (Zhao, 2000: 4)  
 
Liang Qichao supported “a broad nationalism” which called for “the uniting of all the 
nationalities” in China to deal with the foreign aggressions (Chen, 2005: 39). Having 
witnessed the turbulent years of foreign invasion and colonisation of parts of China 
and a weak, highly corrupt and helpless Qing government in its last days, Liang was 
convinced that “what we Chinese lack most and need most today is an organic 
integration and forced order.” And he believed, to achieve this, “Han, Manchus, 
Mongols, Hui, Miao and Tibetan [different ethnic nations] should unite as a broad 
nation” (Liang, 1989: 76). Liang’s nationalism was directed against foreign imperial 
powers that had a foothold in China. His idea on nation-building was based on 
bounding all ethnic nations into a unified state to resist foreign intruders.  
 
Sun Yat-sen, known as the ‘founding father of modern of China’ (国父), also adopted 
a concept of nationalism to save China. Theoretically, Sun provided a workable 
framework to which development of the nation-state could be followed. He is most 
famous for setting the Three Principles of the People – Nationalism; Democracy; and 
People’s Livelihood (民族，民主，民生) – developed before the 1911 Revolution. 
This set of principles became the fundamental ideology of the Kuomintang (KMT) 
and is still praised by many Chinese worldwide, especially amongst people in Taiwan. 
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Nationalism, according to Sun, was “the treasure for a state to prosper and for a nation 
to survive” (Sun, 1997: 86). He concluded that his own Principle of Nationalism was 
equivalent to the “doctrine of state.” Nationalism for Sun was “a kind of thought, a 
kind of faith, and a kind of power” (Sun cited in Hughes, 2005: 120-121).  
 
In short, the period of Western occupation, unequal treaties, and enforced foreign 
extraterritorial jurisdiction (治外法权) in China served as a wakeup call for several 
Chinese elites. They felt the old system of beliefs based on Confucianism was no 
longer adequate to defend China in the face of foreign invasion. Learning from the 
Western concept of nation and national identity, reformist intellectuals such as Kang 
Youwei and Sun Yat-sen used the notion of defending own nation against Western 
intruders to establish a new form of national identity. In other words, rather than 
holding onto the old cultural based national identity focusing on China—us, Chinese 
nationalism was defined through the advancing Western imperialist power—other. 
Thus, it is reasonable to affirm that the catalyst for the birth of Chinese nationalism is 
foreign power. The so-called “century of shame and humiliation” (百年耻辱) 
provided the suitable environment, from which Chinese nationalism had evolved. As 
Chpater Three will show, this practice of using the ‘other’ to define ‘us’ is still very 
much valid in today’s Chinese nationalism, especially on the issues with Japan.  
	  
2.2	  State-­‐led	  Nationalism	  and	  the	  Communist	  Party	  
 
Since 1949, the founding year the People’s Republic of China (PRC), state 
nationalism has dominated official doctrine, placing its mark on most government 
statements and policies, especially on its foreign policy.  In the early years of the PRC, 
due to the prolonged period of war, the newly-born republic seemed very unsure 
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about its place in the world. Early communist leaders in China strictly followed the 
politics of Marxism-Leninism and socialist ideology, so was Chinese nationalism. 
Being highly distrust and disapproval of Western Capitalist society, Mao Zedong 
made his case for Chinese nationalism in a much wider context of the struggle for 
Communism in socialist states across the globe. Chen argues that during this period, 
Chinese nationalism was confined within the context of communist internationalism. 
He continues this argument by presenting Mao’s way of addressing this problematic 
relationship between Chinese nationalism and communist internationalism:  
 
Chinese Communists must therefore combine patriotism with internationalism. We are 
at once internationalists and patriots . . . Only by achieving national liberation will it be 
possible for the proletariat and other working people to achieve their own 
emancipation. The victory of China and the defeat of the invading imperialists will help 
the people of other countries. Thus in wars of national liberation, patriotism is applied 
in internationalism (Mao cited in Chen, 2005: 41). 
 
China’s national identity construction before Deng Xiaoping’s reform seemed 
strongly influenced by the ideological confrontation between communism and 
capitalism.  There are two reasons that can support this statement. First, a tangible and 
intense ideological confrontation between communism and capitalism took place in 
the Cold War, which broke soon after the founding of the Communist China in 1949. 
China being an important member of the Communist bloc, the government had to 
stand along side with the Soviet Union and other Communist states. 40  More 
importantly perhaps, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule was built on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Mao Zedong made his position clearly. He wrote that China must ally itself “with the Soviet Union, 
with every New Democratic country, and with the proletariat and broad masses in all other countries.” 
Hence he announced that Chinese foreign policy would “lean towards one side [the Soviet Union]” in 
the struggle between imperialism and socialism.  See Mao (1965: 415). 
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foundation of its victory over foreign, Western Capitalist powers that had occupied 
China during the ‘century of shame and humiliation’. Therefore, upon establishing the 
PRC, the ruling CCP was able to construct a set of contrasting images between the 
triumph of independence and China under foreign invasion and occupation. As a 
result, a general sense of distrust and hatred toward the Western world was stimulated 
amongst Chinese public. One way to boost CCP’s political legitimacy and consolidate 
its fragile political power was to emphasise its efforts in defeating imperialist powers 
(including Japan) that had occupied various parts of China for 14 years between 1931 
and 1945. Initially, having fought victory against the KMT, the CCP diminished the 
KMT’s achievement in the war against Japan. The KMT was portrayed as a rather 
weak government who did not stand squarely to fight the Japanese. For instance, for 
many years the KMT had been labelled as “KMT Reactionaries” (国民党反动派). It 
is not until recent years, as cross-straight relations with Taiwan gradually improved, 
the accomplishment by the KMT regular armies in frontline battles against the 
Japanese was reassessed. Their bravery actions and enormous sacrifices have recently 
been recognised and appraised in the CCP-directed media and history education.41  
 
Prior to the 1990s, the CCP government led a form of nationalism fuelled by this 
strong sense of anti-imperialist nationalism. Anti-imperialist nationalism asserted that 
China’s decline in the second half of the nineteenth century was primarily due to 
foreign imperialist aggression.  It recalled indigenous Confucian virtue and ideas 
which national salvation could be relied on.  Zhao Suisheng describes this anti-
imperialist nationalism as nativism, which recognises that the “impact of imperialism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The Battle of Tai’erzhauang is a good example to illustrate this. The battle was an extremely hard-
fought victory for the KMT army. This achievement however had been neglected by the CCP in China. 
It was not until the early 2000s, more balanced assessment on KMT’s attitude in the war was made, 
with films and documentaries about the battle broadcasted to Chinese public. 
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on Chinese self-esteem and the subversion of indigenous Chinese virtues are the root 
of China’s weakness” (2000: 5). Nativism identified imperialism as the enemy and 
stressed national independence through self-strengthening to achieve self-reliance and 
self-help. Mao’s principle of 自力更生 (self-reliance and regeneration through one’s 
own efforts) can be seen as a fitting example. Moreover, Goldstein notes that the CCP 
leadership convinced the general public that “China could only become a truly 
independent, sovereign nation if it relied on its own resources and purged the nation 
of these foreign intellectual and political influences.” He went on to argue this 
principle of self-reliance and self-help all seemed “appropriate to a nation that had for 
more than a century, been the victim of a predatory international system” (Goldstein, 
1994: 228-229). Mao’s decision to be involved in the Korea War demonstrated how 
nativist nationalism indeed influenced China’s foreign policy. In order to generate 
public support for sending the “volunteer army” to Korea, the CCP launched a fierce 
campaign against the so-called “American Imperialism”. The slogan of 抗美援朝保
家卫国 (resist American aggression, aid Korea, save our homes and protect our 
country) founded a popular rationale for China’s involvement in the war. Mao 
believed that the only way for the newly founded People’s Republic to survive was to 
preserve China unique national identity and purge Western imperialism.  The Western 
world was therefore perceived as a great threat and the most dangerous enemy to the 
building of a “socialist new China” (Kirby, 1995: 13-14).  
 
Lucian Pye concurs with the argument that a unique semi-colonial experience 
contributes to this xenophobic attribute in Chinese nationalism. A different level of 
local anti-Western hostility appears to show when Pye compares Chinese nativist 
nationalism to that in other ex-colonised states. Although the CCP’s promotion of the 
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‘weak old China, strong new China’ contrast may offer one explanation, Pye does not 
believe it is the only reason. Instead, Pye highlights that partial colonisation in China 
was achieved under a unique “Treaty Port” system, whereby imperialists were only 
interested in controlling the commercial activities by colonising parts of major coastal 
cities, such as Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and big cities like Wuhan, Nanking, 
along the Yangtze River,42 but not the whole country (1993: 113). These colonised 
sections were given the name of Concessions, in which foreign powers usually ran 
their own administration. In contrast, most other states in Asia and Africa became 
colonies when entire states were occupied and ruled by the Western imperialists. In 
effect, the native people in these colonies engaged in frequent and direct personal 
contact with the colonisers. After many years of direct administration of the Indian 
subcontinent by the British Raj, “Indians, for example, knew what Englishmen were 
like and therefore colonialism was not like an abstraction” (Pye, 1993: 113). Whereas, 
Pye believes Chinese people generally had less direct contact with the imperialist than 
people in fully-colonised states, and therefore “for them the threat of foreign 
penetration and the evils of ‘unequal treaties’ were abstract. The psychology was thus 
totally different” (1993: 113). 
 
Comparing to nationalism in other states, this state-led nativist nationalism gives a 
strong xenophobic impression. As presented in previous paragraphs, Chinese 
nationalism does have a close attachment with China’s past history. As a result, when 
China finally achieved national liberation and independence and was freed from 
foreign occupations, the CCP was able to convey a strong popular nationalist belief 
among Chinese people, centred at preserving this freedom and avoiding reliving in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This is the reason why Chinese government often refers to this period (1840-1949) as semi-feudal, 
semi-colonised.  
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past shame and humiliation. Words with strong emotional connotation have also been 
frequently used in diplomatic exchanges ever since the birth of the PRC, reflecting the 
CCP’s conceptualisation of nationalism. ‘…[Foreign government’s action] has 
severely hurt the feelings of the Chinese people’(严重伤害了中国人民的感情) is a 
tagline often used by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in diplomatic protests, most 
notably towards Japan. With added nationalistic sentiment, it is arguable that these 
emotional referents, such as ‘the Chinese people’, ‘feelings’ and ‘humiliation’ 
transcend more impersonal terms such as ‘China’ and ‘protests’, in official diplomatic 
messages (Whiting, 1983: 195).  
 
As China entering into a new era of “reform and open” (改革开放) policy in late 
1970s, there appeared to be a distinct change in characteristics of nationalism 
(Whiting, 1983: 914; Zhao, 2000: 9-10). The emphasis of nationalism shifted from 
classic Communist ideology—Marxism-Leninism to one that focused on national 
interests. New generations of Chinese leaders have adopted a more pragmatic 
approach to foreign policy. As much desire to restore China to its rightful place as 
before, Deng Xiaoping would no longer focus on the ‘century of shame and 
humiliation’ nationalist rhetoric to bind Chinese public. Instead, Deng stressed on 
economic development and poverty alleviation. Nationalism in Deng’s era, still 
placed ‘us, the Chinese people’ in positive terms, but it assigned less negative 
connotations to ‘others, foreign nations’. This pragmatic approach to nationalism saw 
“foreign exploitation, and cultural infiltration as a source of China’s weakness, but 
believes that the lack of modernisation is the reason why China became an easy target 
for Western imperialism” (Zhao, 2000: 9). Deng Xiaoping was convinced that in 
order to survive and prosper in modern world, China could no longer isolate itself 
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from the outside world, as it did during the Cultural Revolution. Chinese people’s 
desire to restore their country to the glorious past can only be achieved by actively 
engaging with other states. To achieve this, Deng was willing to adopt whatever 
economic approach that might make China strong, hence moving away from the 
orthodox teachings of Communism that had been the guiding principle for the CCP 
for many years before Deng. One of Deng’s most famous quotes epitomises this 
belief: “it does not matter if it is a black or white cat, as long as it can catch rats, it is a 
good cat” (Zhao, 2000: 9). 
 
Deng’s economic reform and open door policy focused on economic development and 
international trade.  At the same time, Deng had confronted with some opposition and 
scepticism, mainly from conservative traditionalists within the CCP.43  They feared 
that increasing political and economic contacts with the rest of the world would 
inevitably make China more interdependent with outside world.  This might be able to 
eliminate external military attack, but it risked “undermining the cultural identity it 
was meant to uphold” (Yahuda, 1997: 8). Hence, nationalism in Deng’s era might 
have lost some of its cultural and historic orientation. Nationalism during the early 
years of economic reform appeared to be much more affirmative, more positive, 
which centred on achieving economic prosperity as a nation. “Transform China into a 
modernised, prosperous and strong state” had become the nationalistic theme binding 
the nation together. Oksenberg terms this positive Chinese nationalism in Deng’s era 
as ‘confident nationalism’. He notes: 
  
“[Confident nationalism] is a patient and moderate nationalism rooted in confidence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Mainly constitutes the old generation of high-profile CCP members and the “leftist” ideological 
faction and components of the People’s Liberation Army. See Whiting (1995: 306-315). 
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that over time China can regain its former greatness through economic growth, based 
on the import of foreign technology and ideas. It is a calculated nationalism, linked to a 
strategy for economic and political development. It is also a determined and resolute 
nationalism, flexible in tactics, subtle in strategy” (1986/7: 505). 
 
Since the open door reform, Beijing had been generally pragmatic in its relations with 
other states. Particularly in Northeast Asia, Beijing had played an active, and in some 
cases a leading role in regional security issues. Nevertheless, nationalistic sentiment 
had remained strong among the policy-makers and the public when confronting with 
Beijing’s core national interests, namely the upholding of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. For example, Deng held a firm stance when negotiating with British Prime 
Minister Mrs. Thatcher on regaining authority over Hong Kong. He firmly declared, 
“[o]n the question of sovereignty, China has no room for manoeuvre. To be frank, the 
question is not open to discussion” (Deng, 1982). Furthermore, since the end of the 
Cold War, the Communist central government has continuously warned Chinese 
public about the West, especially the American government,44 vigorous attempts of 
alleged “peaceful evolution” on China (Whiting, 1995: 298-300). State media 
repeatedly underlined the danger of “peaceful evolution” and calling for “vigilance 
against the imperialist armed aggression and ‘peaceful evolution’ conspiracy at any 
time” (Niu and Zhang cited in Whiting, 1995: 300). 	  
2.3	  The	  Rise	  of	  Popular	  Nationalism	  after	  1989	  
	  
Given the difficult period of history that China experienced in the hands of foreign 
occupiers and the Communist Party’s difficult route to power, it is perhaps not hard to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For China’s threat perception against the United States, see Glaser (1993: 259-261); and Wang and 
Lin (1992). 
	   81	  
understand that national self-assertion has served as a core value of Chinese political 
elites ever since Mao’s declaration that “China has stood up” in 1949. From the birth 
of the People’s Republic, China has continuously asserted itself in international 
society as a self-styled “leader” of the Third World. As Phil Deans notes:  
 
the Chinese leadership routinely criticises the liberal assumptions underpinning the 
ideology of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund…[and] the 
international human rights regime. (Deans, 2004: 10)  	  
However, with its opening-up and reform policy, and the rapid development in 
Internet technology in Mainland China, the Chinese public has had, more than ever, 
opportunities to exchange information with the rest of the world. The events took 
place in the Communist bloc towards the end of the Cold War, and the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown in particular, not only brought new challenges for the CCP 
leadership, but arguably, it also marked a gradual transformation in Chinese 
nationalism. Many China specialists have commented on the apparent rise in 
nationalism in Chinese society since the end of the Cold War (Zheng, 1999; Gries, 
2004; Hughes, 2006; Zhao,1998; 2000; 2004a; 2004b and 2005). Most writers of 
Chinese nationalism in the West attribute this rise nationalism to the result of the 
government’s patriotic education campaigns45  and the dramatic changes in global 
political landscape after the Cold War (Gries, 2004; Zhao; 2004a; and Hughes, 2006). 
Specifically, many observers of Chinese nationalism believe that the end of Cold War 
had weakened the value of traditional Communist ideology in China’s domestic 
politics and dislodged it from the pinnacle position in the ruling CCP’s political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The nation wide patriotic education in the 1990s was initiated when the CCP Central Committee 
issued a directive setting out an outline for implementation to relevant local authorities in August 1994. 
See CCP Central Committee (1994). The author, as a primary school student in China at the time, had 
first hand experience of the patriotic education.  
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legitimacy. As a result, the CCP had found nationalism as the new foundation on 
which the CCP might continue to govern. The main effect of this state-led patriotic 
education campaign is that it reinforced the Communist Party firmly as the power 
source for the state. In other words, according to Beijing’s concept, the love of the 
state, or patriotism, cannot be separated from the love of the CCP.  As Zhao puts it 
perfectly, “the best way to love and defend the Chinese nation was to love and defend 
the state under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (2004a: 239). Whilst 
not discrediting the effects of state-led promotion in nationalism, the following 
section will argue that Chinese nationalism after 1989 has gradually transferred from 
state-led top-down elite nationalism to grassroots bottom-up popular nationalism. 	  
2.3.1	   “Culture	  Fever”	  and	  Popular	  Nationalist	  Critique	  
During the early years of economic reform, China was at a crossroads. Chinese 
intellectuals were debating the direction in which China should be heading, pitting 
the discourse of orthodoxy against reform and centralisation against decentralisation. 
As identified by Fewsmith, “[t]his was a question both of political legitimacy—was 
the Chinese revolution wrong from the very start?—as well as of Chinese identity: 
did modernisation mean Westernisation?” (2008: 148). In the 1980s, thanks to 
Deng’s reform and opening-up policy, Chinese intellectuals, who had been isolated 
for so long during the Cultural Revolution, were for the first time able to see the so-
called outside world. Not only did they enjoy wearing flared jeans and miniskirts, and 
dancing in newly opened discos to Hong Kong pop music, the post-Cultural 
Revolution youths were also eager to learn Western ideas. Suddenly, thanks to this 
huge influx of information and new things from the West, Western life styles became 
a trendy way of life, especially amongst the well-educated youths, such as college 
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and university graduates.  In response to this pursue of Western capitalist culture, a 
handful of young intellectuals began to worry this trend of modernisation, as they felt 
it neglect Chinese traditional cultural and values. They, just like the elite intellectuals 
at the turn of the twentieth century, started to write articles warning fellow citizens of 
the potential risk for following this trend. For example, Wang Xiaodong, one of the 
most vocal advocates for Chinese popular nationalism, found himself deeply opposed 
to this cultural cosmopolitanism expressed during the blossoming of ‘cultural fever’, 
when he returned from his overseas study. Over the years, he has strongly criticised 
this 1980s attitude, terming it China’s ‘reverse racism’ (逆向种族主义),46 whereby 
people are critical of their own traditional culture and value for the sake of pursuing 
Western way of life (Wang, 1999a: 81-106; and 2009b: 218).47 He Xin, reflecting on 
the decade of reform prior to the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, criticises this period of 
an apparent flourishing of culture, expressing his dismay at the decline of ideology, 
national spirit, values, state consciousness, and social order (1996: 401-413). 
Moreover, Wang goes further to reveal that the government’s encouragement of 
cultural diversity and its own reflection of the Cultural Revolution did help ‘reverse 
racism’, to flourish in the late 1980s. Along with the influx of products, music, and 
lifestyle from the West, the CCP had also actively encouraged the public to read 
newly-translated Western literature, and newly-imported films. He asserts that this 
state-led promotion has rarely been mentioned in the West, in contrast to discussions 
about official campaign for nationalism in the 1990s (2009b: 217-219). The reasons 
for this, he explains, was because the West simply could not imagine how the 
Chinese government could possibly praise Western ideology (Wang, 2009b: 218).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For a most recent critique on ‘reverse racism’, see Wang (2009a: 206-212). 
47 A common expression in Chinese best encaptures this so-called ‘reverse racism’ goes 外国的月亮总
比中国的圆, which literally means “the Moon in foreign countries are always rounder than the one in 
China”. It is the Chinese equivalent of “grass is always greener on the other side”. 
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By way of example, a television documentary series, 河殇 (He Shang or River 
Elegy),48 heavily criticised by Wang and other popular nationalists, set as a proof of 
this government’s sponsoring of ‘reverse racism’.  The series was first broadcast in 
1988 on the state-run China Central Television (CCTV) and subsequently endorsed 
by CCP’s official newspaper, the People’s Daily. Moreover, during the period of 
broadcast, the government at various levels organised talks and discussion forums on 
He Shang.  Many newspapers even published the scripts of the documentary, whilst 
being shown on the television (Wang, 2009b: 218).  
 
The series took its name from the Yellow River, the cradle of the Chinese civilisation 
and a potent symbol of China.  It portrayed the Yellow River and the old ‘黄土文明’ 
(yellow-soil civilisation) as essentially violent, erratic and stagnant, in need of 
revival.  It announced the “death” of Chinese traditional culture, hence the word 殇 
(elegy) in its title.  As well as criticising the traditional culture, it suggested that 
China should transform itself by accepting influences from the West, and it hoped 
that traditional values and culture would be replaced by Western culture.  At the end 
the series, by using the analogy that the Yellow River eventually flows into the 
Pacific Ocean, the film dared to envisage democracy as the inevitable and unalterable 
end of China’s transformation to replace authoritarian dictatorship (Su and Wang, 
1988). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The scripts of the TV series was based on a book by the same name, see Su and Wang (1988). An E-
book version can be viewed at http://www.northbeauty.org/bencandy.php?fid=5&aid=373&page=1, 
accessed on 01/11/2010. The subsequent descriptions of He Shang are mainly drawn from this book. 
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Initially, He Shang gained great popularity and was praised by the government, 
especially by the reform-minded Premier Zhao Ziyang (Kristof, 1989). It 
nevertheless, aroused a storm of criticism from the likes of Wang Xiaodong and He 
Xin, leading figures of China’s new popular nationalists. He Xin (1989) believes that 
the “complete Westernisation” promoted in He Shang would lead to a “new 
dogmatism” of worshipping Western values, which would represent a very bad 
development for China. The Tiananmen crackdown, he argues, was a result of such a 
trend. As stability was restored after the Tiananmen crackdown, He Xin claims, 
people came to realise that modelling themselves on the West could not solve 
China’s problems (He, 1989). In contrast, Wang’s disapproval of He Shang came 
from another perspective.  What really bothered Wang were the authors of the series, 
whom Wang perceived as cultural elites in China. Wang understood the 
aforementioned important role of elites in formulating Chinese nationalism.  He was 
disappointed about the ‘reverse racism’ shown by the authors (cultural elites), when 
they identified themselves with the West and denigrated the Chinese people on the 
basis of Western standards. As Wang puts it, the authors “ridiculed the Chinese 
peasants’ dull-witted love of the yellow soil and praised highly the courage and 
insight of Westerners in throwing themselves into myriad difficulties” (Wang and 
Qiu, 1988: 4). Coincidentally, both He and Wang conclude their criticisms by 
declaring that China needed nationalism (not ‘reverse racism’), formed by promoting 
China’s own values and culture, and relating to its own history, in order to maintain 
social stability and political authority (Fewsmith, 2008: 206-209). 
 
Wang, He and few others, were the key advocates of Chinese popular nationalism in 
the 1980s. They had set the stage for others to follow in the early 1990s, by injecting 
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vital energy for popular nationalism to prosper. In late 1993, a new journal called 
Strategy and Management (《战略与管理》 ) started publication and quickly 
became a forum for new and often critical ideas (Fewsmith, 2008: 157). It frequently 
featured nationalism in its articles, as a time when nationalism as a sensitive concept 
had not yet been openly debated in the academic circle.49 The general tone of the 
journal was frank and outspoken, sometime even critical of the government. As the 
institution that published Strategy and Management was well connected with the 
government, especially the military, their critical style could be maintained.50 Since 
its establishment, Strategy and Management had been a popular platform on which 
popular nationalists, such as Wang Xiaodong, and academics could exchange their 
ideas on nationalism and how to promote it (Wang, 1999b; and 2000). The 
significance of Strategy and Management is that not only did it provide a space for 
popular nationalists to share their ideas with the intellectuals who are connected to 
the apparatus of the government, but it also created a fashionable trend amongst the 
academic community for the nationalism debate to thrive. This timely debate together 
with the argument put forwarded earlier by Wang and He in the late 1980s was 
supported by Beijing in the 1990s, as the government made a great effort to promote 
an official discourse of nationalism. In the wake of Tiananmen crackdown in June 
1989, Beijing made a U-turn on its position regarding the 1980s ‘cultural fever’, by 
attacking liberal materials such as He Shang. The series was blamed for helping sow 
the seeds of the counter-revolutionary rebellion in 1989.  Hong Minsheng, the then 
deputy director of the CCTV, the very channel that premiered He Shang, said in a 
blisteringly self-critical broadcast on the prime-time evening news: “He Shang was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Examples include, Xiao (1994); Sheng (1996); and Wang (1999b; and 2000). 
50 It is worth noting that Strategy and Management eventually ceased publication in 2004, it was 
allegedly closed down by the authorities for being too critical.    
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propaganda coup for bourgeois liberalization. The broadcast of He Shang provided 
theoretical and emotional preparation for the recent turmoil and rebellion.'' He 
continued:  	  
The essence of the film is to negate the socialist system, oppose the leadership of the 
Communist Party and propagate all-round Westernization. 'River Elegy' is the product 
of bourgeois liberalization, in collusion with the doctrine of 'peacefully transforming 
China' as peddled by the international reactionary forces. We should see that behind the 
series there is a life-and-death struggle for the Chinese nation and the socialist system 
(Kristof, 1989). 	  
While denouncing this previously acclaimed TV series, Beijing quickly placed a 
carefully arranged patriotic education campaign in primary and secondary schools 
across the country, aimed at “correcting the lack of political beliefs, loyalty, and 
morality among the populace.” (Zhao, 2004a: 218) Patriotic education51 was simply 
to rebuild ties between individuals and the state, while reconsolidating the legitimacy 
of the communist state in the post-Tiananmen settings (Zhao, 2004a: 218 and 223). It 
is important to recognise that during the 1990s this state-led discourse of nationalism, 
expressing a very strong anti-imperialist and anti-American tone,52 was exactly what 
popular nationalists of the 1980s had called for. This timely combination of these two 
forces provided the environment for a new form of nationalism to take root and thrive 
among the Chinese public. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For another account on Jiang Zemin’s Patriotic Education Campaign, see, for example, Hughes 
(2006: ch.2). 
52 For a very good discussion on Chinese intellectuals’ quests for national greatness and their 
nationalistic writings in the 1990s, see Zhao (1997).  
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One of the most influential pieces of literature on Chinese nationalism at the time 
was China Can Say No (1996), a collection of nationalistic writings edited by Song 
Qiang. Published against the background of post-Tiananmen state-led patriotic 
education campaign, the book draws heavy criticisms at the West, especially the 
United States. Attacking the ‘cultural fever’, the book argues the post-Cultural 
Revolution Chinese youth embraced Western values too strongly during the 
economic reforms in the 1980s, and thus neglected their own culture and heritage. 
Using the US government as the main subject for critics, the volume asserts that the 
main aim of the US government was to restrict China’s development, and hence its 
foreign policy towards China was dishonest and irresponsible (Song, 1996: 57). It 
also saw Japan as an ambiguous state, with a government not having a strong policy 
stance, but following the strongest power in the world (Song, 1996: 80). In addition, 
the book suggests the Chinese government and public shall stance firm – say No – 
against Western powers in the lights of the United Sates and Japan, by not simply 
accepting the Western-dominated global order and by asserting China’s own 
sovereignty demand in the Taiwan issue (Song, 1996: 44 and 119). Upon its release, 
China Can Say No quickly became a very popular read among the Chinese public, 
with it author Song Qiang becoming one of the best-known advocates of popular 
nationalism in China. Although the opinions promoted by Song appears to be overly 
nationalistic, the book does nevertheless shed some important lights on the 
characteristics of Chinese popular nationalism. 
 
This new popular nationalism is different from state-led nationalism, and is certainly 
more powerful and popular than the outmoded Communist ideology. The main 
distinctions are twofold. Firstly, popular nationalism is mostly passive and reactive, 
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and unlike stated-sponsored nationalism it does not have to have a clear structure. 
Shambaugh has grasped this important feature of Chinese popular nationalism, when 
he characterises it as “defensive nationalism”, which is “assertive in form and reactive 
in essence” (1996b: 205). Secondly, popular nationalism is not necessarily fuelled by 
an official doctrine, like state-centric nationalism; it is often reinforced by a strong 
emotion of collectiveness, shared by common ancestry and perhaps most importantly, 
by memories of glory and agony (Wu 2007: 128). Western commentators have 
repeatedly attributed this solidarity exclusively to the CCP’s purposeful propaganda.  
While this common interpretation is certainly valid to some extent, the emotional 
aspect of it should not be underestimated or neglected altogether.  For example, when 
observing the Western media coverage on the 1999 student protest against US 
bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Gries notes that the “West’s ‘party 
propaganda’ view focuses on the instrumental motivations of Chinese nationalism, 
dangerously dismissing their emotions as irrelevant” (2004: 20). Consequently, from 
a constructivist’s perspective, this work argues that Chinese popular nationalism is to 
some extent instrumentalised through the state-led construction of the ‘century of 
shame and humiliation’ discourse dating back the 1990s patriotic education campaign. 
As the same time, this constructed anti-Western, anti-Japanese sentiment, the thesis 
believes, continues to feed back into government’s internal and external policy 
considerations in the post-Cold War, post-Tiananmen era. 	  
In short, this works believes that popular nationalism in China evolved from 
intellectual criticisms towards the 1980s “culture fever”. The essence of Chinese 
popular nationalism is similar to the state-led nationalism before the reform period, 
which contains a strong, albeit constructed, anti-imperialist, anti-West (including 
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Japan) sentiment. But unlike state-led nationalism, popular nationalism both came 
from grassroots level and spread at grassroots level. Whilst concurring with the 
consensus that the Patriotic Education Campaign helped the CCP leaders to redeem 
some much-needed unity in the society and reconsolidate some lost legitimacy from 
the Tiananmen crack down, this work does not see it as the sole reason for the 
apparent rise of nationalism in China. As presented above, popular nationalist 
movement existed prior to Tiananmen crack down. The crack down triggered the 
CCP to quickly reassess the possible side effects of its economic reform policy. 
Chinese government’s promotion of nationalism might have speeded up its rise, but 
the anti-imperialist and anti-West nationalistic sentiment, genuine or not, has always 
been a significant element in the Chinese construction of ‘us’ and ‘other’ dating back 
to the aforementioned late-Qing period. Just like reform-minded intellectuals in the 
pre-ROC era responded to foreign military invasion, the early popular nationalists 
such as Wang Xiaodoing, Song Qiang and He Xin, reacted to the sudden ‘invasion’ 
of Western products, ideology, value, following the Deng’s economic reforms. As 
China’s economy continued its rapid growth, the technological advance in internet 
and social media has forever revolutionised the way popular nationalism is spread 
and presented. 
	  
2.3.2	   Power	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  Cyber	  Nationalism	  
The fast advance of internet communication technology is a crucial factor driving 
popular nationalism.  The number of internet users in China soared from 22.5 million 
in 2000 to 420 million in early 2010, which currently counts about a quarter of the 
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total population.53 China now has more than 450 million web users, about a quarter of 
the global total, and more than half of the Asian web users or netizen population54 
(CNNIC, 2011: 12). This fast development in internet accessibility has accelerated 
and broadened the Chinese public’s access to information about events inside and 
outside the country. According to the latest official statistical survey, Chinese internet 
users are disproportionally young and well educated, with more than half of them 
(53.2%) aged between 20 and 40, and student making up the largest group of netizens 
(30.6%) in terms of occupation (CNNIC, 2011: 19-20). This coincides, as Shirk notes, 
with the population group that is considered most likely to engage in anti-foreign 
nationalist protest (2011b: 232). These young and well educated netizens are ever-so-
eager to fully grasp the internet to gather real-time information, express opinion and 
participate in public affairs in a country, where previous generations of citizen had 
little opportunity for unconstrained public self-expression or access to free and 
uncensored information.   	  
As internet access becomes more and more common in Chinese households, internet 
has gradually become an indispensable part of the life of urban residents.  Internet 
Bullet Board System (BBS) forums, chat rooms and social networking sites have 
emerged as a popular choice for Chinese web users (网民 or netizens) to exchange 
information and to share their emotions, including nationalistic sentiment. By taking 
advantage of online technology, popular nationalists have gained an effective tool to 
promote the nationalistic causes among Chinese people around the world. These 
sentiments do not necessarily follow the lines of official state-promoted nationalism. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Figures gathered from Internet World Stats, accessed at 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/asia/cn.htm. Accessed on 5/10/2010. 
54 Data from the latest report on China’s Internet development, compiled by China Internet Network 
Information Centre (CNNIC), China’s state network information centre.  
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Rather, they are often much more provocative and extreme, in terms of opinions and 
language. Despite certain government restrictions on its use, the Internet has been a 
preferred choice for popular nationalist to share, promote, spread and circulate its 
nationalistic messages, and to organise anti-foreign protests. As a result, cyber 
nationalism, a new post-Cold War phenomenon facilitated by the development in 
online technology, has grown swiftly.55  This work sees cyber nationalism in essence 
being the online form of popular nationalism.  In other words, cyber nationalism is a 
non-government-sponsored movement led by popular nationalists, as oppose to the 
CCP-directed patriotism. It has increasingly become an indispensible tool in the 
popular nationalist movement. Wu states,  
 
Taking advantage of the online communication technology…Chinese cyber nationalists 
have been utilising the Internet as a communication centre, organisational platform, and 
execution channel to promote the nationalistic causes among Chinese people around 
the world (Wu, 2007: 3). 	  
There are several qualities that made the Internet a catalyst for the continuous rise of 
popular nationalism. 
 
First, online anonymity presents lower risks for web users to express opinions. 
Unlike the real world, internet is a vast virtual space, in which people know one 
another by their chosen user names. Communication is done hidden behind a physical 
computer screen. People can be faceless in this virtual world, and they can be anyone, 
and everyone, as “on the internet, nobody knows you are a dog”.56 Comparing with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 For one of the earliest studies on Chinese cyber nationalism, see Hughes (2000). 
56 This famous quote perfectly captures the spirit of the Internet. It originated from a cartoon by Peter 
Steiner. See Fleishman (2000).  
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traditional ways of face-to-face discussions and telephone communication, netizens 
do not need to compromise elements of their identity (e.g. appearance, voice) to 
convey messages across. As it will be demonstrated in subsequent case studies, 
online anonymity sometimes empowers Chinese netizens to express popular 
nationalist opinions both outwardly, and inwardly at one’s own government. 
Therefore, in a country like China, where public expressions may only follow the 
official doctrine, cyberspace is a comparatively safer place to voice dissent. 
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the reason for terms such as ‘relatively’, and 
‘comparatively’ being used is that China’s cyberspace is far from totally free. Ever 
since the internet technology started to develop in China in the late 1980s, the CCP 
government has been constantly upgrading its online censor system, infamously 
dubbed the Great Fire Wall of China.57 The government uses this system to filter out 
any information and opinion deemed a risk to social stability or attacking the CCP’s 
rule. 
 
Second, internet contains endless amount of information. The scope of information, 
knowledge and news that can be found online are far wider than traditional media 
outlets such as television and newspapers. More importantly, contrary to traditional 
media format, where people are passively fed with information, internet enables 
people to actively search for whatever information at one’s will. In addition, because 
one intentionally searches for information, one only gathers materials that are needed 
or interested. For example, when Chinese netizens search nationalistic materials 
online, they would mainly receive information of a nationalist nature, such as China’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 For analyses on the Great Fire Wall of China, see Deibert (2002); and The Economist (1998). 
	   94	  
sufferings under foreign occupation, and China’s lost territories. This means 
knowledge can be accumulated more easily and quickly. 
 
Third, online news and information are instantaneously updated. In contrast to 
traditional media platform, the Internet is open 24/7, with no cut-off time. News can 
be loaded up from one corner of the globe and be viewed almost instantly by people 
from the other. This advantage is particularly significant when covering high-
intensity and fast-developing events. Instant updates online allow netizens to closely 
keep pace with developments of a particular news or event. Crucially, thanks to its 
instantaneous and open characteristics, netizens are able to interact with news and 
events much more easily and conveniently online than via any other media platforms. 
In recent years, as the explosive growth in Internet access continues in China, BBS 
forum, weblogs, chat rooms and instant messaging services have become extremely 
popular channels for communication (Xiao, 2011: 205). Furthermore, thanks to its 
openness and the interactiveness, the Internet also enables ordinary people to be the 
news reporter, as they may reveal anything online from celebrity gossip to local 
government scandals. As subsequent case studies in Chapter Four and Five will 
show, this ability of instant interaction with current affairs and with other fellow 
netizens plays a critical role in Chinese popular nationalist movements today. 
 
Finally, the virtual world is boundariless and has no geographical barriers. Through 
the internet, Chinese netizens may communicate with people across the length and 
breath of the earth.58 It is this ‘boundariless’ nature of the Internet that has helped 
people to create millions of virtual communities for different issues, interests and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 In theory this is true. But in practice, without anti-fire wall skills or software, Chinese netizens 
cannot access sites containing information deemed too sensitive by the CCP. These usually include, the 
Tiananmen crackdown, criticisms on Chinese human rights, Falungong, and Tibetan independence. 
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beliefs. Just like people join different clubs and societies for different hobbies and 
interests, within a virtue community, it is much easier for one’s ideas or opinions to 
be understood, shared, reaffirmed and prospered. For Chinese nationalists, this means 
they are able to meet like-minded netizens who share similar nationalistic value and 
opinions. There are hundreds of nationalist forums in China. Some of them are more 
generally focused, where all issues concerning popular nationalists are discussed; 
others have chosen to concentrate on specific issues such as Sino-Japanese relations, 
historical issues with Japan, and boycott of Japanese goods.59 It is worth noting that 
even on generally themed nationalist forums, predominant spaces are dedicated to 
issues regarding Japan. Again, the subsequent two case studies on Sino-Japanese 
relations will show the roles of these internet forums in shifting the dynamics of 
popular nationalism. 
	  
2.3.3	   The	  Pride/Humiliation	  Complex	  in	  Chinese	  Nationalism	  
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Chinese nationalism has deep roots 
stretching back to the indignities foisted on China by European imperialist powers 
and Japanese militarists during the ‘century of shame and humiliation’. It was when 
China was at the hands of foreign powers that had led the forward-thinking elites to 
search for a new form of national identity that could unite and defend the Chinese 
nation. The victim-orientated aspect of Chinese nationalism represents China as a 
nation ruthlessly violated by Western imperialism after the Opium War from the mid-
nineteenth century until 1949, when China’s military and political weakness had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For examples of generally themed sites, see Strong Nation Forum (强国论坛): 
http://bbs1.people.com.cn/; Utopia (乌有之乡): http://www.wyzxsx.com/;  and The Patriots Alliances 
(爱国者同盟网): http://bbs.1931-9-18.org/index.php. For issue specific forums on Japan, see for 
example, China-Japan Net Forum (中日网论坛): http://www.sjhistory.net/site/bbs/; and Anti-Japanese 
Goods Forum (反日货论坛): http://www.cnni.com.cn/bbs/.  
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made it an easy prey to aggressive foreigners (Barme, 1995: 210). Therefore, from the 
outset, Chinese nationalism was strongly associated with anti-Western, anti-Japanese 
xenophobic connotations. Throughout the contemporary Chinese history, whenever 
China is perceived to have been badly ‘bullied’ by these powers, Chinese nationalists 
will come out and vent their anger. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the May Fourth 
Movement of 1919, the anti-American protests of 1999 and anti-Japanese 
demonstrations in recent years have all epitomised this victim orientation in Chinese 
nationalism.  
 
This victim-orientated nationalistic feeling also forms part of the cornerstone for the 
Communist Party’s official nationalism discourses. According to the official 
narratives, it was the Communist Party that eventually achieved victory against the 
Japanese ‘invaders’ and ended the ‘century of shame and humiliation’. During the 
state-led patriotic education campaign, the CCP government not only reminded its 
people the glories of ancient Chinese civilisation, it also induced a heavy dose of 
“national humiliation education” that commemorates China’s defeats (Callahan, 2010: 
14). School children were made to watch patriotic films, from a compulsory list 
drawn up by the central government. Museums, war memorials, battle sites, and war 
cemeteries were designated as “Patriotic Education Bases” (爱国主义教育基地), 
where school trips were taken to for the students to learn about Chinese heroic actions 
and foreign (especially Japanese) atrocities. In addition, several important museums 
on the War of Resistance against Japan, such as Nanking Massacre Memorial Hall, 
and Museum of War of People’s Resistance against Japan, were extensively 
renovated, with new ones constructed, including the Mukden Incident Museum in 
Shenyang.  
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It may seem odd for China publicly endorsing humiliation, after all, as Callahan 
observes, “common sense tells us that humiliation is something that is suffered in 
silence, rather than publicly celebrated” (2010: 16). However, the reason for the CCP 
to promote this negative victim image was that it would serve as a contrast for what 
the party had achieved, namely the founding of an independent new China. It helped 
the CCP to emphasise a strong sense of “redemption” (Callahan, 2010: 16), hence to 
boost the positive side of popular nationalism that is the pride of the Chinese nation. 
On 1 October 1949, when Mao Zedong declared, “Ours will no longer be a nation 
subject to insult and humiliation. The Chinese people have stood up!” (Mao, 1977: 
17), not only did he announce to the world the establishment of a new independent 
China, he also conveyed a perhaps more important message that the new country 
ruled by the CCP would never let its people to be mistreated by foreign powers. The 
painful historical experiences contrasting with China’s independence, Shambaugh 
argues, represent “the raison d'être of the modern Chinese Communist state, which 
came to power on a promise to unify the nation, restore its dignity and never again 
permit foreigners to subjugate, discriminate against or try to ‘split’ China” (2008). 
 
It is precisely due to the humiliation narratives being so deeply rooted in the mind of 
Chinese people, that people share enormous sense of pride as China’s influence 
quickly grows. This strong sense of pride after humiliation reflects how Chinese 
position China on the world stage today. For many Chinese people, China is not a 
rising power, but a returning power. They argue that China had never “fallen off the 
world stage”, but merely faded away in the last century or so (Wu, 2007: 1). As 
China’s profile increases both in terms of politics and economic, Chinese popular 
	   98	  
nationalists have been increasingly eager for the CCP leaders to steer China back to 
its “rightful place on the world stage” (Callahan, 2010: 15; and The Economist, 
2010c). Furthermore, the sense of pride and the sense of humiliation are intertwined 
in Chinese popular nationalism dynamics. Put simply, “pride” comes from 
overcoming “humiliation”, “humiliation” arises from dented “pride”. Whilst Chinese 
people often feel immense pride whenever China achieves something on the world 
stage (e.g. in sport events), Chinese popular nationalism hits back when this 
achievement is discredited by other countries. Popular nationalists in China have “a 
very low threshold for foreign criticism, zero tolerance for ‘losing face’ (Shambaugh, 
2008). 
 
2.3.4	   The	  Pride/Humiliation	  Complex	  at	  Work	  
The Anti-CCN movement prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics exemplifies the 
pride/humiliation complex operating in Chinese popular nationalism today. For the 
Chinese, the Beijing Olympics in 2008 are more than games; they generate immense 
national pride.  As well as being a global sporting event, the Games were aimed at 
showcasing China’s rapid economic growth and prosperity, confirming, what Beijing 
believes to be the return of its rightful status in the international community (Cha, 
2008: 107). However, as the whole country was putting the finishing touches on what 
turned out to be “truly exceptional Games”,60 the preparations were hindered by the 
sudden outbreak of violence on the street of Lhasa and other Tibetan areas in China. 
The unrest occurred just days before the start of the much-publicised global Olympic 
Torch relay. The Tibetan riots drew strong criticisms from the West on Chinese 
government’s alleged heavy-handed approach to the crisis. Apart from the critical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Speech by Jacques Rogge (2008), the President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). 
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coverage from Western media, pro-Tibet, anti-China protests erupted along the torch 
relay route. Having witnessed the disruptions which anti-China protests created 
during several overseas legs of the Olympic Torch relay, the immense pride attached 
to the Olympics amongst the Chinese public soon became a huge humiliation. They 
felt the chaos had made China to “lose face” at a time when China should have been 
applauded by the world for organising such great spectacle.  Hence, nationalist fury 
quickly raged across China.  
 
As popular nationalists vented their anger online, they soon discovered that some of 
the Western media reports, such as Cable News Network (CNN), on the Tibet unrest 
used photo-editing techniques to dramatise the event and make the Chinese law 
enforcement agents appearing more aggressive. In response to this seemingly biased 
and inaccurate report, Anti-CCN.com was established to expose the “lies and 
distortions of facts from Western media” (Takung Web News, 2008). The website 
posted a collection of photos and video clips used in Western media outlets which 
were accused to be airbrushed or photoshoped. It instantly became a popular hit in 
online communities, and within days the site received more than 500,000 daily 
visitors and hundreds of volunteers emailed the site’s creator Rao Jin, offering help in 
gathering materials and doing translations61 (CCTV, 2008). “做人别太CNN” (Don’t 
be too CNN)62 became a very popular catch phrase in China, both in cyberspace and 
in daily life (China Economics Network, 2008). Apart from illustrating Western biases, 
Internet users in China shared their anger, frustration and other anti-West nationalistic 
sentiment with one another via chat rooms and forums. One of the biggest Chinese 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 For a personal account of the development of anti-CNN.com, please see an interview with Rao Jin 
(CCTV, 2008) 
62 A song with the same name was timely created by a famous online singer Mu Rongxun.  The song 
too became an Internet sensation and a popular download in China at the time.  A MTV version can be 
watched at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uX28hMlkB5Y. Accessed 15/11/2010.  
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language online portal sites, Sina.com, even set up a dedicated page under a 
nationalistic title “Chinese Netizens Firing at CNN and other Western Media”.63 Other 
popular portal sites soon followed suit. The anti-West tone was particularly strong in 
nationalist forums.64  In addition, thanks to the internet, the nationalist force in 
Mainland China was strongly supported by patriots worldwide, especially by Chinese 
students overseas.65  
 
The anti-CNN movement demonstrated how popular nationalism transfers from pride-
orientated positive feelings to humiliation-orientated negative sentiment. The 
Olympics Games, more than any other sporting event, have always seen by the 
Chinese a perfect opportunity for China to demonstrate state power (Cited in Yardley, 
2008). Every four years, the nation glues to the television sets and supports their 
sporting heroes to great success. Not only does the feeling carries the great patriotic 
feelings of love one’s own country, with every gold medal won by Chinese athletes, it 
also beings out a strong nationalistic sentiment of redemption and vindication 
amongst the Chinese public. This sentiment came from the infamous title the “Sick 
man of East Asia” that had so long been associated with weakness in terms of Chinese 
individual physical power and China’s national power.66  When referring to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See http://bbs.sina.com.cn/zt/w/08/attackcnn/index.shtml. Accessed 12/11/2010.  
64 For example, Strong Nation Forum, 
http://bbs1.people.com.cn/boardList.do?action=postList&boardId=1; and Utopia, 
http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Special/zangdu/. Both accessed 10/08/2010. 
65 A search for “藏独” (Tibet Independence) in title on powerapple.com, one of the most popular and 
influential overseas Chinese student forums, found more than 100 threads were posted between March 
and August 2008.  Most of them were news and information updates, denunciations of pro-Tibet 
protestors, but some were calling or organising counter-demonstrations to support China. It is 
interesting to note that powerapple.com has always been blocked in Mainland China. Search result can 
be accessed at 
http://forum.powerapple.com/modules.php?name=forum&file=searchtopic&forum=38&searchkey=藏
独&uname=&start=0. Accessed 11/08/2009. 
66 Interestingly, the term is reportedly first appeared as the title of a cartoon published in a Singapore in 
1936 as Chinese delegation returns from the Berlin Olympics via Singapore. The cartoon portrays a 
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decision for China to host the Olympics in 2008, the phrase 圆了百年奥运之梦 (the 
100-year-dream of hosting the Olympics Games has come true) was often used to 
indicate the length of time since China joined the Olympic Movement, and to express 
the immense pride that China’s growing strength had been vindicated.67 As a result 
successful hosting the Olympics in 2008 is seen by most Chinese as a confirmation of 
the PRC’s great power status (Xu, 2008: 1-29; and Brownell, 2008: 19). This positive, 
pride-orientated feeling quickly turned into negative, raging nationalistic anger amid 
the critical coverage on China from the Western media. Popular nationalism swiftly 
spun into action in order to counter the claims made by Western media and defend 
China’s image. The analysis on the anti-CNN movement has shown that these two 
mutually constitutive and yet distinctive mindsets, pride and humiliation, cannot be 
discussed in isolation. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that, it is not possible to 
understand the positive aspect of Chinese popular nationalism without fully 
comprehending the negative side. 
	  
2.4	  Summary	  
 
This chapter has offered a comprehensive overview on Chinese nationalism. It has 
identified the birth of Chinese nationalism was due to European and Japanese powers 
occupation of China from the second half of the nineteenth century. It has presented 
the way which popular nationalism started to flourish at the grassroots level since the 
adoption of economic reforms. Critically, the chapter has assessed how popular 
nationalism compliments the state-led nationalism discourse, becoming a dominant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
group of skinny Chinese men with queue-styled hair, carrying a stretcher with a big zero on top 
(indicating China had won nothing from the games). See Hu (2008).   
67 The Chinese Olympic Committee was established in 1910, under Republic of China, and participated 
its first Olympics Games in 1932. For history of China in Olympic movement, see COC (2008). 
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yet volatile force to confront with any perceived foreign provocation. Furthermore, it 
has acknowledged the rise of internet communication offered popular nationalists a 
perfect platform on which their opinions may be spread and their actions may be 
coordinated.  
 
Throughout the chapter, the importance of the “century of shame and humiliation” in 
Chinese nationalism discourse has been emphasised. In particular, the chapter has 
argued that Chinese popular nationalism presents a mixture of positive and negative 
discourse, partly due to government-led construction, partly due to China’s 
experience in contemporary history. The pride/humiliation complex is the core of 
popular nationalism today. It is this mutual constitutive relation between pride and 
humiliation sentiments that has created the popular nationalism dynamics in the post-
Cold War China. 	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Chapter	  Three:	  China	  and	  Japan	  –	  Near	  Yet	  So	  Far	  	  	  	  
Officially China has always described Japan as a “close neighbour, separated only by 
a strip of water” (一衣带水的邻邦).68  As close neighbours, China and Japan have a 
long history of trade and interactions. Indeed, Chinese civilisation has greatly 
influenced Japan with its writing system, culture and philosophy.  However, due to 
the decline of late Qing Dynasty in China and Japan’s successful Westernisation in 
the Meiji Restoration in the mid-19th century, and Japan’s subsequent invasions and 
occupations of China, the relations between these close neighbours have become 
somewhat alienated.  The very narrow “strip of water” that separates the two nations 
with strong cultural connections, has become a battleground for several major 
territorial disputes that epitomises the current status of Sino-Japanese relations.  The 
bilateral relationship between China and Japan has always attracted much attention 
from the academic field, as well as the general public in East Asia and beyond.  Not 
only is it because the vital importance of two states being the most powerful in the 
East Asia, it is also due to the serious consequence and implications of any 
disturbance or friction in Sino-Japanese relations may have to the region and beyond. 
 
Since the normalisation of relations between the two nations in September 1972, there 
have been ups and downs between the two governments in Beijing and Tokyo 
respectively. Perhaps, one could use the term “roller-coaster ride” as the best 
description for Sino-Japanese relations. Dreyer describes the bilateral relations as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The term was first included in the joint Communiqué for establishment of bilateral relations in 1972 
(see Appendix I).  It has been frequently used by both governments thereafter.  Geographically, China 
and Japan are separated by a narrow stretch of Ocean—the East China Sea. 
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cyclical, “with periods of relative cordiality interspersed with episodes of contention” 
(2001: 373). During the Koizumi years as the Prime Minister of Japan, it was believed 
then, Sino-Japanese relations had hit the lowest point in three decades, and it was seen 
as the darkest hours since the normalisation in 1972 (Hsiung, 2007: xi; and BBC News 
Online, 2005).  
 
This chapter presents an overview of Sino-Japanese relations. It offers a general 
understanding of the critical but sensitive element of popular nationalism in China’s 
stance and actions toward Japan, both in public and in decision-making process of the 
government. The chapter first provides a review on what has been an increasing 
academic interest in the studies of Sino-Japanese relations. The aim of this review is 
to gather together as much material as possible, then to review them in groups 
according to their different approaches and focal points. Only in this way, the review 
will offer a clear observation and a thorough understanding of the current literature.  
For the purpose of clarity only, the current literature on Sino-Japanese relations is 
split into two separated groups, namely, general introductory literature, and issue 
specific literature. Nonetheless, it certainly does not incline that the coverage of one 
piece of literature from one group is exclusive to that of the one from other groups.  
For example, when one considers Sino-Japanese relations, it is inevitable to talk about 
the history and the issues related to the war.  Unsurprisingly, that is why all scholars 
in this field have acknowledged this and spent considerable ink on history and war in 
one way or another. The way the literature is separated is according to the main focal 
point or approach that each piece has been taken. The review also includes a general 
overview of Sino-Japanese relations in the post-Cold War period, and its current 
trends. 
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The second part of the chapter deals with the sensitivity surrounding matters 
concerning Japan in China’s politics and public sphere. It explores the prominent 
position where Japan is situated in modern-day China’s increasing popular 
nationalism.  More importantly, it critically assesses the so called cycle of influences 
between policy makers (the state), the media and public opinions on China’s relations 
with Japan whereby Japan or the nationalistic sentiment towards whom provides fuel; 
the internet and mobile communication technology act as effective carriers for it to go 
around.   	  
3.1	  General	  Introductory	  Literature	  
 
There are vast amount of books and articles written on Sino-Japanese relations in 
general, which provide a good overview and hence a starting point of any relevant 
research. Howe (1996), Austin and Harris (2001), Dreyer (2001), Hsiung (2007), Iriye 
(1994), Calder (2006), and Rose (2005) are those this work has found particularly 
helpful to not only one’s understandings of the issue and also to in depth thinking on 
the subject.   
 
Dreyer’s article titled ‘Sino-Japanese Relations’ is a short and concise summary on 
the contemporary issues lingering between China and Japan. She concentrates on the 
relevant events in the 1990s and the subsequent increasingly hardened approach from 
Tokyo to Beijing (Dreyer, 2001: 373). The Communist collapse, quickly followed by 
Chinese government’s suppression of student demonstrators in June 1989, Dreyer 
argues, had caused a sharp drop in the favourable Japanese public views of China. 
This combined with China’s seemingly belligerent behaviour had aroused 
	   106	  
considerable concern for Japan, ultimately resulting in intensified frictions between 
the two governments (2001: 375-7). Moreover and perhaps most significantly for 
Dreyer, “the year 1995 proved a turning point for Sino-Japanese relations:  Japanese 
concern at Chinese aggressive behaviour propelled Tokyo into a closer defence 
relationship with the United States and into undertaking a higher defence profile for 
itself” (2001: 385). The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-6, during which China 
repeatedly fired missiles over Taiwan and into waters with close proximity to Japan, 
has prompted Japan to participate in the United States-backed Theatre Missile 
Defence System (TMD). Thus, it created a new irritant in Sino-Japanese relations. 
Dreyer warned that the continuous deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations in the 
1990s would become worse if hard-liners in both Beijing and Tokyo to exacerbate the 
different between the two states and to adopt more assertive policies to one another 
(2001: 385). 
 
History plays a pivotal role in Sino-Japanese relations.  Therefore, many of these 
general literatures present a chronological overview on development of bilateral 
relations (Howe, 1996; Rose, 2005; Hsiung, 2007; and Iriye, 1994).  
 
Iriye offers an interesting way of approach which focus on how relations between 
China and Japan have been affected by developments in the international community 
as a whole, and at the same time, have contributed to defining it. His book has 
clarified the nature of the interconnection between the bilateral relationship and global 
developments (1994: vii). In order to achieve this, Iriye places Sino-Japanese relations 
into the three dimensions of international relations, namely power, economics and 
culture, and argues that although three dimensions are overlap and affect on another, 
	   107	  
but within a particular timeframe, they are by no means synonymous or 
interchangeable (1994: 4).  He divided the modern history of Chinese-Japanese 
relations into three periods: from the 1880s to the First World War; form the end of 
that war to the Second World War; and the post-1945 years.  Each period is then 
discussed in terms of the three dimensions.  He argues that during the first period, 
with the Meiji Restoration, and Western colonial power enjoying territorial privileges 
in China, power took precedence over economics and culture in Sino-Japanese 
relations (Iriye, 1994: 27). In this period, Japan enjoyed the success of Meiji 
Restoration, with westernised economy and dramatic increase in military power.  
After defeating Qing China in the First Sino-Japanese War 1894-5, Japan established 
military and economic superiority over China, which was reinforced through colonial 
acquisitions from China (Iriye, 1994: 15). During the inter-war period, the driving 
element behind China-Japan relations was culture.  He further argues that economics 
has been the primary factor in the post-war history of China and Japan.  This is 
because, in the post-war era, China-Japan power relations were now becoming part of 
the global power system, in which “the United States and the Soviet Union enjoyed 
hegemonic positions.  Given such circumstances, neither China nor Japan would 
enjoy military autonomy.  Accordingly, economic and cultural factors would be of 
greater significance in the initial post-war phase of Chinese-Japanese relations” (Iriye, 
1994: 93). The post-war cultural exchange promoted the reconnection between 
Beijing and Tokyo before the official normalisation. The cultural contacts might not 
have a direct impact on the two countries official relations.  Nevertheless, the cultural 
ties, Iriye believes, may have helped sustain and promote the developing economic 
connections, thereby confirming the policy of seikei bunri (separation of politics and 
economics) (1994: 108-9). It is possible then to argue that in time the economics and 
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cultural ties might have grown to such an extent that pressures might have been 
generated for normalising diplomatic relations between China and Japan.  
 
The edited volume China and Japan: History, Trends and Prospects by Howe (1996) 
represents another excellent introductory to Sino-Japanese studies. Being a volume 
with paper produced as a result of a conference held in Tokyo in 1990, the timing of 
this publication corresponds with the dramatic changes both in global settings at the 
end of the Cold War and in China after the Tiananmen crack down.  Similar to Iriye’s 
book, Howe’s volume also attempts to examine Sino-Japanese relations within the 
global context.  Perhaps more focused than Iriye on post-war Sino-Japanese relations, 
Howe’s volume places heavy weight on the increasing bilateral and multilateral 
political (Shambaugh, 1996a: 83-97) and economic interdependence and its 
implications to relations between China and Japan (Howe, 1996: 98-126; and Yokoi, 
1996b: 127-146).  Howe’s emphasis tackles the problem of the political economy in 
Sino-Japanese relations. On the surface, the pattern of a country’s economics relations 
may be described in terms of statistics, but it is important, he argues, to bear in mind 
that economics relations are “interactions between economic, political, and even 
cultural factors in the broadest sense” (Howe, 1996: 2). 
 
It is necessary to highlight a chapter by David Shambaugh (1996a) in Howe’s edited 
book, as Shambaugh examines strategic dimension of in Sino-Japanese relations.  The 
central focus of his article is whether the relations between the two powers will 
remain amicable or whether their historical rivalry will be re-ignited.  He does this by 
assessing the factors of stability and instability in the emerging Sino-Japanese 
relationship.  He argues that although potential disagreement could escalate to higher 
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levels of mistrust and rivalry, at the same time, the strength and depth of existing ties 
and the complexity of interdependence in particular will restrain the rivalry 
(Shambaugh, 1996a: 83).  It is worth noting that some scholars already see the signs 
of strategic rivalry between China and Japan (Segal, 1993: 27-32; and Calder, 2006: 
129-139). 
 
Austin and Harris (2001) agree to Iriye (1994) that as China and Japan look to 
influence global order, so too does it influence them.  They further argue that “[a]t 
very least, global and regional circumstances in a broad range of dimensions define 
the room for manoeuvre and the responses of the two governments in their mutual 
relations.  Thus, the shape of the bilateral relationship can depend more on factors 
external to it than any factors under the direct influence of either government” (Austin 
and Harris, 2001: 2).  However, different from other general literature on Sino-
Japanese relations, Austin and Harris have enlarged their geographic scope, to 
introduce the Greater China (i.e. mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and overseas 
Chinese, especially those in East Asia).  As well as covering the usually issues in 
Sino-Japanese relations, a dedicated chapter discusses the issue of Taiwan, and the 
“One China” policy between Japan and China.  Austin and Harris believe that such 
issues have been and will be an important factor in relations between the national 
governments in Beijing and Tokyo (2001: 4 and 119-151).  With the return of Hong 
Kong and Macau to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and 1999 respectively, Taiwan 
constitutes the unfinished element in the Greater China objective. The Taiwan issue 
has always been declared as the fundamental determinant of Beijing’s relations to all 
states. In addition, Taiwan has extra significance in relations between Beijing and 
Tokyo, since the island was under Japanese occupation and administration for fifty 
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years after the First Sino-Japanese War.  Due to this colonial connection, China has 
been suspicious that Japan may want to maintain a “special” relationship with Taiwan.  
Beijing is also worried about the “pro-Taiwan” group in Japanese politics.  Changes 
of political leadership in Japan, particularly at prime ministerial level can have 
determining implications to Sino-Japanese relations (Austin and Harris, 2001: 121).  
Their work reviews how various Taiwan and Hong Kong issues have played out in 
Sino-Japanese relations.  It discusses Japan’s relations with Greater China economy 
and the influences at Japan “One China” policy.  Finally, it covers in great details on 
the Taiwan Strait Crisis 1996 and the subsequent changes in US-Japan defence 
arrangements (Austin and Harris, 2001: 121-2). 
 
The edited volume by Hsiung (2007) is one of the most updated books on Sino-
Japanese relations.  In this volume, a team of experts representing different shades of 
opinion and disciplines write on a broad spectrum of burning issues between China 
and Japan, with different perspectives.  The book examines all aspects of Sino-
Japanese relations, including historical root and cause of conflict (Chu, 2007: 23-42); 
the economic exchange amidst adversities (Cheng, 2007: 81-94); the military and 
security implication (Hickey and Lu, 2007: 95-112) and the sovereignty disputes 
(Suganuma, 2007: 133-172; and Yu and Kao, 2007: 173-192).  Materials focus on the 
studies of these individual issues will now be reviewed. 	  
3.2	  Issue	  Specific	  Literature	  	  
 
On war related issues, Rose (2005) provides a comprehensive historical approach to 
the understandings of Sino-Japanese relations. Her book presents a thorough, 
balanced and objective examination of the legacy of history, arguably one of the most 
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important issues that continue to plague the Sino-Japanese relationship.  She uses 
Sino-Japanese reconciliation as the theoretical framework for her study.  The theme 
“reconciliation” runs through the whole text of the book.   Within this framework, she 
considers the different ways in which history is represented and remembered by 
China and Japan respectively.  She also examines how the governments and people in 
Japan and China have come into term with the past.  Rose argues that although China 
and Japan have been undergoing reconciliation for the past fifty years, fundamental 
problems relating to the war between the two countries still exist.  This appear to 
“pose a formidable obstacle to settlement of the past and, therefore, to the smooth 
running of the relationship in the future” (Rose, 2005: 15).  The aim of her book is to 
apply the understandings on the process of reconciliation to the case of China and 
Japan.  Hence, it serves a means of explaining the efforts made by both governments 
and society to settle the past.  She then studies several specific issues in Sino-Japanese 
relations, such as textbook problems, Japanese official apology, Japan wartime 
atrocities and compensation movement, and the Yasukuni Shrine visits.  All these 
issues and a range of governmental activities, she argues, can be seen as “different 
stages along the path of reconciliation” (Rose, 2005: 15). 
 
In her earlier publications (Rose, 1998; and 1999), Rose closely examines the 1982 
history textbook event, focusing on the responses of Japanese government to Chinese 
and Korean protests and assessing Japan’s foreign policy making vis-à-vis China.  She 
argues that disagreement between China and Japan on how to talk and remember the 
war history followed a “ritualized” course in the 1980s and 1990s (Rose, 1998: 187).  
The textbook issue of 1982 set the pattern for these reoccurring conflicts and their 
solutions.  The question she was interested in was how to interpret these ritualized 
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diplomatic disputes. Rose believes the textbook issue is more than just “historical” 
per se.  She disagrees with the conventional assumption that due to the horrific impact 
from the war, decision makers in both countries were and still are psychologically 
overwhelmed, therefore, accounts to the conflict over the history textbook issue.  
Instead, Rose argues there is more to it. In other words, Rose concludes that the 
controversy over textbook issue was not really about whether or not the Japanese 
government approve such textbooks that ignored Japanese atrocities in China and rest 
of Asia during the Second World War, but rather, about contemporary power 
struggles among the leads in China and Japan.  In effect, Rose claims that here, 
“history” was a tool which both sides use to manipulate the present.  
 
The Yasukuni Shrine visits is another highly controversial issue seems recurring in 
Sino-Japanese relations. Numerous journalistic and scholarly articles have centred 
their studies on this (Tamamoto, 2001; Shibuchi, 2005; and The Economist, 2002; 
2005a; 2006a; and 2006b).  It is worth mentioning that Shibuchi’s article studies the 
influence and role of Japanese rightist in the disputes of Yasukuni Shrine, and 
explains the aspect of “identity politics” in Japan.  He argues that the essence of the 
Yasukuni Shrine dispute is a “clash of incompatible identities”; and because of these 
conflicting identities, the Chinese and the Koreans have no choice but to “oppose, 
dispute and demonize the Japanese rightists” (Shibuchi, 2005: 213).  Hence, this 
tension appears to be almost irresolvable.  The Chinese see the Shrine as honouring 
Japanese militarism; whereas, many of the Japanese public see it as honouring those 
who sacrificed their lives for the Japanese nation. 
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The security dimension of Sino-Japanese relations is also a field that received good 
attentions by the scholars.  On this field, Wu scrutinizes the security relations between 
Japan and China from geopolitical perspective, presenting the security concern from 
China and Japan respectively (2000: 296-310).  His article also includes a detailed 
study on the US-Japan security alliance and how it affects the views from China (Wu 
2000: 298-304).69   To the contrary, Takamine observes Japan’s strategic use of 
foreign aid to China.  Through three case studies of economic sanctions imposed by 
Japan on China in the 1990s, he looks closely how domestic political and bureaucratic 
interests motivated aid sanctions and determined the decision-making process leading 
to these sanctions. He argues “with certain politico-security interests, Japanese 
governments actively used foreign aid as a strategic instrument to counter provocative 
military actions by China in the East Asian region since the mid-1990s.” (Takamine 
2005: 439)   
 
Other literatures on security relations are concentrated on sovereignty disputes 
between Japan and China, namely the Diaoyu Islands, (Yu and Kao, 2007; Suganuma, 
2007; Tretiak, 1978; and Downs and Saunders, 1998-9) and specifically, the East 
China Sea (ECS) oil and gas field (Valencia, 2007).  Most notably, several scholars 
have used the concept of nationalism to explain territorial disputes between China and 
Japan and the bilateral relationship as a whole (Hughes, C. R., 2006; Downs and 
Saunders, 1998-9; Rose, 2000; Shih, 1994-5; and Suzuki, 2007).  Hughes presents an 
analysis of the tension between nationalism and globalisation in China since the 
beginning of the “Reform Era”.  He studies the link between Chinese nationalism and 
key areas of decision-making.  He argues that popular nationalism fuelled the anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 For Japan-US security alliance, see also, Christensen (1999). 
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Japanese sentiment in Chinese public.  From time to time, Beijing utilised this to 
consolidate its legitimacy, but yet popular nationalism often pose a dilemma to 
Beijing. The authority understands the importance of maintaining a long-term good 
relationship with Japan, it fears that anti-Japanese sentiment could turn against the 
Communist government, as seen in the Tiananmen crack down. Public demands for 
tougher stance and action against Japan could eventually undermine the legitimacy 
that Beijing has hoped to be relied on nationalism in the post-Cold War era (Hughes, 
2006: 146-151). On a similar level, Shih uses Chinese nationalist assumption to 
explain how China sees Japan.  His analysis of China’s policy towards Japan is based 
on studies of Chinese nationalism (Shih, 1994-5). Moreover, Suzuki views the 
contemporary conflicts between China and Japan are a result of the difference of 
identity. He argues that modern China’s national identity has been characterized by an 
acute sense of “victimhood” arising from its turbulent interactions with International 
Society, and that Japan plays an important role as an “other” which enhances China’s 
self-image as a “victim” (Suzuki, 2007: 23). 
 
3.3	  Ups	  and	  Downs	  	  
 
Between 1972, the normalisation of bilateral relations, and the end of Cold War in 
late 1980s, China and Japan maintained generally stable and cooperative relations, 
with some observers noted as the “honeymoon period” (Jin, 2007: 11). This was 
largely due to a favourable international political background, where China and the 
United States were enjoying close relations, together with rather positive economic 
conditions, where China’s chief reformer Deng Xiaoping adopting an open-up policy 
in 1978, dropping ideological and class struggle from Chinese Communist Party’s 
(CCP) political doctrine and favouring economic trade and development.  Since then, 
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however, Sino-Japanese relations have had a rather bumpy ride, while series disputes 
have been strong and persistent despite ever increasing bilateral trades.   
 
The post-Cold War relationship between China and Japan is a paradox.  Scholars and 
media in China frequently use the term “cold politics, hot economics” (政冷经热) to 
describe this general phenomenon of close economic trade, but intense political 
tension that seemingly characterises the post-Cold War Sino-Japanese relations.70  On 
the economic level, the two countries enjoy complementary trade, investment ties, 
and maintains a rather healthy partnership.  In 2007, China overtook the US as 
Japan’s biggest trading partner since World War II (WWII) with two-way trade 
totalling $236.6 billion (Reuters, 2008).  China has replaced the US as the largest 
export destination for Japan and Japan is also the third largest trade partner for China, 
behind the United States and the European Union. Japan is also an important source 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for China, with the FDI figure reached $69.48 
billion by the end of 2009 (Zhang, 2010).  Even at the height of the latest global 
economic crisis in 2008, the bilateral economic partnership was still tightly 
intertwined, with trade maintaining steady growth (Ding, 2010).   
 
Yet, political relations between the two countries have remained relatively cool and 
unstable. It must be noted that the bilateral relations did not deteriorate in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War and China’s Tiananmen crack down of 1989.  
Although it is well understood that Japan had little choice but to follow many Western 
states to enforce sanctions against China, Tokyo soon resumed its Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) with the third yen loan in July 1990.  Tokyo saw the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See Jin (2002; and 2004); Liu (2007), esp. Ch 2 and Govella and Newland (2010). 
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incident as both a crisis and opportunity for its relations with Beijing (Wan, 2006: 24).  
On the one hand, strict sanctions and arms embargos applied by the European Union 
and the US would somewhat slow down the pace of military build-up in China, and 
therefore prevent China from seeking regional hegemony in the foreseeable future 
(Takamine, 2005: 444).  On the other hand, Japan did not want China punished too 
harshly as it feared an unstable China and the serious implications for the East Asia 
region.  This was demonstrated when Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki visited 
China in August 1991, as the first G-7 leader to do so after the TSI.  In addition, 
despite considerable domestic resistance,71 the Emperor Akihito and Empress Michito 
made a high profile state visit to China in October 1992, the first ever Japanese 
imperial visit to China.  Both visits were warmly received by Beijing and the Chinese 
public (Wan, 2006: 24).  The early 1990s the bilateral relations enjoyed its best period 
since WWII.  Apart from the aforementioned two visits, there were regular mutual 
visits by the heads of government of both sides.72   
 
During the latter half of the 1990s, however, problems and frictions between China 
and Japan surfaced and bilateral relations had experienced strong turbulence with 
many setbacks on major conflicting issues.  From the high point of the imperial visit, 
bilateral relations contacted its first series of problems when Japan allowed Taiwan’s 
Vice Premier to attend the Asian Games opening ceremony held in Hiroshima in 
September 1994, despite Beijing’s strong protests (People’s Daily, 1994).  Beijing’s 
position on the Taiwan question has always been an unalterably fundamental principle 
in its foreign policy.73 Moreover, because of Japan’s prolonged occupation of Taiwan, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See Kim (2001) for a detailed analysis on this imperial visit.  
72 See Appendix V for a list of political exchanges between China and Japan. 
73 Kane (2001) provides a short but useful presentation on the guiding principles of Chinese foreign 
policy. 
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and subsequent connections with Taiwanese government and inherited influence of its 
culture, Taiwan is one of the most sensitive issues in Sino-Japanese relations.74 The 
Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, made Japan’s already delicate relations with China 
more difficult, as being at middle of China, Taiwan and the US.  The crisis started 
when the US government, according to Qian Qichen (China’s then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs), suddenly reversed its earlier promise to China and allowed Taiwan’s 
President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States, with Lee duly accepting an 
invitation from his alma mater, Cornell University75 in June 1995 (Qian, 2003: 305-
306).76  And only less than a year later, March 1996, in the run up of Taiwan’s first 
direct elections for the President and Vice President, China conducted a series of 
military excises, including missile firing across the Taiwan Strait.  It was intended as 
a show of force to intimidate Taiwanese public and electorate.  This massive flex-of-
muscle military manoeuvre not only triggered the US immediate deployment of two 
carrier battle groups to the area, it also, as Wan argues, “had a long term negative 
impact on Sino-Japanese relations; Japanese now saw China as a country that is too 
willing to use violence to advance its objectives” (2006; 24).77  	  
The Taiwan issue not only greatly affects Sino-Japanese relations, it is also the most 
critical piece in the triangular chessboard consisting China, Japan and the US.  Both 
Japan and the US were seeking to strengthen their alliance in the early 1990s to 
prepare potential new challenges to the regional security arrangement.  The Taiwan 
Strait Crisis was believed to have accelerated the confirmation of new enhanced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 For the importance of the Taiwan issue in Sino-Japanese relations, see Wang, Qingxin Ken (2000); 
and Yoshihide, Soeya (2001).  
75 See Cornell University’s press release on the event, Cornell University (1995). 
76 In his book, as a top diplomat involving in the event, Qian presents inside perspectives of Beijing’s 
stance and action plus the reactions from the US (2003: 305-310). 
77 See Ross (2000) for a detailed account and analysis on the Taiwan Strait Crisis 1995-1996; also see 
Wang (2000) and Nakai (2000) for Japan’s role in the crisis. 
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alliance between Japan and the US (Asher, 1997).  Despite Chinese government’s 
strong objection, Japan and the US issued a Joint Declaration on Security on 17 April 
1996, and ratified the new Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation on 23 
September 1997, expanding the scope of Japan-US security cooperation to areas 
surrounding Japan.78  The most controversial point in the new guidance for Beijing is 
the definition of “situations in areas surrounding Japan”.  Though the term is 
mentioned 23 times in the new guidelines, never once a clarification is made on what 
constitutes the surrounding waters and airspaces of Japan; and how far does the area 
stretch to? Beijing wanted Tokyo to declare that the surrounding areas of Japan do not 
cover Taiwan, but neither Tokyo nor Washington has provided a satisfactory answer 
to Beijing.  China lodged a strong protest in August 1997, when Japanese Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama indicated that the new guidelines covered 
Taiwan (Midford, 2004: 126).  If the areas included Taiwan, there would be 
significant implications for China’s potential plans for Taiwan’s reunification, as the 
TMD system in place would considerably weaken China’s missile capability in the 
conflict, if the use of force was deemed necessary.  In a wider context, China also 
extremely concerned that the enhanced security guidelines might give Japan the 
excuse to increase its defence capabilities, thus transforming the US-Japan alliance 
from “a vehicle that contain Japanese remilitarization into a vehicle that promotes it” 
(Midford, 2004: 115).79 
 
Another important factor causing the decline in China’s relations with Japan between 
late 1990s and early 2000s was the history issue, which is a general term used to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Both documents can be viewed online on Japan MOFA website.  For the Joint Declaration, see 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html; for the New Guidelines, see 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html.   Both accessed on 17/12/2010.  
79 For more studies on China’s concerns and reactions to the new guidelines, see for example, 
Christensen (1999); Wu (2000); also in Chinese language, Liu (1997); Jin (1999); and Sun (2001). 
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describe several issues relating to the Japanese aggressions and subsequent war from 
1930s to 1945.  Generally speaking, the history issue includes the Japanese textbooks 
issue, Yasukuni Shrine and Japan’s war apology.  All these issues, at one point or 
another, have been unavoidable obstacles in development of the bilateral relations 
(The Economist, 2005b).  Caroline Rose pointed out “the history problem centres on 
an inability to agree on a shared version (both within Japan and between Japan and 
China)” (2005: 5-6). Since 1982, the Chinese government and its people have been 
very sensitive to the way Japan’s recognition and reaction to its aggressive past.  
China’s official opinion regarding history problems places the “correct” recognition 
of past history as the precondition for Sino-Japanese cooperative relationship, it reads,  	  
the correct understanding of history is a sensitive political issue in the bilateral 
relations…On the basis of respecting the history, the Chinese side wishes to look to the 
future and develop friendly relations between the two peoples from generation to 
generation. Nevertheless, the prerequisite for long-term bilateral cooperation is to face 
and recognize the history (MFA, 2002). 
 
As the literature review above has presented, how China perceives Japan’s attitude 
towards its past remains Beijing’s critical prerequisite for stable development in 
political relations with Tokyo. In many dialogues commenting on Sino-Japanese 
relations, Chinese officials and media have frequently used the phrase “Taking history 
as the mirror, and looking forward to the future” (以史为鉴，面向未来), to insist 
what the “correct” attitude should be for Japan to face up its past.80  It is worth noting 
here, for Beijing, “taking history as the mirror” is the vital precondition for “looking 
forward to the future”.  In Beijing’s view, squarely facing the past and correctly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 For example Wang, Y. (2005); and Wang, J. (2008). 
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understanding and handling history is the important foundation for further developing 
relations between Japan and China.81  During the period of decline in bilateral 
relations, Beijing placed strong and repeated emphasis on the first part—taking 
history as the mirror—as it felt several actions by the Japanese government and 
officials did not represent what Beijing believed as the right approach towards Japan’s 
wartime history, thus undermined the historical elements in bilateral relations. These 
actions include Prime Minister Koizumi’s regular visit to the Yasukuni Shrine82 
during his term from 2001-2006.  On every occasion, following Koizumi’s official 
visit to the shrine, China voiced its strong disapproval and condemnation to such 
action.  Despite close economic ties, and geographic proximity, there had been no 
official visit by either side’s head of government between 2001 and 2006 (The 
Economist, 2005c). Moreover, China sees the Yasukuni Shrine as a place glorifies 
Japanese militarism, beautifies Japanese aggressions, and distorts the history of the 
Second World War (People’s Daily, 2006).  Therefore, by visiting the shrine, the 
government of Japan is deemed as sympathising with Japanese militarism and taking 
on a revisionist view on its wartime history.  Subsequently, the actions, Beijing argues, 
have grossly hurt the feelings of Chinese people (严重伤害了中国人民的感情). 
From China’s perspective, it is arguable that the insistence of Koizumi on visiting the 
controversial Yasukuni Shrine has catalysed deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations. 
Some even go further to state that the relationship between Beijing and Tokyo during 
the Koizumi term at the office has reached to its worst state – frozen point – since 
reconciliation (Fogarty, 2006). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 This is stated Japan-China Joint Declaration of 1998, see Appendix III. 
82 See Shibuichi (2005) for an analysis on the Yasukuni Shrine controversy. 
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However, Beijing’s strong and repeated emphasis on history did not go down well in 
Japan. The Japanese government felt it could never do enough for Beijing on the 
history issue. In Tokyo’s view, although only a small minority in public and politics is 
considered as so called “history revisionists”, Beijing keeps playing the history hand, 
and using as a diplomatic bargaining chip to pressurise Japan. The more Beijing 
raising the questions about history, the stronger the resisting force within Japan, both 
politically and publicly, as Japan becomes increasingly frustrated (Amako, 2004: 69).  
This confrontation is best illustrated during Jiang Zemin’s state visit to Japan in 
November 1998. The trip was meant to lay the foundation for a new partnership, and 
to commemorate the 20-year anniversary of Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978.83  
Nevertheless, China, and Jiang personally tried long and hard but failed to convince 
Japan to give in on the history and Taiwan issue. The final version of the joint 
declaration of the above treaty did not include a written apology, nor did it confirm 
Japan’s support for One China policy over Taiwan (Wan, 2006: 25). What made it 
embarrassing for Beijing and President Jiang angry was that the fact Tokyo had made 
a formal written apology with South Korea a month earlier when President Kim Dar-
jung visited Japan. 84  In the remainder of his visit, Jiang notably vented his 
disappointment to his host by delivering a series of strong rebukes over Japan’s past. 
To great surprise and shock for the Japanese officials, President Jiang lectured on the 
wartime past in his speech during the state dinner hosted by the Emperor Akihito 
(Sieg, 2008).  Privately, many Japan specialists in China and foreign policy officials 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 There are thus far four principal documents serve as the legal basis for China-Japan diplomatic 
relations.  This is the second document, following the Joint Communiqué, See Appendix II for the 
content. 
84 Japan and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration, in which it states “Looking back on the relations 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea during this century, Prime Minister Obuchi regarded in a 
spirit of humility the fact of history that Japan caused, during a certain period in the past, tremendous 
damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule, and expressed 
his deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this fact [emphasis added]” (MOFA, 1998). 
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concurred Jiang’s 1998 visit a serious failure (Wan, 2006: 25; Interview C, 2009; and 
Interview D, 2009).   
 
After this diplomatic disaster, Beijing quietly sought to reverse its tone towards Japan 
by reducing the emphasis on history, and paying more positive attention to the part of 
“looking forward to the future”, in order to concentrating on improving future 
relations.  Articles stressing the impotence of maintaining “friendship with Japan 
were commonplace in by the spring of 2000” (Rozman, 2002: 113).  On official level, 
China’s then Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said “China would judge relations with 
Japan from a long-term and strategic perspective” (Shirk, 2008: 167).  Furthermore, to 
make a friendly gesture, for example,  
 
Jiang met a 5000-member Japanese delegation on May 20, 2000, and emphasized the 
importance of a good relationship with Japan.   Premier Zhu Rongji visited Japan in 
October 2000…he had told Japanese journalists that he would not volunteer discussion 
of history during the trip (Wan, 2006: 26). 
 
This softened “smile diplomacy” approach did not go unnoticed by the Japanese 
officials and media, as they recognised this shift as signs of Beijing wanting to change 
public opinions and attitudes toward Japan (Rozman, 2002, 113).  
 
The above examples of Yasukuni Shrine and Jiang’s 1998 visit to Japan have 
demonstrated the sensitivity of history issues in Sino-Japanese relations. The root of 
issues of history between China and Japan, is not the historic event – war and atrocity 
– itself, rather it is the difference in interpreting and evaluating history. The reason for 
this difference is more ideational than material.  This is to say that different levels of 
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emotional attachment to that period of history more than the significance of the 
historic event itself cause the difference in interpretation, and more importantly, in 
evaluation. However, by say this, it is necessary to clarify that it is not intend to 
diminish the significance of wartime history for the people and governments of both 
states. In fact, it is arguable that history, the experience and portray of it, as ideational 
factors, indeed shape people’s perceptions and understandings. In the case of Japan, 
as discussed in Chapter Two, the wartime history strongly fuels the anti-Japanese 
nationalism in Chinese public opinion, which in turn, as will be presented in the two 
cases studies in Chapter Four and Five, adds implications to Beijing’s Japan policy 
considerations.  
 
Overall, the post-Cold War Sino-Japanese political relations have been fluctuating 
and inconsistent, presenting a general pattern of ups and downs. The relations 
remained reasonably good despite the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, as Tokyo did 
insist with punitive sanctions against Beijing; and reached its height during the 
Imperial visit in 1992.  Bilateral relations began to deteriorate in 1995 and reached a 
deep freeze throughout Prime Minister Koizumi’s six years in office. Koizumi’s 
resignation in 2006 offered a good opportunity for a fresh reconciliation of relations.  
Koizumi’s successor Abe Shinzo quickly managed to reverse the ties with China, by 
travelling to Beijing just days after becoming the Prime Minister, the first bilateral 
summit for five years.85  The “ice-breaking” trip was seen great significance in 
rapprochement of Sino-Japanese relations (Chang, 2006; Liao and Li, 2006).  Abe 
was well-received by Beijing with President Hu declaring the visit a “positive” step 
and Premier Wen promising friendly, cooperative relations (BBC News Online, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 See Appendix V.  By choosing China his first overseas visit, Prime Minister Abe has also broken 
with the tradition of new Japanese Prime Ministers making their first foreign visit to Washington.  This 
shows the importance Tokyo attached to the trip (BBC News Online, 2006a and 2006b).  
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2006b).  Fukuda Yasuo continued Abe’s good work in rebuilding Sino-Japanese 
relations when he took over the office of Prime Minister in September 2007.  It can be 
said that during Fukuda’s short term at the office, the relations between China and 
Japan reached a new high.  This was illustrated by a series of high profile political 
exchanges, including the Fukuda’s visit to China in December 2007 and President 
Hu’s return trip in May 2008.86  Diplomatically, it is very rare for the mutual leaders’ 
visits being so close to one another (with only five months apart).  More importantly, 
this renewed friendship also shown in increased bilateral exchanges in a wider context.  
The most significant example perhaps was the exchange visits by the two navies, 
which was the first mutual port visits since WWII.87  Despite taking some positive 
steps to rebuild relations with China, the main problem for the post-Koizumi 
reconciliation is that Japan’s domestic politics are not stable with frequent changes of 
Prime Ministers,88 so Beijing has to constantly get to know new faces, no close 
personal relationship of the leaders, like previously between General Secretary of the 
CCP Hu Yaobang and then Prime Minister Nakasone, can be formed (Interview C, 
2009).  Hence both sides cannot set a solid framework in which serious and prolonged 
discussions of some important issues in bilateral relations can be taken place.  In 
addition, major issues in Sino-Japanese relations, being such sensitive matters, still 
remain unsolved, therefore will from time to time flare up to destroy any good work 
that has previously been laid down.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See Appendix V.  
87 For Chinese media coverage and analysis see Xinhua News (2007; and 2008); Feng (2008).  It is 
believed that China’s warship visit to Japan was initially planned for 2002, to mark the 30th anniversary 
of establishing diplomatic tie.  The plan was however aborted due to the rapid deterioration of relations 
as Koizumi visiting the Yasukuni Shrine (Chen, 2007). 
88 Since Koizumi, there has been five Prime Minister in office to date, and none of them has lasted for 
over a year. 
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3.4	  A	  Sensitive	  Matter?	  	  
 
Today, of all China’s foreign relations, Sino-Japanese, along with Sino-American, 
relations perhaps attract the greatest interests from the public and the media, where 
public option may have most impact on its decision-makings. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, defining and redefining national identity has become a prominent feature in 
China’s post-Cold War society, and Japan has always been a central target for the 
drawing on victimization-based nationalism in the 1990s, national identity has a 
greater than ever profound impact on how China plays out its relations with Japan. 
How one government and its people view their own country and its place in the world 
as well as how they perceive their counterpart make important contributions to “how 
issues are interpreted and how policy goals and approaches are defined” (Wan, 2006: 
158).  “Us” can be used to define “other” as “other” can be used to define “us”.  In 
China, the ever-shifting definitions of “self” and “other” are critical to its dynamic, if 
not sometimes volatile, interactions with Japan.  
 
Commercialisation of the media in the late 1970s and more recent explosion of 
internet access have transferred this process of definition from one directional, 
government endorsed to multidirectional, which in turn, has made matters and actions 
on Japan much more complicated.89  In other words, today’s media and Internet have 
broken the CCP’s absolute monopoly on generating public interests and perceptions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The commercialisation of China’s media happened gradually since 1979, when it allowed 
newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations to support themselves by selling 
advertisements and competing in the marketplace.  Nevertheless, the media remains heavily controlled 
by the CCP, which can easily stop or even shut down any media outlets that are perceived to have 
violated its strict censorship rules.  For a very comprehensive and up-to-date discussion on China’s 
media and its influences, see Shirk (2011). 
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toward Japan; hence public opinions have become difficult to direct but more 
significant to be taken into consideration.  
	  
3.4.1	   Media:	  Nationalism	  Sells	  
The Communist Party of China has always recognised the indispensible value in 
information.  Even in its early days, the CCP understood that the pen (笔杆子) is just 
as important as the gun (枪杆子) in gaining and maintaining political power.90 
Propaganda was used widely and effectively as a vital tool for the CCP to gather 
support and popularity during the War of Resistance (1937-1945), from which the 
CCP had firmly established its political legitimacy over China.91     
 
The commercialisation of the media and the emergence of the internet have 
revolutionised the way Chinese leaders and the public interact in both domestic and 
foreign policy issues.  Instead of the old dogmatic propaganda directed from the top, 
the interactions between the media, the public and the leaders have become 
multidimensional. Opening up the marketplace for media outlets in China means that 
media companies jousting for readership and competing for the market. As a result, 
like editors everywhere, Shirk observes, “Chinese editors seek to attract audiences by 
dramatizing international news events, exaggerating threats, and emphasizing conflict 
over cooperation” (2011b: 226). For reporting international affairs, this sensationalist 
reporting style runs much less risk with the propaganda officials than doing so for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Several old guards of the CCP had reiterated this.  Collectively, it called the power of the “Two 
Sticks” (两杆子), i.e. the pen and the gun.  Mao Zedong once famously declared, “political power 
grows out of the barrel of the gun” (枪杆子里出政权).   Lin Biao, once Mao’s most trusted lieutenant, 
is attributed to have commented, “gun and pen:  to seize power needs them, to consolidate power also 
needs them” (枪杆子，笔杆子，夺取政权靠这两杆子，巩固政权也靠这两杆子). 
91 The Communist Party also used sympathetic foreign correspondences to spread out its messages 
regarding the Chinese Revolution and its efforts against the Japanese.  The best example of this 
perhaps is Edgar Snow and his book Red Star over China. 
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domestic issues. This is because being critical in domestic reporting often means 
criticism of CCP officials. The government is very sensitive to domestic issues, thus 
critical report of which is considered as destabilising factors for the society and 
ultimately the CCP’s rule. 
 
On international affairs, on the other hand, in a reversal of the old cliché – no news is 
good news – China’s commercial media seems to believe good news is no news, as it 
does not generate big sales (Shirk, 2011b: 226). The more threats, crises, and 
hostilities, the more viewers are attracted to news programmes, hence the better for 
the success of the media company. Japan, always an emotional and sensitive subject, 
provides a perfect platform for this new nationalistic sensationalism in media. Unlike 
most foreign policy issues, which receive relative little public attention and media 
coverage, even minor events and seemingly irrelevant news to bilateral relations can 
become headlines and evoke a strong nationalistic response.  In today’s China, Sino-
Japanese friction emerges not only in traditional state-to-state diplomatic relations, 
but also in popular nationalist movements (Callahan, 2010: 161). Every remark and 
action by Japanese officials, every flaw in Japanese products, every misbehaviour of 
Japanese student or tourist to China, even every comment on Japan by Chinese public 
figures, is an opportunity for tabloid newspapers and internet websites to attract 
audiences and whip up popular nationalistic passions (Shirk, 2008: 156). For example, 
when a famous Chinese actress Zhao Wei appeared on a fashion magazine’s cover 
wearing a short dress with patterns similar to that of the imperial Japanese flag in 
December 2001, it made a huge public stir. Hours after its revelation, angry messages 
flooded Internet forums and chat rooms, as the flag is considered as a potent symbol 
of Japanese militarism and the atrocities it committed to the Chinese people. The 
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editor of the magazine was forced to resign, and Zhao had made numerous public 
apologies on television and online.  Nevertheless, none of this was enough to ease the 
public anger, at a New Year’s party in Hunan province, an enraged man walked on 
the stage while Zhao was performing, and smeared excrement on her.92 Other similar 
examples that caused widespread fury towards Japan include a large Japanese tourist 
group was exposed to have involved in a three-day orgy with Chinese prostitutes at a 
luxury hotel in Zhuhai, South China, on and around 18 September 2003, a painful 
anniversary of Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931;93 and the Toyota delayed recall 
request in its Chinese market as part of its global product recall in early 2011.94   
 
All three incidents highlighted above attracted great interests and sparked fury among 
the Chinese public.  Although none of the event had anything to do with politics or 
diplomacy, they potentially could become political because of sensational reports and 
infuriating nationalistic messages exchanged on the Internet.  As a result, stories had 
been followed continuously as they made good business sense for the media.  
Sensational coverage in the official media of incidents like these has served to stoke 
the flame of Chinese resentment; resentment, anger and nationalistic passions have 
helped the media outlets to sell more newspapers and rise the popularity of their 
websites in return for potentially more advertising revenues.  Shirk sums up very well 
on this nationalism-sells phenomenon, “Anti-Japanese stories are too good a draw for 
commercial media to give up” (2008: 157). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 The event attracted such public interest that a special report site was created to follow it on 
people.com.cn, the official website for People’s Daily, see 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/wenyu/223/7010/index.html. Accessed on 15/03/2011. 
93 This is first revealed by Beijing Youth Daily, see Xiang and Lin (2003); for report in English see 
BBC News Online (2003). 
94 See Xinhua News (2011). 
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3.4.2	   The	  Internet:	  A	  Thermometer	  for	  Public	  Opinion	  
The rapid development of Internet technology and an ever-growing large population 
of netizens (web users), as discussed in Chapter Two, becomes a vital driving force 
for China’s grassroots nationalism.  
The expansion of Internet together with the recent speedy rise of blogging, instant 
messaging and social networking services in China have revolutionised the way in 
which news and information are spread, digested and interacted among the 
government, the media and the public. This has given the Chinese netizens an 
unprecedented capacity for communication. Xiao Qiang identifies that the Internet 
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) play a “particular important role in Chinese Internet 
life”, and gradually become the “primary way that Chinese netizens access and 
transmit information online to a large number of people, almost as effectively as mass 
media” (2011: 204). 95  Increasingly, Chinese netizens use the social network services 
such as BBS forum to disclose news and information, such as scandals, injustice, 
alleged corruptions, mistreatment by local authorities, most of which are too sensitive 
to be published in the official media.96 These cases are then picked up by fellow 
netizens and quickly passed around the internet in weblogs, chat rooms and by instant 
messages. The cases can become extremely popular in online community within 
hours as this process is repeated. Almost instantaneously, cases are widely discussed 
and debated with opinions shared across Internet BBS forums, weblogs, and in chat 
rooms.  Due to their rapid rising profile of these news and information, traditional 
media are forced to follow the cases in order to respond the needs of the market.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The latest CNNIC report shows that by the end of 2010, China had 295 million bloggers, with an 
annual increase of 33%; more than half of all netizens use social networking sites; and 80% of China’s 
Internet sites had their own BBS forums, with popular forums such as Tianya Club and Mop.com 
attracting tens of millions registered users (CNNIC, 2011: 36-38).    
96 Several such cases are studied in Xiao (2011). 
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It is worth noting that this form of netizen-reporting mainly limited to domestic issues.  
Due to China’s sophisticated online firewall systems, it is very difficult for ordinary 
citizens to directly access unrestricted foreign news, therefore much harder for 
Chinese netizens to expose news from overseas.  Nevertheless, domestic cases may 
easily spark nationalistic sentiment if in any way involving a foreign country, 
especially Japan. For instance, questions were raised when a well-known Chinese 
actress was falsely revealed online to have held a Japanese nationality.  It happened in 
summer 2009, when the actress, Xu Qing was set to portray Madam Sun Yat-sen in a 
showcasing film to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC on 1 
October 1949.97 Netizens questioned casting a Japanese national to play such a 
prominent Chinese political figure in a film with such high political importance.  
Others went further to label Xu as a traitor and asked how could a traitor to the 
country portray an important founding member of the PRC.  What is interesting is that 
of the all-star cast in the film, several of them are real foreign nationals, but Xu was 
singled out perhaps because it was Japan. In order to clarify this accusation and 
respond to public criticism, Xu late had to disclose her Chinese identity card to the 
public, declaring that she did not, and would never adopt Japanese nationality.98  
Thanks to the growing popularity of social media sites, through the use of the internet 
as a new media source, the general public are now able to report, spread and make 
comments on news in China.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Madam Sun Yat-sen was amongst China’s most significant political figure in the 20th Century, she 
was the Vice Chairman of the PRC at its establishment.  For Xu Qing’s “nationality gate”, please see 
China News Network (2009).   
98 Chinese law does not accept dual-nationality; one automatically gives up Chinese nationality upon 
becoming a foreign national.  So by showing she still holds a Chinese Citizen Identity Card, she can 
prove she has not join any other nationality.  
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On international affairs, although it is harder for Chinese netizens to play the 
reporting role, the Internet provides them with a rather effective tool to play the 
broadcasting and most importantly, the commentating role. This is particularly 
demonstrated with issues and events concerning countries, such as Japan, that have 
traditionally been targeted by Chinese nationalism. By reporting however minor 
issues concerning the so-called “controversial” countries, newspapers and the Internet 
web portals, the online community will react with passionate nationalistic sentiment 
on the BBS forums and in chat rooms across China. It should be mentioned that the 
State Council Information Office (SCIO), China’s news/information regulator, seems 
to be more open and tolerance towards international issues than domestic ones (Shirk, 
2011b: 226). The reason for this is that, as discussed in Chapter Two, the 
government’s propaganda department has been the major promoter for patriotism; 
hence, it has to be very careful when choosing to suppress nationalistic sentiment 
online.  
 
With commercial media finding nationalism a good selling point, the public’s lack of 
direct access to foreign news sites, and the state’s relative tolerance in nationalistic 
comments, Chinese people frequently use the Internet share their nationalistic 
opinions and vent their anger at Japan.  Not only is the anti-Japan banner waved on 
general discussion forums whenever a relevant issue pops up, there are also several 
popular BBS forums that maintain a strong nationalistic tone, where anti-Japanese 
sentiment are continuously voiced.  The Strong Nation Forum perhaps best represents 
this.  Created in the wake of the 1999 US bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 
the forum is sponsored by the People’s Daily and is attributed as an important 
development in Chinese popular nationalism (Shen and Breslin, 2010).  The forum 
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has a specific section for Sino-Japanese relations – no other bilateral relationship has 
its own section, browsing through the China-Japan section, it is not hard for one to 
discover a pattern of posting.  While the section keeps a constant monitor on anything 
to do with Japan and with odd critical comments thrown in, it is whenever an issue 
breaks out, the forum soon explodes with hatred messages expressing strong anti-
Japanese sentiments. If there is any discontent about the nationalistic opinions, the 
person(s) is quickly accused as betraying the Chinese nation and labelled a traitor.  
Peer pressure from fellow netizens can be a significant factor in opinions forming and 
sharing in an online community, as people naturally want to be a part of group with 
similar views and characteristics. Essentially, no one would like to be criticised or 
even insulted by faceless total strangers. Therefore, there may be too much 
psychological pressure that any different voice may be reluctant to come and express 
true opinions. For the same token, people may simply follow or concur with 
nationalistic sentiment in order to earn credit and popularity ratings on the BBS or 
social networking sites. The following two case studies will look into this more 
closely.  Generally speaking, with a young active dominant group, immense peer 
pressure, plus tabloid media’s exploration of nationalism, the online community in 
China today does show a strong anti-Japanese public opinion.  
 
The new online social media platform also presents critical challenges for the CCP to 
contain and control the spread of information. Due to the its decentralised, 
instantaneous, anonymous, and boundariless nature of the online technology, it 
potentially posts “grave threat to any governing measure that is highly centralised, 
bureaucratic, and parochial” (Wu, 2007: 137). Whilst, the CCP understands that it is 
nearly impossible to maintain total control over the cyberspace, nevertheless, the 
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internet offers the government an effective way to promptly and accurately gauge 
public opinions on any breaking events. This enables a swiftly evaluation to public 
reactions and appropriated responses taken by the government.  Shirk here illustrates 
how tabloids and Internet are used to “test the water” for the public opinions: 
 
Whenever a foreign policy official tells me that he or she feels under pressure from 
nationalist public opinion, I ask, “How do you know what public opinion actually is?” 
“That’s easy,” the official says. “I read Global Times99 and the Internet.” (Shirk, 2011b: 
230). 
 
Regarding to Chinese netizens’ behaviour and its impacts on policy makers in Beijing, 
Daniela Stockmann (2011) offers a detailed study on government’s response in terms 
of information management, to the public opinion crises, referring to “a situation in 
which public opinion and the position of the state on a particular issue are in 
disagreement, thus endangering social stability and economic growth” (Stockmann, 
2011: 176). Rising popularity in the new web-based media source, Stockmann argues, 
has presented a platform on which information that differs from the position of the 
government may be distributed, thus “simulating distrust in government and 
encouraging people to protest against government actions” (2011: 176). Contrary to 
the usual evidence in social psychology and communications indicating that people 
tend to selectively seek information consistent with their beliefs and avoid 
information that contradicts their beliefs, Stockmann’s study on the interactions 
between the Chinese public and Beijing’s media management shows that under state-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Global Times《环球时报》 is considered as a prime example for sensational reporting and 
nationalist headlines, on which its readership strives.  It is the tabloid version of its founder, the CCP’s 
flagship mouthpiece, People’s Daily, with most of its readers being well-educated, upper-income 
young urbanites.  See Shirk (2011b: 227-230) for a specific discussion on Global Time and its impact 
on mobilising public opinion on foreign policy.  For a critical view on Global Time’s sensationalising 
international news and pandering to nationalism, see China Digital Times (2008). 
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initiated synchronisation on media reports, new media sources would be able to aid 
the government in “appeasing” public protest rather than “mobilising it” (Stockmann, 
2011: 176 and 185). This is because, as Stockmann explains, “the commercial look of 
domestic media source [in China] creates the perception of a media outlet that 
represents the public as opposed to the state and thus aids the government in guiding 
public opinion to favour its politics” (2011: 198). Stockmann’s view will be further 
reflected in Chapter Four, when the thesis also studies the 2005 anti-Japanese protests. 
This case will argue that government’s careful management on information acts as an 
effective mechanism to control the release of popular nationalist anger. 
 
3.4.3	   Public	  Opinion:	  Unpopular	  Japan	  
Negative opinion towards Japan in the Chinese online community is reflected on the 
three major social surveys on public view of Japan, conducted by the Japanese 
Studies Institute at the Chinese Academy for Social Sciences (CASS).100 The three 
major surveys were conducted in 2002, 2004 and 2006, with the results showing 
strong similarities, suggesting no significant change in Chinese public’s attitude 
towards Japan. In all three surveys, more than half of the participants do not have 
close feelings for Japan, with only around 7% responding with positive feelings, 
despite the geographic proximity between the two countries. In the 2006 survey, when 
asked the reasons for the non-friendly feelings, overwhelming majority pointed at 
history issues (“Japan had invaded and occupied China”—27.3%; “Japan has yet to 
face the history squarely”—63.3%).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 For evolutions of the surveys see Jiang and Wang (2009), for the survey questionnaires see Li and 
Zhou (2009: 178-184).  Subsequent discussions are based on the survey results. 
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Moreover, the 2006 survey shows that more that one third of the respondents thought 
the current relations with Japan as not being good (34.3%), and the other one third 
believed bilateral relations as being “neither good nor bad” (35.3%). In contrast, only 
about 10% of replies responded positively on the status of Sino-Japanese relations. In 
addition, the results also show that most respondents thought the Chinese media 
coverage on Japan as being fair and objective (62%), whereas, the Japanese media 
coverage on China as being too negative (50%). From these figures, it is not hard to 
draw the conclusion that Chinese public holds a relatively negative perception on 
Japan and Japanese politics. However, it should be mentioned that the methods by 
which these survey were conducted might be debated. Take the 2006 survey as an 
example; the survey was only lasted about two weeks, with 4066 questionnaires sent 
and 3915 return across the vastly populated nation (Jiang and Wang, 2009: 5). The 
samples were chosen randomly with people responded voluntarily. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to argue that not only the sample size might be too small to represent the 
whole population, but also those of who did respond to the survey might have already 
held strong opinions on the subject. Furthermore, it would be interesting to know by 
what means the poll was conducted, as it may lead to biased result. This is because if 
the survey were conducted online only, as college-educated young urbanites (aged 30 
and below) being the dominant and most active amongst the Chinese netizens, the 
result would overly reflect opinions of this group, but not necessarily the perceptions 
of the wider public.101 
 
3.5	  Summary	  	  	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Although this is not to say that there is no strong anti-Japanese sentiment in general public, nor does 
it imply that anti-Japanese connotation is not an important element of popular nationalism in China. 
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This chapter has not only reviewed current academic studies on Sino-Japanese 
relations, it has also offered a concise account on the “ups-and-downs” nature of the 
bilateral relations since its normalisation.  The turbulent progress has demonstrated 
that Sino-Japanese relations are principally issue-oriented and largely driven by 
breaking events.  Additionally, from China’s perspective, the chapter has explored the 
complexity in dealing with Japan. It has discussed how commercialised media and the 
ever-growing internet users in China have helped make the Sino-Japanese relationship 
China’s most emotionally charged international issue. The chapter has made a critical 
assessment on how policy makers, commercialised media and the rapidly expanding 
online community in China shape contemporary popular nationalism vis-à-vis Sino-
Japanese relations. 
 
As it is often the case in Sino-Japanese relations, when strong nationalistic sentiment 
is generated in public sphere via the Internet and sensational media coverage, the 
foreign policymakers often feel especially constrained by nationalist public opinions 
and are forced to respond, no matter how trivial the issue (Shirk, 2011b: 226).  This 
effect shall now be systematically analysed via the 2005 anti-Japanese movement case, 
and the Diaoyu Islands dispute case, in the following two chapters. 
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Chapter	  Four:	  The	  2005	  Anti-­‐Japanese	  Protest	  	  	  
 
In the spring of 2005, large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations erupted in many cities 
across China. The protests lasted for more than three weeks, and made headline news 
across all forms of media in China and around the world. It was the first nation-wide 
nationalist demonstration since the 1999 anti-American protests following the 
bombing of Chinese embassy in Belgrade. In terms of scale and duration, the 2005 
protest was considered the largest public demonstration since the Tiananmen 
crackdown in 1989. The mass demonstrations were triggered by the United Nation’s 
(UN) proposal on possible reforms or expansion of the Security Council (UNSC), and 
Japan being the candidate for a permanent membership in the enlarged UNSC. By 
following the development of the event in chronological order through media reports, 
and examining existing academic works on this event (Stockmann, 2011; and Weiss, 
2008), this chapter explores the interactions between the central government of the 
Communist Party (CCP) and the mass nationalistic public. In other words, it seeks to 
understand Beijing’s responses to this event, on domestic and on international levels. 
The chapter aims to assess the extent this mass popular nationalism movement had 
affected or assisted Beijing foreign policy stance. 
 
The chapter begins with a brief overview on the general status of Sino-Japanese 
relations leading up the protest, and issues that prompted the mass nationalist 
movement. This follows by a presentation on the narrative of the events, weaving 
together the domestic and international levels. Along side with the narratives, here the 
responses from the nationalists and Chinese government are used to interpret their 
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respective motives and reasons. Finally, the chapter assesses to what extent did 
Beijing manage to instrumentalise anti-Japanese popular nationalism to reaffirm its 
opposition to Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC.   
	  
4.1	  Background	  
 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter Three, it is not an understatement to claim that the 
political relations between China and Japan were perhaps at its lowest point in years 
leading up to 2005. Despite booming economic relations between the two countries, 
the bilateral political exchange was literally frozen with no top-level visits by either 
side since 2001,102 prompting some commentator to change the phrase that commonly 
describes Sino-Japanese relation from 政冷经热 (cold politics, hot economics) to 政
冰 (icy politics). Several issues, China blamed, had caused this diplomatic alienation.  
 
The first issue was Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro paying repeated visits 
to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine since he came to the office in 2001. China sees 
the Yasukuni Shrine as a place that glorifies Japan’s militarist past. Among the 2.5 
million spirits venerated for the people who lost lives for Japan, the shrine includes 
fourteen Class A war criminals who were executed after the Tokyo war tribunal in 
1948, and thirteen of them had direct involvement in Japan’s invasion of China 
(Shibuishi, 2005: 198; and People’s Daily, 2006). This includes the names of Hideki 
Tojo and Itagaki Seishiro.103 Moreover, Yushukan, the shrine’s war museum, offers a 
revisionist and highly controversial view of Japanese history.  On Yushukan’s website, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See Appendix V. 
103 The Yasukuni Shrine controversially regards these war criminals as the “Martyrs of Showa”.  It 
further asserts that they were “cruelly and unjustly tried as war criminals by a sham-like tribunal of the 
Allied forces (United States, England, the Netherlands, China and others).” See the Yasukuni Shrine 
official website: http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/.  
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it claims, “The truth of modern Japanese history is now restored.” However, it refers 
to Japanese invasion of China as the “China Incident” and the Pacific front of the 
Second World War as “the Great East Asia War”, in which, it argues, Japan was 
forced to fight self-defensively104. It is arguable that the shrine and its revisionist 
museum focus purely on Japan’s loss in the war, but neglecting the fact of Japan 
being the perpetrator for the war and the sufferings it caused to other neighbouring 
countries (Breen, 2005). From China’s perspective, therefore, the Yasukuni Shrine 
together with its affiliated Yushukan symbolise Japanese militarism, which inflicted 
enormous pain and suffering to the Chinese People some sixty years ago. It sees the 
Yasukuni Shrine as a place glorifies Japanese militarism, beautifies Japanese 
aggressions, and distorts the history of the Second World War (WWII).  
 
During his prime ministership, Koizumi paid annual homage in his official capacity to 
the shrine, in spite of fierce condemnations from the Chinese government and people. 
For China, Koizumi’s persistence had offended the Chinese people by showing a total 
disrespect to their feeling (中国人民的感情). Due to the deep-rooted memories of 
Japanese atrocities in the war, history has been the most critical issue to Sino-
Japanese relations since 1982. Prior to 2005, Beijing had already repeatedly reminded 
Koizumi and the Japanese government the importance of Japan’s attitude toward 
history in maintaining healthy bilateral relations. Two phrases were frequently used to 
convey this point, namely 前事不忘，后事之师 (the past, if not forgotten, may 
serve a guild to the future); and 以史为鉴，面向未来 (taking history as a mirror and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 See the Yushukan official website, http://www.yasukuni.jp/~yusyukan/index.html (Japanese), and 
http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/yasuhtml_english/yusyu.html (English). 
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looking forward to the future).105 China saw Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni 
Shrine as an appeasement or even an endorsement to the glorification of militarism, 
and the revisionist view on history. Therefore, on every occasion, the CCP central 
government together with state-controlled media flooded with criticism. At official 
level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) delivered its usual critical remarks by 
the spokesperson at routine press conference. In the meantime, the CCP’s mouth 
piece  (喉舌) Xinhua News Agency and People’s Daily published strong worded 
editorials and commentaries on the issue.  
 
Koizumi’s stubbornness on the Yasukuni Shrine issue led to a growing sense of 
discontent and distrust in Chinese public and the government. Koizumi was deemed 
as a “bad person from his bones” (从骨子里坏的人). This is a very important belief 
in Chinese culture, according to one prominent Japan expert in China (Interview C, 
2009). Once a person is deemed “bad” then everything he/she does would be viewed 
through critical lens, explained by the scholar, “Chinese thinking on this is heavily 
influenced by a Confucian legal concept of conviction by the intention (原心定罪). It 
judges a person whether guilty or not by the intention from his/her heart” (Interview 
C, 2009). This means if one’s intention is morally unacceptable, one shall be punished 
severely regardless actual outcome. On the other hand, if one’s intention is morally 
right, then even if a crime was committed, one shall be shown leniency. By paying 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and disregarding the controversy, Koizumi was deemed 
to have a morally wrong intention, thus he was guilty and very much disliked by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Two phrases have been widely used in many official statements, documents, speeches and messages 
in regards to Japan. See a selection: ‘the congratulatory message from Primer Zhu Rongji of the PRC 
State Council to Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan on the 30th Anniversary of Normalisation of China-
Japan Relations’, (29 Sept. 2002), ‘Some Sensitive Issues’ (08 May 2002), and ‘Hu Jintao’s Speech the 
Celebratory Banquet for the 30th Anniversary of Normalisation and of China-Japan Relations’, Yu  
(2002).     
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Chinese public. As a result, unless he had stopped doing the “morally wrong 
action”—visiting Yasukuni Shrine, then whatever Koizumi did, it could only 
strengthen the negative perceptions of him in China (Interview C, 2009). 
 
Along with the long lingering Yasukuni Shrine issue, which led to the 1985 anti-
Japanese protests, sentiment also heightened when Japan approved a new version of 
revisionist history textbook in early 2005. The textbook was authored by the Japanese 
Society for History Textbook Reform (JSHTR), a group of conservative scholars 
promoting a revisionist view of Japanese history.106 The controversial textbook, 
published by Fusosha, did not mention the “Nanjing Massacre” in the main text, only 
referred to “Nanjing Incident” in footnotes.  The textbook also did not give the 
number of victims, which is estimated between 250,000 and 300,000.107 Instead it just 
briefly stated “Chinese military and civilian population suffered many casualties to 
Japanese military” (JSHTR, 2005: 49). In response, Beijing voiced its strong 
disproval via diplomatic channels. The Chinese Ambassador at the time, Wang Yi 
visited the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yachi Shotaro to protest what he described 
as an alteration of historical facts in the textbook. “It damages the public sentiment of 
Asian nations who were victims [of Japan’s aggression].” Wang was quoted telling 
Yachi, “it also negatively affects Japan’s image in international society” (Cited in 
Nakamura, 2005). By approving this controversial textbook for the second time, the 
Japanese government was seen as whole promoting the revisionist approach to history 
issues. Hence, serious questions about Japan’s attitude towards the wartime history 
were raised by people in China and several other Asian countries. As the next section 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See the objectives on which the society advocates, 
http://www.tsukurukai.com/02_about_us/01_opinion.html. Accessed 01/04/2011. 
107 For more details on the Nanking Massacre, see Princeton University Nanjing Massacre site: 
http://www.princeton.edu/~nanking/ Accessed 2/04/2011.  
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will show, the main reason cited against Japan’s bid to become a permanent member 
in the UNSC was Tokyo’s questionable attitude towards historical issues. 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, Chinese popular nationalism generally reacts to 
events in current affairs. Japan, due to its association and unsolved issues relating to 
its wartime history, has emerged as the prime target for Chinese popular nationalism 
since the end of the Cold War, thanks to the pride/humiliation discourse. Therefore, as 
the Sino-Japanese political relations continued to deteriorate prior to 2005, the anti-
Japanese sentiment in Chinese public had already been simmering for several years. 
Even small seemingly unrelated event could trigger strong nationalist response. For 
example, less than a year earlier in summer 2004, China hosted the Asia Cup finals, a 
continental football competition that is equivalent to the European Football 
Championships. Throughout the finals, Chinese fans had tauted the Japanese team and 
cheered for whoever they played against. Anti-Japanese banners and flags were 
displayed at every Japan participated match. Ironically, despite the close attention on 
the Japanese team by Chinese fans, their own team actually had a very good 
tournament by reaching the final for the first time in 20 years. And the final was 
against Japan. Chinese authorities, wary of potential troubles, mounted a massive 
security operation by deploying more than 5000 police and security agents to the 
streets close to the stadium. As expected, Chinese fans turned out in numbers, waving 
anti-Japanese banners, burning Japanese flags, and singing patriotic songs. Japan’s 
national anthem was drowned out by Chinese jeers, which continued whenever Japan 
had possession of the ball. However, despite the ultra hostile environment both inside 
and outside the stadium, Japan eventually won 3-1, ending China’s dream of winning 
its first ever Asian Cup. As Japan celebrated inside the near-empty stadium after the 
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final whistle, the disappointing defeat sparked out deep-rooted historical resentment 
among Chinese fans. In spite of heavy security present, they hurled plastic bottles at 
Japanese supporters, shouted obscenities and even attacked a Japanese diplomat’s car 
(Tabuchi, 2008). For Chinese fans, this match seemed to mean more than just football, 
as fans reportedly used the occasion to vent out their anger at Japan amid worsening 
political relations in recent years (BBC News Online, 2004).  
	  
As presented above, the 2005 anti-Japanese protests occurred against a backdrop of 
estrangement of bilateral political relations and a growing public discontent that had 
already led anti-Japanese nationalism to the brink of boiling point. This brewing 
nationalistic sentiment eventually boiled-over when Japan attempted to bid for a 
permanent seat along side with China in the UNSC reform proposal. 
	  
4.2	  The	  Anti-­‐Japanese	  Protest	  	  
4.2.1	   Japan’s	  UNSC	  Bid	  	  
For many years, the United Nations (UN) had been debating on possible reforms in 
order to face the new challenges after the end of the Cold War.  The Security Council 
has been seen as a body in need of major restructure. Although four non-permanent 
seats were added in 1963, the composition of the permanent veto-wielding seats had 
not been altered since the establishment of the UN in 1945. The allocation of 
permanent seats was in principle based on the global power dynamics at the end of 
World War Two (WWII). The five major powers in the victorious Allies, namely the 
United States (US), Britain, France, China and Russia, were granted permanent 
member status, with each member given the rights to veto. Many believe this out-
dated composition, which gives far too much power in favour of the unclear-capable 
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Permanent 5, does not offer a balanced structure to adequately resolve the security 
challenges the world is facing today. For example, the UNSC was widely criticised 
for the failed handlings of the diplomatic row on the Iraq issue prior to the 2003 
military intervention. The UNSC was criticised by both the supporters and opponents 
of the war. Whilst, the US and its allies were exasperated at the UNSC’s failure to 
agree action against Saddam Hussein’s regime, the opponents of the war were equally 
angry as the Security Council’s failure to stop America from launching it regardless 
(The Economist, 2005d).  
 
Fearing the UNSC sliding from a forum for resolving differences to a mere stage for 
acting them out, several attempts had been made by various states since the 1990s to 
expand the representations in the Council, but all of them met with stubbornness from 
one state or another amongst the Permanent 5. For example, Japan and Germany’s bid 
for the permanent seats in the late 1990s met strong opposition from China and a 
group of nations dubbed the “Coffee Club”, led by Italy, South Korea and Mexico.  
 
In September 2004, amidst the then Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan’s new 
initiative in finding a solution for the UNSC reform, a group of four nations (G4) 
containing Japan, Germany, India and Brazil began jointly campaigning to increase 
the number of permanent and non-permanent members in the Council. The G4 nations 
all mutually supported one another for permanent seats to the UNSC, and their efforts 
had initially attracted support form about 120 UN member states (Weiss, 2008: 92-93). 
  
By March 2005, discussions over the UNSC reform gathered new impetus when 
Annan published a report titled In Larger Freedom, setting out possible plans for a 
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comprehensive reform of the UNSC. In the report he acknowledges the general 
consensus by majority of states for a change in the UNSC’s composition. He stated, 
 
a change in the Council’s composition is needed to make it more broadly representative 
of the international community as a whole, as well as of the geopolitical realities of 
today, and thereby more legitimate in the eyes of the world. Its working methods also 
need to be made more efficient and transparent (Annan, 2005: 42). 
 
In the report, Annan outlined two models for Security Council’s expansion. Model A 
would create six new permanent seats, with no veto being added, and three new two-
year term non-permanent seats. Model B would provide no new permanent seat, but 
would create a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new 
two-year non-permanent and non-renewable seat (Annan, 2005: 43). As a new around 
of UN General Assembly meetings fast approaching on 6 April, the G4 members 
intensified their efforts to mobilise supports for their case in the UN. And it appears 
that their lobbying had yielded some early success. 
 
On 19 March, during her trip in Japan, the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice announced at a speech in Tokyo, that “through its hard work and unique quality, 
Japan has already earned a respected position amongst other nations”, therefore the 
US “unambiguously support” a permanent seat for Japan on the UNSC (Sina Net, 
2005a). Moreover, several days later, when Kofi Annan discussing about the regional 
imbalance of the UNSC at the press conference, he suggested those who contribute 
most to the UN financially, militarily and diplomatically should be given increased 
involvement in decision making. Given Japan’s position as one of biggest financial 
contributors, Annan reportedly offered his support to Japan’s application by saying, 
	   146	  
“of course Japan would get one [permanent seat], as being in Asia [which was rather 
underrepresented]” (Sina Net, 2005b). It has been argued that these two heavy-
weighted endorsements on Japan’s bid prompted fear among official and popular 
nationalists in China that “the G4 proposal might succeed in getting a two-third 
majority if put to a vote in the General Assembly” (Weiss, 2008: 96). 
 
4.2.2	   Initial	  Media	  Reports	  and	  Online	  Petition	  	  	  
On 2 March 2005, the official website of the People’s Daily reported a story about a 
global Internet petition against Japan’s bid for the UNSC permanent membership 
which had launched by overseas Chinese in Los Angeles in late February (Zhou, 
2005). This news was soon reposted on many information web portals in China and 
across nationalist forums. Chinese netizens quick followed suit, as many web portal 
and Bullet Board System forums set up petition sites to collect online signatures for 
this global petition. These sites included China’s largest commercial web portals, such 
as Sina, Sohu, and Netease; and influential BBS forums such as China918.net, and 
Tianya Club. Within days, the petition managed to collect more than 400,000 
signatures from Chinese netizens with numbers rapidly increasing (Sina Net, 2005c). 
On Sina site alone, the number of signatories reached a staggering 20 million when 
the petition ended in September 2005.108  
 
Officially, the Chinese authority initially did not take an active role in the petition, nor 
did it attempt to close the petition on commercial websites. Nevertheless, when 
Xinhua Net, the official website of the Xinhua News Agency, joined the petition to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See http://news.sina.com.cn/comment/index.shtml. Accessed 03/04/2011. 
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“resolutely oppose to Japan’s bid for a permanent UNSC seat”, 109 it could be seen as a 
clear green light from the central government for the action. The MFA’s reflections 
on the mass public petition further reflected central government’s approval. Following 
Xinhua’s participation in the online petition, the spokesperson for the MFA, Liu 
Jianchao, had twice made positive comments on the petition. He dismissed the mass 
petition movement as anti-Japanese sentiment. In contrast, picking up the history 
textbook issue, he claimed the petition was a strong request for Japan to adopt a 
“correct and responsible attitude towards historical issues” (正确的，负责任的态度), 
in order to earn trust from the Chinese public (China News Network, 2005a; and 
2005b). The main reason for Chinese government to support the mass online petition 
was, explained by two senior researchers at Chinese Academic Social Sciences 
(CASS),  
 
“China in principle did not want Japan to be granted a permanent seat in the UNSC, so 
that it could sit side-by-side with the Chinese (平起平坐 ) on the international 
stage…However, China had a genuine fear that as the G4’s proposal gaining more and 
more support, it might get the required number if it were put to vote in General 
Assembly in autumn…As a result, Beijing saw this mass petition as a great opportunity 
for the Chinese around the world lobbying for its position, as it knew it could play the 
population card and get a astronomical number of signatures to present its case at the 
forthcoming UN General Assembly meeting (Interview D, 2009). 
 
It is worth stressing that although Beijing saw the mass petition not as an anti-
Japanese nationalist movement, but a way to serve up a notice on Japan’s attitude on 
history, this study sees it the other way round. First, as discussed at length in Chapter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 This is how Xinhua petition was titled, the original Chinese is 坚决反对日本入常. See 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/forum/2005-04/04/content_2772116.htm. Accessed 04/04/2011. 
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Three, the strong anti-Japanese nationalistic rhetoric is rooted in the Chinese public as 
the most significant part of the constructed discourse on Chinese popular nationalism, 
a concept this thesis believes to be mutually constitutive to state-led nationalism, 
historic narratives, and China’s contemporary Japan policy. In addition, against the 
backdrop of deteriorating relations between China and Japan, this nationalistic feeling 
was arguably already very strong at the time prior to the petition. Consequently, it is 
reasonable to argue that even though the petition itself on surface was to block 
Japan’s bid, but the driving force behind the petition that had quickly received tens of 
millions of signature was the strong nationalistic rage against Japan.  
 
On the petition issue, Beijing had made a careful calculation that by giving tacit 
consent to the online petition, the possible reward in achieving foreign policy 
objectives, namely undermining Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, not 
only outweighed the potential risks in terms of public order, it also, according Weiss, 
“mitigate[s] the international reputation costs to the Chinese government of making 
an eventual veto threat” (2008: 88). Beijing’s support of the online petition underlines 
the mutually constituted relations between domestic politics and foreign policy, 
outlined in Chapter One as it has demonstrated how domestic politics may be 
instrumentalised to serve foreign policy objectives under the dual-aspect setting—
domestic and international sphere. Externally, Beijing’s objective on this issue was 
inline with the desire of the petitioning public, namely to prevent Japan from gaining 
sufficient support for a permanent seat in the UNSC. Beijing saw the petition 
movement—a domestic source—could provide a sufficient input to China’s lobbying 
in the UN negotiations. And indeed, the petition was used by Beijing to argue that 
overwhelming number of people both in China and abroad was opposing the Japan’s 
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bid, thus the reform proposal required reconsideration (Weiss, 2008). Internally, being 
a body at least partly responsible to the construction of the popular nationalism 
discourse, the CCP government understands the deep-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment 
in Chinese popular nationalism. Given that the petition movement up to the end of 
March was mainly conducted online as opposed to on the street, so the risk of public 
disorder (nationalism being out of control) was deemed relatively low. Beijing’s 
initial unconstrained attitude towards the media reports on this matter seems to reflect 
its belief that the petition movement in its current form did not pose a notable threat to 
social stability in China (Stockmann, 2011: 183). In short, not only was the petition 
movement regarded by Beijing offering potentially a convincing persuasion for the 
UNSC to block Japan’s bid, domestically, it was seen as a relatively safe channel for 
the Chinese public to vent out nationalistic anger. 
 
4.2.3	   From	  Street	  Petition	  to	  Full-­‐Scale	  Protests	  
After sensing the official approval and support, the petition movement eventually 
spread from online to the streets. Collections of actual signatures, as opposed to 
online registration, started on university campuses, the traditional hot bed for 
nationalist movement. Many universities first put up anti-Japan’s bid banners (反日入
常横幅) inside campuses for students to sign. Typically, the banner contained a 
slogan printed on a white fabric. Not only did the banners include slogans such as  
“resolutely against Japan joining the UNSC permanent membership”; “Crushing 
Japan’s wild dream of permanent membership”; but some of them also contained 
angry messages on a wider range of issues in Sino-Japanese relations, such history 
textbook, and Japan’s occupation of the Diaoyu Islands (China Daily, 2005). In late-
March, students across China then spontaneously took these banners outside, and set 
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up signature collection points in cities and towns. In order to encourage people 
putting their names down, they shouted slogans to “educate” passerby from all walks 
of life of Japan’s intention in the UNSC and Japan’s revisionist approach to history 
(Sina Net, 2005d). The intention of these student-organised street petition was 
peaceful, not to cause any trouble. However, on 2 April, things went out of control in 
Chengdu, when a group of people gathered outside a Japanese supermarket, Ito 
Yokado, not far from a street petition point. The protest started with anti-Japanese 
slogans such as “Shut down Ito Yokado”, “boycott Japanese goods”, “Down with 
little Japan (小日本)”. The atmosphere gradually became more intense, the protest 
turned more physical with the windows of Ito Yokado smashed. When looking 
through archives in popular online news sites such as Sohu, Sina, and the official 
Xinhua News, no report of this violent protest was found, indicating strict information 
control being introduced by the government (Stockmann, 2011: 196-197). The reason 
for this, interpreted by a Chinese scholar, was that: 
 
the central government needed time to assess this new development…As well as 
worries about anti-Japanese violence spreading domestically. The central government 
did not want to suppress public sentiment too much so the nationalist gun turned to the 
leaders. At the same time, in terms of its position on the UN reform, the government 
did not want to lose the momentum in terms of public pressure against Japan’s bid…So 
when all was unsure, the government simply directed the news not to be broadcasted, 
in order to give it some leeway (余地) (Interview A, 2009). 
 
Here, the dynamics of nationalist protest had again made Beijing pondering between 
the two levels simultaneously. On the domestic level, the new violent protest, if 
spread out, could potentially cause large-scale social unrests. Moreover, if Beijing’s 
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management of popular anti-Japanese protests was perceived too heavy-handedly by 
the public, then the nationalistic anger may turn inwards and become criticism to the 
leadership. On the international level, if popular nationalism left unrestricted, it would 
no doubt tarnish Beijing’s reputation on the international stage. Conversely, placing 
too much restrains on the popular anti-Japanese protests may lose some of the “public 
lobbying” effects that had been gathered for Beijing in the early mass petitions.  
 
On the weekend of 9 April 2005, following Japan’s approval of the highly 
controversial history textbook on 5 April, street petition against Japan’s bid on UNSC 
finally erupted into full-scale spontaneous anti-Japanese protests in several cities in 
China (Stockmann, 2011: 183; He, 2007: 22; and Weiss, 2008: 104-105). For 
example, in Beijing, the protests started in the Zhongguancun (中关村) District, 
dubbed as the Chinese Silicon Valley. The district is surrounded by many top 
universities, including the most prestigious two in China, Peking and Tsinghua. As 
protesters gathered, the group took a detour to pass several close-by universities, 
asking students to join. As a result, the number expanded quickly, and soon reached 
more than 10,000. Protests then moved towards the Japanese Embassy, picking up 
passerby as they walked. Along the way, angry nationalist protesters smashed 
Japanese restaurants, damaged business establishments, including office of All 
Nippon Airlines and Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, and overturned Japanese cars. 
Interestingly, as well as singing patriotic songs, and shouting derogatory remarks 
against the Japanese, such as “Kill the Japanese Devils”, “Death to Koizumi the pig”, 
protesters were also keen to make their action legitimate by chanting “Patriotism is 
innocent!” (爱国无罪 ) and “Never forget national humiliation” (勿忘国耻 ). 
Additionally, protesters threw rocks, water bottles, eggs at the Japanese Embassy, in 
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front of heavy security presence. At the weekend, similar scenes to these in Beijing 
were repeated in Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and many other 
cities across China. Furthermore, smaller scale anti-Japanese demonstrations took 
place in subsequent weekends until the end of April 2005. 
 
4.3	  Assessment	  on	  Beijing’s	  Responses	  	  
 
4.3.1	   Domestic	  Responses	  
The first observation shall be made is that although no public announcement was ever 
made on the issue, during these mass anti-Japanese protests, as noted by Weiss (2008), 
a large contingent of police and security personnel had always followed the 
nationalist protesters. Japanese diplomatic establishments always had heavy security 
presence. This only meant one thing; the central government had closely monitored 
the online and mobile phone message exchanges among popular nationalists. Beijing 
seemed to be fully aware about the time, place, potential routes and targets, hence was 
able to allocate sufficient police force accordingly. Given Beijing’s pre-event 
preparation for police deployment, it appeared that the central government had given 
its tacit consent (默许) for the public demonstrations at the weekend of 9 April.  
 
The second observation drawing from the case is, despite heavy security presence, 
actions of vandalism by popular nationalists, which would be illegal in China, were 
not effectively stopped by security forces. By comparison, road and barrier blocks 
surrounding Japanese diplomatic establishments were strictly enforced, with Japanese 
diplomats in Beijing being informed by the Chinese police about the upcoming public 
protest (Weiss, 2008: 105). During the demonstrations, on many occasions, police just 
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watched protesters smashing windows, destroying shops, and overturning cars (Kahn, 
2005). Without access to the inner circles of the CCP in Zhongnaihai (中南海), my 
interpretation to this strange action is based on the effects of popular nationalism 
dynamics at domestics level.  
 
Adopting a pressure cooker analogy and taking a constructivist approach, popular 
nationalism here is seen as the steam in the pressure cooker, constantly being 
constructed by both foreign policy and domestic politics. Beijing as the chef, has two 
mechanisms to control the inner pressure, namely the heat control for the hob and the 
valve regulator on the pressure cooker. The hob represents the original source of 
nationalist pressure, which can be frictions with a nationalist external target, Japanese 
government’s perceived attitude to historic issues, and Japan’s bid for the permanent 
membership in the UNSC in this case. Valve regulator determines how much 
nationalist steam is allowed to escape. It represents tactical actions to manage popular 
nationalism, such as information restriction and crowd management. Too much and 
too little popular nationalism in today’s China would both lead to serious domestic 
problems, namely social unrests, as analysed in Chapter Two. By turning a blind eye 
to some acts of vandalism, Beijing was able to let some steam vented out (泄愤) from 
the nationalist pressure cooker. And by enforcing a strict crowd control along the pre-
designated demonstration route, Beijing at least had managed to contain the 
movement of nationalists. This would enable the pressure to be released at the 
required rate so it would not pose serious risks to both domestic social stability and 
foreign policy accomplishment. 
 
	   154	  
However, a series of emergency meetings were conducted by the government with 
senior university staff in the evening of 9 April 2005, suggesting that outcomes of the 
protests did not make happy reading for the CCP leaders. At the meetings, 
instructions were issued to university staff to prevent university students from taking 
part in future public protests (Weiss, 2008: 106). Although, heavy police presence 
was in place that weekend, the sheer number of protests spontaneously turned up in so 
many cities still came as a shock for the central government (Interview B, 2009; and 
Interview C). Thus, after that weekend, the central government swiftly implemented 
another valve control tactic, namely information restriction (Stockmann, 2011).   
 
Despite many of the world media running news coverage on the events at the 
weekend of 9 April,110 nothing of the event was mentioned about in Chinese media, 
including official and commercial online news portals. Stockmann notes,  
 
After the first demonstration in Beijing took place on 9 April…space for news 
reporting closed. The Propaganda Department prohibited coverage of the protests and 
in order to subdue them instructed the media to keep news reporting close to the 
government line. (Stockmann, 2011: 183-184). 
 
On Sina Net (新浪网), the largest Chinese language information portal, there is a 
special report micro site created in 2005 dedicating for the Japan’s bid on the UNSC 
permanent membership. Nevertheless, no words about the public anti-Japanese 
protests appear in the news titles under the tap of “Japan seeking a permanent seat” 
(日本谋求常任理事国席位). Only public online and street petitions were reported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See for example, The Economist (2005) 
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until early April.111 The focus of report was generally on either other countries’ stance 
on the issue, or on Japan’s lobbying efforts. This seems to confirm Stockmann’s 
observation that new information guidelines were put in place in China, in the wake 
of the 9 April protests. In addition, the central government appeared to have also 
tightened up police control on the streets. For instance, a fresh round of protest 
marches was effectively prevented on 17 April, when the strong police presence at a 
meeting point in Beijing intimidated protesters (Stockmann, 2011: 183). 
 
The final valve control tactic employed internally by the central government was 
guidance and persuasion, to channel the negative anti-Japanese sentiment into positive 
energy elsewhere. In order to prevent university students joining protest marches 
again, as well as asking lecturers and tutors to monitor students’ movement, the 
authority also directed university staff to talk with students, according to one Beijing-
based IR scholar (Interview A, 2009). This was aimed at assessing their status of 
mind, and persuading them to keep away from the protests. More professionally 
perhaps, the government also arranged Japan experts, foreign policy specialist, and 
retired diplomats to hold seminars across nation’s campuses, hoping these experts 
might able to rationally reason with students on the ideas of public protest and 
boycotting Japanese goods. Furthermore, students were also able to ask any questions 
concerning about Japan, or issues relating to Japan and Sino-Japanese relations, to 
which these policy experts would made better answers and rational explanations. This 
tactic of rationalising and reasoning with the students, dubbed as “massage of the 
senses” (理性按摩) among Chinese IR academics, was first introduced during the 
2005 anti-Japanese protests, and since has become an increasingly popular valve-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See http://news.sina.com.cn/z/unnation/1.shtml. Accessed 05/04/2011. 
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control choice for the government to ease the nationalistic steam (Interview A, 2009; 
Interview D, 2009; and Interview E, 2009).  
 
4.3.2	   International	  Reactions	  
The above measures adopted by the CPP leaders could only temporarily alter the rate 
of which nationalistic steam was released from the public pressure cooker. It could 
not nevertheless, stabilise the popular nationalist rage for a longer period. To achieve 
this, Beijing had to tackle the source of the heat, namely Japan’s bid for a permanent 
seat in the UNSC. This section evaluates how Beijing managed to turn down the 
nationalist heat at the international level. It argues that during the 2005 anti-Japanese 
protests, China adopted a tough stance at international level in order to achieve its 
goal of preventing Japan from gaining a permanent seat in the UNSC.  
 
Responding to the mass anti-Japanese nationalist protests of 9 April, the MFA 
appeared rather hawkish at least on the surface. This was reflected in spokesperson 
two regular press conferences on 12 April, and on 14 April. On both occasions, as 
expected, when questions on the protests were asked, spokesperson Liu Jianzhao 
replied them with a unified hard-line response: 
 
These protests and demonstration are spontaneous public response to Japan’s wrong 
attitude and actions towards its past history…we do not support isolated irrational 
behaviour…however, Japan is fully aware of the cause for the current status in Sino-
Japanese relations. Japan should carefully rethink (认真反省) [its attitude and actions] 
(MFA, 2005).  
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This official response blamed the cause for the anti-Japanese protests and riots 
squarely on Japan. Therefore, it asserted only Japan could reduce nationalistic 
sentiment in China by reconsidering the issues on the UNSC reform and the history 
textbook approval.  
 
Furthering to MFA’s position, Premier Wen Jiabao publically announced on 12 April 
that China would oppose Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC: 
“Only a country that respects history, takes responsibility for the past, and wins over 
the trust of the people of Asia and the world at large can take greater responsibilities 
in the international community” (Cited in China News Network, 2005c).  
 
The tension between China and Japan was slightly loosened when Koizumi “held out 
an olive branch to China” on 18 April, saying he was willing to have a civil meeting 
with his counterpart after Beijing refused to apologise for violent anti-Japanese 
protests. He explained his reason, “It is better not to make it an exchange of 
accusations…it is necessary to think about not fuelling confrontation. The meeting 
should be future oriented. We should consider how we can promote friendly ties” 
(AFP, 2005). 
 
China seemed to have accepted Koizumi’s olive branch. The central government 
quickly began to concentrate its efforts to bring an end to the current wave of anti-
Japanese movement. On 21 April, two important piece of information was published 
on the official Xinhua News site. The first is an editorial titled “Consciously act 
according the law, maintaining overall stability”.  The editorial, whilst understanding 
the anti-Japanese sentiment from the public, asked the public to abide the law, and act 
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sensibly, in order to maintain an overall social stability. It reminded the public that 
promoting social harmony and stability was every citizen’s duty. Finally, it called for 
turning the patriotic passion into hard work (Xinhua News, 2005a). The second piece 
of information was a declaration by the Public Security Bureau. It warned that 
vandalisms taking place in recent anti-Japanese protests were illegal actions, which, if 
reoccurred, would be punished in future. In addition, it reminded the public that 
unauthorised protest, slogan, banner, and public gathering remain prohibited by the 
Chinese law (Xinhua News, 2005b). These two official announcements were seen as 
CCP’s determination to end the month-long anti-Japanese movement (Fu, 2005; and 
Interview A, 2009). 
 
China’s repeated blamed Japan for causing the mass public protests appeared to be a 
tactic of “playing public opinion card”. The hidden message of this claim was that the 
Chinese public is too angry for the issues to be resolved by Beijing alone. By 
asserting Japan’s irresponsible actions caused this nationalist outrage, Beijing 
attempted to convince Tokyo that Japan was the only party who could fundamentally 
solve this problem. This is based on ancient Chinese belief, “the knot can only be 
untied by the person who tied it” (解铃还需系铃人). However, it was actually the US 
who helped to untie this nationalist “knot”. Following the public protests on 9 April 
which had caused considerable damage to Japanese business and diplomatic 
establishments in Beijing, the US stance on Japan’s bid appeared to have made a U-
turn, indicating that Japan’s bid was unlikely to succeed. On 13 April, referring to the 
anti-Japanese protests in China, the incoming US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton 
stated that it would be “politically very difficult to make any change in the 
composition of the permanent membership,” against the backdrop of the “things that 
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were going on in China over the weekend, combined with public statements made by 
senior Chinese officials [referring to Premier Wen’s public statement opposing 
Japan’s candidacy a day earlier]” (cited in Weiss, 2008: 107). John Bolton’s statement 
could not be further away from Secretary of State Rice’s “unambiguous support” 
offered to Japan only a month earlier. With Beijing persistent persuasions, the US 
eventually voiced an objection to Japan’s bid for a permanent Security Council 
membership in early June 2005 (Takahara, 2005). 
 
Without access to Beijing’s foreign policy decision-making body, it is difficult to 
accurately ascertain reasons for China’s diplomatic hard-line approach to the Japan’s 
UNSC bid and the subsequent anti-Japanese protests. However, by looking closely the 
interactions between Beijing’s management of the issues at domestic and international 
level, the compiling circumstantial evidence suggests that the pressures of domestic 
nationalist opinion had both helped and influenced Beijing’s handling of the issue at 
international level. Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the UNSC came at a time when 
Sino-Japanese relations were at a the worst point for many years, cumulated by 
diplomatic rows over Koizumi’s Yasukuni Shrine visits, history text-book 
controversies amongst other issues. Adopting the constructive approach outlined in 
Chapter One, it is arguable the deterioration in bilateral relations would have 
constituted the rise of anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiment among the Chinese public 
prior to the April protests. When UN reform negotiations reached a critical phase in 
March 2012, so too did the popular nationalist pressure against Japan. As a result, 
fearing this pressure could get out of control, thus threaten domestic stability, Beijing 
had little choice but to use various ‘valve control’ mechanisms allowing the public to 
release some nationalist steam.   
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On the international level, because foreign policy directions are rooted in beliefs and 
perceptions of the decision makers, which in turn are shaped by subjective meaning 
from domestic sources, popular nationalism discourse in this case. Domestic sources 
thus provide both inputs and constraints to foreign policy, according to Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA). In this case, as outlined above, the belief and perception of the 
decision makers in Beijing was that Japan should not be given a permanent seat in the 
UNSC. With the public’s consensus strongly agreeing to Beijing’s stance, the online 
petition against Japan’s candidacy and subsequent public anti-Japanese protests had 
offered ‘inputs’ in foreign policy decision-making, reinforcing Beijing’s stance at 
international stage. Nonetheless, when foreign policy objective (generate enough 
support to delay UN reform negotiation) was achieved, anti-Japanese protest lost its 
instrumental value – inputs – in foreign policy, and became a constraint for domestic 
politics, the Chinese government quickly deployed mechanisms such as media 
blackout, to contain the popular nationalist pressure. The actions and interactions 
between Beijing, the Chinese public and foreign governments during the 2005 anti-
Japanese protests have demonstrated the mutually constitutive relations between 
popular nationalism, foreign policy and domestic politics.  
 
4.4	  Summary	  
	  
This chapter has focussed on the large-scale anti-Japanese movement in China 
between March and April 2005. By following the developments on both the anti-
Japanese nationalist aspect, and Beijing’s handling of the nationalist pressure, the 
chapter has been able to interpret how popular nationalist opinion has influenced 
Beijing domestic and foreign decision-makings. 
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Initially, Beijing fully supported the online mass petition opposing Japan’s bid to 
become a permanent member of the UNSC. I argue that Beijing was convinced that 
by playing the public opinion card—allowing mass online petitions, not only would it 
strengthen its own stance on Japan’s bid on international level, it would also safely 
vent some nationalist rage that had been building up for years.  
 
When online petition turned into full-scale protests.  On domestic level, I argue, 
Beijing’s approach was more cautious than in the petition phase, as it was seeking to 
maintain a delicate balance of maintaining a steady but stable nationalist steam from 
the public.  To achieve this, as I analysed, Beijing had to constantly adjust the steam 
release rate by adopting various valve control tactics, including tacit consent, strict 
crowd control, media blackout, and “massage of the senses”. 
 
On international level, however, Beijing’s posture was less flexible. My explanation 
for this is: For Beijing, the main foreign policy objective in this issue was preventing 
Japan becoming a permanent member in the Security Council. Consequently, by 
standing firm with popular nationalists, it gave Beijing a secure platform on which 
history issues could be cited as the reason for opposing Japan’s bid. In addition, I 
believe, the gradual deterioration of China-Japan bilateral relations prior to the 2005 
anti-Japanese had build nationalist pressure so strong that Beijing’s stance on the 
UNSC issue was simply less readily negotiable. By the same token, Beijing was left 
with no much leeway to domestically suppress anti-Japanese popular nationalism. 
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Now, it is the time moves to the second case study, namely the Diaoyu Islands 
Dispute between China and Japan. In this case, I will explore another, much more 
recent anti-Japanese movement in China during a diplomatic stalemate with Japan. It 
will be interesting to see whether the dynamics of popular nationalism in this case 
operate differently. 
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Chapter	  Five:	  The	  Diaoyu	  Islands	  Dispute	  
	  
The Diaoyu Islands, or Senkaku Islands in Japanese, are the collective name for a set 
of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks in the East China Sea (ECS), with the 
largest islet named Diaoyutai. The island group is located approximately midway 
between the island of Taiwan and Yonaguni Island, Okinawa Prefecture, the 
southernmost and westernmost island of the Japanese Ryukyu Islands; it is 
approximately 174 nautical miles east of coast of mainland China112 (Downs and 
Saunders, 1998-1999: 124; Liu, 1996: 13; and Su, 2005: 46). Notwithstanding the 
uninhabitability of the islands, it is the geographic location of the Diaoyu Islands, and 
the potential resources available in the surrounding area that have a triggered a three-
way dispute over its sovereignty among China, Taiwan and Japan, although, China 
sees it as a dispute with Japan only, since it regards Taiwan as an integral part of its 
sovereignty. Critically, the sovereignty question over Taiwan is the essential element 
in Beijing’s claim on Diaoyu Islands.113   
 
This chapter uses the Diaoyu Islands dispute as a case to demonstrate the mutual 
constitutive assumption between nationalism, domestic politics and foreign policy. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of both the strategic and economic values that 
the Diaoyu Islands possess for China. It looks into the strong nationalistic emotions 
with which the dispute has been attached. More importantly, the chapter presents how 
the islands dispute is well placed at the centre of the conceptualisation of nationalism 
in post-Cold War China. The actual case coming under close scrutiny is the 2010 boat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 For a geographic illustration see Appendix VI: Maps of Diaoyu Islands and the disputed area in the 
East China Sea. 
113 More on this will be discussed later. 
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collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and two Japanese patrol boats near the 
Diaoyu Islands, and the subsequent diplomatic stand-off. By studying the interactions 
between Beijing and Tokyo, and between Chinese government and its popular 
nationalists during the incident, the chapter critically assesses the level of nationalist 
influence on Beijing actions towards Japan. 
 
 
5.1	  Strategic	  Value	  
 
Because of its vital geographic position as the frontline outpost for China and the last 
post of the rear guard for Japan, the strategic value of the Diaoyu Islands in military 
and geopolitics cannot be underestimated.   
 
For China, the Diaoyu Islands situated right at the centre of what Chinese strategists 
call “the first island chain”, defined by a line of islands tightly surrounded China’s 
coastal water stretching from Kurile Islands, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, through 
Taiwan, to the Philippines and the Spratly Islands. This chain of islands separates 
China coastal waters and the vast Pacific Ocean, is seen as a natural barrier restricting 
Chinese naval power projection beyond its shore. From China’s strategic rivals’ 
perspective, some see that “the first island chain” is a kind of “Great Wall in 
reverse:…a well-organised line of US allies that serve as a sort of guard tower to 
monitor and possibly block China’s access to the Pacific Ocean” (Kaplan, 2010: 33). 
Increasingly, Chinese military, especially the navy, has been conducting a series of 
modernization programme in both hardware and strategic doctrine, in order to match 
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its rapidly risen economic and political status.114 There appears to be a growing 
perception in the West that with improved economic and military capabilities, China 
is more willing to flex its muscles farther away from its coastal waters by developing 
a “blue water” navy115 (The Economist, 2007; 2009; and 2010b). Beijing’s decision to 
send a rotating naval anti-piracy task force to the coast off Somalia demonstrated this 
increasing power-projection capability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy. 
The vital strategic importance of the Diaoyu Islands is that by controlling the island 
group, it would “break” the “first island chain” and provide a secure gateway to the 
deep and vast Pacific Ocean, hence extending Beijing’s sea defence perimeter deep 
into the Western Pacific. Access to the Diaoyu Islands would be particularly useful 
for the Chinese submarine force, as it would allow submarines to plunge much deeper 
in the waters east of the islands,116 hence becoming more difficult for the United 
States (US) and Japan to track their route before slipping into the unrestricted Pacific 
Ocean. As an indication of the increasing ambition and confidence in PLA’s 
submarine force,117 a US top admiral disclosed in 2006 that a Chinese submarine 
surprised the US Navy and risked setting off a military confrontation by closely 
shadowing a US aircraft carrier sailing in the ECS and surfacing within the torpedo-
firing range of the carrier (Scarborough, 2006). 
 
The Diaoyu Islands offer the same strategic importance to Japan. First, by 
maintaining the de facto control of the islands, Japan has been able to conduct regular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 On Chinese recent military modernization, see The Economist (2010a).  
115 For analyses on China’s efforts to build up a “blue water” navy, see Cole (2001: 138-178); You and 
You (1991); You (1997); and Wortzel (1994). 
116 Geographic surveys of the ocean floor show the big difference in depth between the water west of 
Taiwan (i.e. the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea), and the sea east of it.  The Okinawa Trough lays 
just to the south and southwest of the Diaoyu Islands (Liu, 1996: 13; and Ji, 1995). 
117 Erickson et. al. (2007) offers a comprehensive and up-to-dated study on China’s current and future 
submarine force. 
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patrols in the water surrounding it, thus is able to force any perceived intruders out of 
the area, and prevent anyone from attempting the land on the disputed islands. There 
are numerous occasions, in which patrol boats from Japanese Coast Guard (JCG), 
ships and planes from the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) have 
intercepted fishing boats and military activities in proximity of the Diaoyu Islands, 
including several collisions.118 These incidents are always the flash points in the 
territorial disputes. They, as will be demonstrated in the studies of the most recent 
case in September 2010, have detrimental effects on Sino-Japanese relations and 
Chinese popular nationalism. Second, due to its relative close proximity to the 
airspace and maritime boundary of Taiwan and China, The islands and the sky above 
are ideal for Japan to carry out surveillance and intelligence gathering about 
movements of PLA planes and ships. Tokyo’s recent decision to deploy troops 
permanently based on the Yonaguni Island, Japan’s westernmost point and the closest 
undisputed territory to the Diaoyu Islands, illustrates the critical strategic value of the 
area (AFP119, 2010a). 
 
5.2	  Economic	  Value	  
	  
Apart from the vital strategic importance, the Diaoyu Islands also possess great 
economic values for both claimants. Although the disputes have always existed since 
the end of World War Two (WWII), Suganuma argues that until the 1970s, the 
islands were regarded of little value to either China or Japan (2000: 11). It is in fact 
only after the discovery of potential abundant natural resources under these islands in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 It is not only China, but boats from Taiwan and Hong Kong have also had frictions with Japanese 
patrol vessels.  On 10 June 2008, a Taiwanese fishing boat was hit and subsequently sunk by a 
Japanese frigate.  This caused major diplomatic difficulties between Taiwan and Japan.  For more 
details see news reports, The China Post (2008), and BBC Chinese (2008). 
119 Agence France-Presse. 
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later 1960s did the dispute of ownership over them “ignite the fuse of territorial 
confrontations between Japan and China”, and the ownership of these uninhabited 
islands has become “one of the most complicated territorial disputes in the world” 
(Suganuma, 2000: 11). 
 
A series of surveys on the area around the Diaoyu Islands conducted in the late 1960s 
concluded that the seafloor between Taiwan and Japan in the ECS might potentially 
contain one of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs in the world.120 Naturally, these 
surveys attracted great attention from Taiwan, China and Japan, with all three sides 
reaffirming their claims over the area, in order to explore the potential considerable 
oil and gas deposit, and authorise drilling rights.121 For China and Japan, potentially 
huge oil and gas resources right at their doorstep were certainly very welcome news 
back then in the 1970s. As both economies develops, especially with China’s rapid 
growth since the 1980s, this oil and gas field becomes even more invaluable for both 
sides as China increases its energy consumption and its dependence to imported oil, 
and Japan’s lack of natural resources. Consequently, in recent years, there appears to 
be a rise in bilateral confrontations over the disputed area in the ECS.122 The dispute in 
the ECS centres on the way the maritime border between China and Japan should be 
drawn, and the consequent overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).123 It is 
reasonable to say that the discovery of oil and gas in the seabed placed the Diaoyu 
Islands dispute at the centre of a dispute in much wider context, hence intensifying the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 For detailed findings, see Suganuma (2000: 129-131). 
121 For the reactions to the discovery of oil and gas reservoir and the earliest analyses on the legal 
ownership of the disputed area of the ECS, see Allen and Mitchell (1972), and Cheng (1974). 
122 For a detailed account on the recent development in the ECS disputes and negotiations, see Valencia 
(2007), and Drifte (2008). 
123 The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, in which the coastal state has the 
sovereign rights to explore and manage the natural resources, and conduct marine scientific research in 
the zone.  It can extend up to 200 nautical miles from the coastline.  See The United Nations (1982: 40-
49). 
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competition between China and Japan for the sovereignty over several uninhabitable 
rocks in the sea (Valencia, 2007: 128; and Onishi and French, 2005).  
 
5.3	  Emotional	  Value	  
	  
Both China and Japan based their claim over the Diaoyu Islands on a great amount of 
historical evidence supporting their own arguments. This section discusses China’s 
historic basis for sovereignty claim over the islands. More important, the section also 
investigates the strong emotional attachment amongst the Chinese public to the claim. 
As this study focuses on Chinese nationalism and Beijing’s policy and action toward 
Tokyo, and since the study is not the ownership debate per se,124 it therefore will 
mainly concentrate on China’s stance and position on the Diaoyu Islands issue. 
Nonetheless, this should not be seen as dismissing the credibility of Japan’s claim, nor 
should it be regarded as promoting China’s perspectives.  
 
To put simply, the foundation of China’s claim over the Diaoyu Islands is that China 
had, according to historical documents, first discovered, named the island group and 
since the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) mapped out as a navigational post. Although 
Chinese archives show that the islands were under its administrative rule as early as 
the Southern Song Dynasty (1127-1279), the islands had never been permanently 
habited, were merely used in shipping charts (Suganuma, 2000: 42-44). Nevertheless, 
using the evidence above as the basis, Beijing repeatedly proclaims that the Diaoyu 
Islands group has always been China’s “sacred territory since ancient times” 
(People’s Daily English, 2003; and China Daily, 2010a).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 For a very good and balanced study on the ownership claims over the islands from a historical 
perspective, including analyses of historical records and maps, see Suganuma (2000). 
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The main reason for strong nationalist emotion attachment to the claim is that Diaoyu 
Islands dispute presenting a prime illustration of the “pride/humiliation” discourse 
that, as discussed in Chapter Two, characterises modern Chinese identity and fuels 
popular nationalism. According to Beijing’s narratives, the Diaoyu Islands group (as 
part of Taiwan) was taken away from China after China’s defeat in First Sino-
Japanese War (1894-1895), initiated by Japan. The war broke out at the height of the 
“Century of Humiliation”, when the Qing Dynasty was in its terminal decline, whilst 
Japan was boosting its power following the Meiji Restoration.  
 
The island of Taiwan provides the critical element from which China’s claim on the 
Diaoyu Islands archipelago is constructed.  Beijing argues that these islands, together 
with Taiwan, should have been returned to China at the end of WWII, under the Cairo 
Declaration of 1943.125 The Cairo Declaration stated that Japan ought to return all the 
territories “stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], and the 
Pescadores, shall be stored to the Republic of China (ROC)” (The Cairo Declaration, 
1943). The islands were not specified in the Cairo Declaration, thought both Beijing 
and Taipei would argue that it did not need to, as they were not listed in the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, when Japan took them as islets of Taiwan. Conversely, the Diaoyu 
Islands were not returned to the ROC with Taiwan after the Japanese surrender, but 
taken over by the US occupying force in Japan as part of Okinawa archipelago, and 
used by US military for target practices. The islands were eventually returned as parts 
of Okinawa island group to Japan in 1972 when the US ended its post-war control of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 The defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War resulted signing of what China calls as, an unequal treaty: 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, in which stated annexation of the Island of Formosa (Taiwan) and 
all its subsidiary islands (including the Diaoyu Islands).  Japan soon placed the Diaoyu Islands into 
Okinawa Prefecture (Suganuma, 2000: 117-119).  
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Okinawa.  Initially, between 1945 and early 1970s, at the height of their own bitter 
power struggle, neither the Kuomintang (KMT) nor the subsequent Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) government voiced its strong objection against the US 
control or the handover to Japan. Nor did the two sites lodge any meaningful 
declaration over the islands’ sovereignty before 1970.126 Consequently, it is reasonable 
to articulate that what has made this dispute much more complicated is its close 
connections to the Taiwan sovereignty question and the involvements of the United 
States, as Beijing argues that the islands, belonging to “Taiwan Province”, which has 
been an integral part of China’s territory. The fact that neither Beijing nor Taipei 
currently administers the islands, makes many Chinese feel that China was unjustly 
deprived the rightful ownership of an essential part of its territory (Taira, 2004). It is 
as if the territory was forcedly taken away from China, and was not rightfully returned 
as it should have when China finally defeated Japan.  
 
Officially, while Beijing has never given up territorial claims over the islands, aiming 
at seeking to improve the diplomatic ties between China and Japan, Deng Xiaoping, 
Vice-Premier at the time, suggested in 1978 two countries to agree, “shelve bilateral 
disputes, and seek common development” (搁置争议，共同开发). On Deng’s 
recommendations, China claims that both countries abided by this consensus and 
worked to develop bilateral relations for many subsequent years (China Daily, 2010). 
Conversely, Tokyo’s stance on, what Japan call the Senkaku Islands, has been that 
there exists no issue of territorial dispute to be resolved concerning the archipelago.  
The earliest traceable such statement from the Japanese official is in 1996 at a regular 
press conference held by the Japanese foreign ministry (MOFA). When asked about a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 For a more detailed presentation on the historical confusion and complication of the dispute, see 
Taira (2004). 
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reported lighthouse construction by a rightist group on one of the islands, the Press 
Secretary explained Japan’s fundamental position on the islands, “It is clear, 
historically and in light of international law, that the Senkaku Islands form an integral 
part of Japanese territory. The Islands are under the effective control of Japan. There 
does not exist any territorial issue regarding the Senkaku Islands” (MOFA, 1996).127 
Emotionally for the Chinese therefore, one is not difficult to envisage that Japan’s 
denial of the very existence of a sovereign dispute only adds more nationalist spice 
into an already volatile mixture of the “pride/humiliation” complex. 
 
Callahan argues “to understand the success of China’s current rise, we need to 
understand the failures of China’s “Century of Humiliation” (2010: 8). Emotionally, 
due to its historical connections with both wars that China had recently fought against 
Japan, and Japan’s failure to promptly return the territory, the Diaoyu Islands issue 
has naturally attracted a great deal of nationalistic sentiment in China. The dispute sits 
at the middle in the “pride/humiliation” complex of Chinese nationalism. On the one 
hand, the islands group is presented as a potent symbol of Chinese nation being the 
victim at the hands of Japanese aggression, and the enormous suffering Chinese 
nation had endured. Therefore, Japan’s continuous rejection on China’s claim and 
restriction on Chinese access to the islands, bring out the fury of anti-Japanese 
nationalist movement. On the other hand, as China’s international profile rises, 
Chinese public now proudly feel their nation is strong enough to demand for the 
return to its “rightful place on the world stage”.128 Thus, regaining “lost territories”, 
including Taiwan and Diaoyu Islands, should be an imperative step to achieve this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 In response to the latest incident on the disputed islands, Japanese government reiterated its 
unchanged official position regarding the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (MOFA, 2010).  More on 
this in the following section. 
128 See The Economist (2010c) for an up-to-date special report on China’s place in the world. 
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goal. In essence, the dispute perfectly illustrates, “rather than being opposites, in 
China, pride and humiliation are interwoven, separated only by a fine line and can 
easily trade places” (Callahan, 2010: 9). Due to this important symbolism the Diaoyu 
Islands dispute epitomises to Chinese nationalism, history and its perception towards 
Japan,129 the dispute remains a sensitive issue that has been hotly debated in China-
Japan relations among the government and the general public since the 1990s, 
coinciding with the apparent rise of Chinese popular nationalism.   
 
5.4	  “Defending	  Diaoyu	  Islands”	  Movements	  
 
Whenever issues and events relating to the Diaoyu Islands dispute is reported in the 
media, it stirs up strong anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment amongst the general 
public in China. However, in terms of venting out nationalist passion, for most people 
at most of times, sharing angry messages and derogatory remarks on Japan in 
cyberspace is as far as it goes. Yet, there are three main non-governmental 
organisations (NGO) across the Great China (PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan) aimed at  
actively defending China sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands (保卫钓鱼岛 or 保钓). 
Namely, they are the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (CFDDI or 
中国保卫钓鱼岛联合会) in mainland China, the Action Committee for Defending 
the Diaoyu Islands (ACDDI or 保钓行动委员会) in Hong Kong, and The Chinese 
Association for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (CADDI or 中华保钓协会) in Taiwan. 
These NGOs130 lead the way in terms of collaborating collective activities against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Mitter’s work (2000) on China’s War of Resistance Museum presents a good example on the 
importance of symbolism in Chinese nationalism and culture.  See also Dittmer (1977), for a fine 
general discussion on political culture and symbolism, 
130 The CFDDI in mainland China is an unofficial social group, as registration of NGO in China needs 
to secure government support, and once registered NGOs remain under strong government’s 
management.  
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Japan’s occupation of the islands, from organising street protests to funding for 
activists to sail up and make landings on Diaoyutai, the largest islet of the archipelago. 
The three NGOs maintain regular contact with one another through meetings to 
discuss current situation on the issue. The main activity for the NGOs is to coordinate 
trips to the disputed area as an act of protest or sovereignty declaration.131 On the 
Diaoyu Islands dispute, despite the significant political differences between the PRC 
and Taiwan, their stances on the issue are the same, which is that ancient Chinese first 
discovered and administered the area; therefore, sovereignty over the islands group 
belongs to China—either the PRC for the Communist or the ROC for Taiwan.   
 
Street protests and activists sailing to the disputed archipelago often take place in 
response to Japan’s perceived wrongdoings and mistreatment to Chinese fishing boats 
in the disputed area, and on important anniversaries, such as 18 September (Mukden 
Incident in 1931), 7 July (Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937) and 13 December 
(Nanking Massacre in 1937). This direct-action approach to the dispute has 
sometimes not been well perceived by the authorities. Fearing for negative impact on 
the official channel of diplomacy and social stability, requests by the NGOs to sail to 
the islands have often been blocked by the maritime authorities in China, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan.132 Officially, neither China nor Taiwan has ever made attempted landings 
on the Diaoyu Islands or any other form of physical declaration, as both prefer to deal 
the dispute with Japan through diplomatic channel. Thus, even when activists 
managed to sail close to the islands or made successful landings on Diaoyutai Island, 
it is questionable that their direct actions would bear any tangible effect on altering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 ACDDI’s website provides a detailed chronology of the Diaoyu Islands disputes and the “defending 
the Diaoyu Islands” movements.  See http://www.diaoyuislands.org/fwl/1.html. Accessed on 
23/03/2011. 
132 See for example, Sing Tao Daily (2010) and Phoenix Television (2010).  
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Japan’s de facto control over the area. Despite the fact their actions lacking any 
official support, and their actions may do little to change Japan’s stance on the issue, 
what is significant from these “defending the Diaoyu Islands” actions is the 
nationalist symbolism shown.  Japan and Diaoyu Islands epitomise the 
“pride/humiliation” complex that is the core of China’s popular nationalism today. 
Even though, direct actions are less achievable for general public, the subject has 
always been hotly discussed in the cyberspace.133 It is precisely because of this strong 
and passionate nationalist feelings in China that any friction arisen from the dispute, 
widespread anti-Japanese movements soon follow on the street and online, hence 
making the Diaoyu Islands dispute one of most sensitive and nationalistic-oriented 
issues in today’s Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
The following section studies a major and recent event in the island dispute, namely 
the 2010 boat collision incident. The study investigates the public reactions and 
government’s responses following the event. It analyses the strength of popular 
nationalism in the public sphere, and the pressure it place on Beijing’s diplomatic 
responses. It also looks into how Beijing intricately manages this form of nationalism 
between instrumentalising it in its demands to Tokyo and worrying about its domestic 
implications. 
 
5.5	  The	  2010	  Boat	  Collision	  	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 A search by the title word “Diaoyu Islands on the Strong Nation Forum—a popular place for 
Chinese nationalists, shows 14350 results on 19 May 2011, from March 2008. See 
http://bbs.people.com.cn/quickSearch.do?threadtype=1&field=title&op=in&content=%E9%92%93%E
9%B1%BC%E5%B2%9B&x=19&y=10&pageNo=1.  
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On the morning of 7 September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two 
large patrol boats from the JCG in disputed waters near the Diaoyu Islands. The 
collision was one of the most serious incidents occurred in the territorial dispute 
between China and Japan. Not only did it cause a considerable diplomatic row 
between the two countries, crucially, it also sparked one of the largest nationalist 
responses against Japan on the Diaoyu Islands dispute.   
 
According to the JCG’s narratives, the two patrol boats were conducting routine 
patrol when they encountered the Chinese trawler, which was apparently operating in 
the area close to the disputed islands (Bloomberg News, 2010). As stated previously, 
the islands and the surrounding area are under Japan’s effective control, thus ships 
from the JCG maintain regular patrols in the area to chase off any what Tokyo sees as 
illegal intruders to its territory. On encounter, Japanese ships notified the Chinese 
trawler for its “illegal” operation within Japanese territorial waters, and ordered the 
trawler to leave the area. The Chinese boat allegedly ignored this request and then 
refused to stop to allow Japanese officials to conduct onboard inspections. Eventually, 
the JCG claimed, the Chinese trawler struck the two patrol ships, and damaged one of 
them. As a result, the JCG detained the 14 crew members on the Chinese fishing boat, 
and arrested the captain, Zhan Qixiong. All of them were then taken ashore for 
questioning.134 Japan later released the crew members, and the boat, but kept the 
captain in detention.   Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary claimed, “the vessel was 
illegal fishing in Japanese territorial waters around the islands. We will address the 
issue rigorously according to our laws,” adding that the Chinese boat struck with the 
Japanese patrol ships despite repeated warnings by the JGC (Bloomberg News, 2010). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 The incident received worldwide media coverage; see for example McCurry (2010); AFP (2010b); 
and BBC News Online (2010a). 
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Despite China’s demands, Japan had twice extended captain Zhan detention period, 
and he was finally freed on 24 September (MFA, 2010d). 
 
5.5.1	   Initial	  Official	  Responses	  
Recognising the sensitivity on the subject, the Chinese government responded quickly 
to this incident, with the spokesperson for Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) strongly 
condemned Japan’s action on the same day. She argues,  
 
China emphasises that the Diaoyu Islands and the surrounding area have been its 
territory since ancient times, so Japan shall not conduct any so-called ‘law 
enforcement’ activity in the waters off the islands.  More importantly, Japan shall not 
take any action may threaten the safety of Chinese fishing boat and its crew.   China 
will closely monitor its development and reserve the rights to take further action (MFA, 
2010a).  
 
Moreover, China requested the immediate release of the crew and had twice 
summoned the Japan’s ambassador in 24 hours, to express its dissatisfaction with and 
lodge strong protests against perceived illegal actions by the Japanese. Besides words, 
China had also confirmed to have postponed a round of negotiations with Japan on 
the ECS issues as well as a senior official’s visit to Japan citing “inappropriate 
atmosphere” (MFA, 2010b; and BBC News Online, 2010c). Moreover, when Japan 
decided to detain captain Zhan for a further 10 days, China replied with its sturdiest 
words yet, accusing Japan’s refusal to release Zhan in violation of “international law 
and basic international common sense”. It went on to declare Japan’s application of 
its judicial procedure on Zhan as “absurd, illegal, and invalid (荒唐，非法和无效的)” 
(MFA, 2010b and 2010c).  
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From the beginning, the collision incident had grasped full attention of the Chinese 
media, as crises in Sino-Japanese relations combining with sovereignty disputes 
making the headline-grabbing story that was too good to miss. The story became 
sensational front-page headlines for several days in popular newspapers, such as 
Global Times. More effectively, several most used information web portals in China, 
such as Sohu, Baidu, ifeng, and Huanqiu, all set up special reports to closely follow 
the event, with live updates, specialists comments, and have-your-say sections. The 
reports not only reflected the government’s position on the incident, but most of the 
headlines also blamed Japanese ships for ramming into Chinese fishing boat.135 The 
perspectives Chinese media adopted in covering this event had helped to create a 
general consensus among the Chinese public that Japan was twice on the guilty side, 
first for causing the collision, and then for illegally detaining the Chinese captain for 
10 days, ignoring Beijing’s repeated calls for his release.  
 
5.5.2	   Nationalist	  Fury	  
With this narrative dominating Chinese media, it is not difficult to understand anti-
Japanese nationalists comments soon filled chat rooms and BBS forums across the 
country. Arguably, what is interesting about these nationalist remarks is that, they 
create two forms of considerable domestic pressure on the Chinese government. 
Whilst following the development of the incident, this section will take turns to 
present these two forms of nationalist pressure and analyse Beijing’s responses. 
 
“Weak-­‐Knee”	  Syndrome	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 For example, ‘Japan patrol boat ramming our fishing boat’, and ‘Japan arrests our captain whose 
boat was hit,’ see Global Times (2010). 
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The first kind of domestic pressure from the nationalists is what I call “weak-knee” 
criticism. This arises when the government is criticised by nationalists for being too 
soft in its responses to a perceived foreign aggressor, in this case, Japan. In the boat 
collision case, this type of criticism showed up across the online community almost as 
soon as the news broke out.  As well as venting their fury at the Japanese, many 
messages however directed the same level of anger and disappointment at their own 
government for lacking any meaningful action. In other words, the usual anti-
Japanese rhetoric went hand in hand with criticisms for CCP’s weak management of 
the crisis. For instance, a popular thread posted on the Strong Nation Forum, a BBS 
forum affiliated to the People’s Daily, best illustrates this double-edged nationalist 
rage. The thread, posted on 8 September 2010, a day after the collision, was intended 
to provide an account of the incident (Strong Nation Forum, 2010a). It immediately 
drew great attention from fellow netizens with a total of 38169 readers and 421 
replies. Whilst many replied with strong derogatory remarks, and calling for boycott 
against Japan, as event further developed with Japan’s refusal to release the captain, 
many comments turned to the Chinese government for its “weak-kneed” responses: 
 
“Where is our navy? [Diplomatic] protest—what’s it doing to do? If our war ships not 
dare to enter the Diaoyu Islands, that means we have admitted its sovereignty lays with 
the Japanese, as even if was international waters, Chinese war ships can enter, let alone 
territories that belong to us”; “Japan forever dares to take action, China forever stops at 
words, but the doer always bullies the talker”; “our leaders desperately need some 
calcium supplements”; “If Japan can arrest our captain off the Diaoyu Islands, why 
can’t our patrol boats punish the Japanese intruders [in the same way]?”; “The Chinese 
once thought we were no longer the ‘sick man of East Asia’, we’ve just realised that we 
still are” (Strong Nation Forum, 2010). 
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Criticisms on Beijing’s weak dealings in international affairs are nothing new for the 
Chinese public, nor are they restricted to the issues with Japan. In 1999, for example, 
when China’s entry application for the membership of World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) failed to gain support from the US, despite Premier Zhu Rongji’s personal 
promise to offer substantial concessions to the Americans, Premier Zhu was abused 
mercilessly by his own people, labelling him a “traitor who sells one’s own nation” 
(卖国贼).136 Moreover, China’s official approach to the Diaoyu Islands dispute had 
thus far been sticking to the aforementioned Deng Xiaoping’s suggestions. Whilst 
claiming unquestionable sovereignty for the archipelago, Beijing had actually 
preferred putting the issue aside for the future generations of leaders to reach a 
resolution. This official position was troublesome for Chinese nationalists. From their 
perspective, while Beijing’s shelving the issue and waiting for a wise resolution, 
Tokyo, in contrast, had been effectively controlling and administering the area since 
1970s. It is arguable therefore, in the view of Chinese nationalists, Japan will never 
want to acknowledge the existence of the dispute, let alone to negotiate with China, so 
long as it maintains de facto control of the islands. China on the other hand, will never 
be able to bring Japan to the negotiation table, unless physically challenging Japan’s 
de facto control. As a result, for Chinese nationalists, the Diaoyu Islands sovereignty 
cannot be guaranteed unless Beijing toughens up its current stance by actions.  
 
Although it was certainly not the first time that Beijing was criticised by its own 
people for being too soft in foreign affairs, this type of comments were normally 
much weaker than the offensive ones aimed at Japan. This time however amid one of 
the most serious China-Japan confrontations in the area of Diaoyu Islands, incensed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 For more analysis on Zhu’s failed negotiation on WTO entry, see Fewsmith (2008: 212-221). 
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comments directed at the Chinese leadership soon echoed through the cyberspace, and 
increasingly becoming the dominant tone among the online nationalists. For the 
nationalists, it was as if Japan’s perceived bullish behaviour in the event (refusal to 
release and threaten to trial captain Zhan) was partly encouraged by China’s lack of 
actions. Put simply, Chinese nationalists believe Beijing’s all-talking-no-action 
approach over the years has made Tokyo undisturbed in its actions around the 
disputed area. This undoubtedly created enormous pressure on Beijing to speedily 
defuse this in-ward public anger. A series of drastic actions were taken following the 
nationalist outbursts on the internet. First, Beijing made several despatches of its own 
fishery administration ships and maritime patrol boats to the disputed waters in order 
to protect Chinese fishing boats and crew operating in the area (MFA, 2010b). Second, 
as the diplomatic stalemate continued, Beijing appeared to have allowed small-scale 
anti-Japanese street protests to take place around “Mukden Incident” anniversary on 
18 September (BBC News Online, 2010b), perhaps to release some of nationalist 
steam on this highly emotionally charged date. Third, although denied by Beijing, at 
the height of the diplomatic row, China allegedly stopped exports of rare earths to 
Japan, which are crucial for manufacture of many high-technology products (The 
Economist, 2010d).  
 
Initially, the online community responded positively to Beijing’s decision of sending 
patrol ships to the disputed waters (Strong Nation Forum, 2010b). Moreover, the 
news of Chinese law enforcement boats patrolling off the Diaoyu Islands featured 
prominently in both traditional media, and online. For example, a journalist of the 
popular Global Times reported from one of the ships on patrol in a series of 13 diaries, 
detailing numerous encounters with the Japanese counterparts and the bravery and 
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determination shown in these confrontations by the crew members.137  This so-called 
“patrol diaries at Diaoyu Islands” was first serialised on Global Times online special 
report section. It quickly became an Internet news sensation, as it was widely cross-
posted and linked in many BBS forums and blogs. After reading Cheng’s emotional 
and sensational reports, many netizens praised the courageous actions and 
determining fighting spirit shown by Chinese crew in face with outnumbered and 
superiorly equipped opponents. Hence credits were duly given to the CCP leadership 
for taking such hardened approach.  
 
As the diplomatic stalemate continued with captain Zhan still in detention, anti-
Japanese street protests were organised online. The protests took place on the 
weekend of the “Mukden Incident” anniversary in several big cities across China, 
Hong Kong, and New York.138 From lessons of previous event, including the 1999 
anti-NATO, and 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations, the CCP leadership was fully 
aware of the implications and potential risks attached to mass public protests. 
Authorities have sought to forestall protests, blocking the websites of Chinese 
nationalist groups, telling university students not to protest and erasing discussion of 
organising demonstrations from the Internet. For instance, it was reported that some 
nationalist websites and BBS forums were apparently inaccessible by 15 September, 
with comments and articles deemed too inflammatory deleted (RFI139 Chinese, 2010). 
 
However, as stated above, Beijing did allow some small-scale anti-Japanese protests 
in several big cities. While unless the leadership confesses, one can never be certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 See Cheng (2010). 
138 For reports, see Voice of America (VOA) Chinese (2010a; 2010b); and the Economist (2010e). 
139 Radio France Internationale. 
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what the real rationale was behind this rare decision, some interpretations may 
nonetheless be drawn from the outcomes.  
 
First, the CCP understands that the victim narratives and anti-Japanese sentiment are 
deeply rooted in current Chinese nationalism, as its patriotic education campaign in 
the 1990s was focused on this pride/victim discourse. As examined in Chapter Two, 
not only did CCP’s war-based patriotic education campaign in the 1990s strengthen 
this nationalist root, but also its own political legitimacy was constructed from the 
victory over Japan in the WWII. Perhaps more so than anyone else, the Communist 
government recognises the long lasting memories of Japan’s brutal occupation of 
China still strokes Chinese public ire about Japan. Under normal circumstance, 
Chinese public opinion on Japan is already showing significantly more negative than 
it on other countries and regions (Li and Zhou, 2009). For a serious incident like the 
collision, nationalistic emotion amongst Chinese public was bound to be very high. 
Consequently, the leadership might have little choice but to find ways to safely let the 
public to vent out some nationalist steam. The collision occurred only days before an 
important commemoration for the “Mukden Incident” of 1931, marking the start of 
Japanese occupation in China. The Zhuhai Japanese orgy case mentioned above has 
already shown the emotional importance these sensitive anniversaries for the Chinese 
public and in Chinese national identity. Although Chinese boat patrolling off the 
Diaoyu Islands was a welcome move by the online nationalist, the issue remained 
unresolved with captain Zhan still in detention as the anniversary approached.  The 
continuous stand off between China and Japan coinciding with the “Mukden Incident” 
commemoration day making it a potentially explosive nationalistic emotion if harshly 
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suppressed. As a result, when wide spread calls for anti-Japanese public protests 
appeared online, it became a passionate request that Beijing could not simply ignore. 
 
Secondly, there is evidence shown that Beijing had made extensive preparation to 
ensure this round of anti-Japanese protests was under its management. When news of 
the boat collision broke out, it was not difficult for Beijing to identify a potential high 
risk period that was just around the corner—the weekend of 18 September, with most 
people off work. In order to properly manage strong nationalist rage from the public, 
the government apparently first sent warnings days before the anniversary to activists 
of the Diaoyu-related issues—potential protest organisers—not to further provoke the 
matter.  For example, it was reported that editors of the website for the CFDDI, the 
main NGO in mainland China well-known for its advocacy of China’s claim of the 
islands, were warned by the police “not to break the law by holding demonstrations 
and other radical actions” (Lam, 2010). Moreover, the anti-Japanese protests took 
place under tight security. Not only did authorities ensure large police presence 
outnumbering the protesters, they also cordoned off the route and separated protesters 
from groups of the public, so that protester number would not increase (Buckley and 
Master, 2010). Additionally, amid worries that the protests might get out of hand in a 
recurrence of what happened in 2005, authorities appeared to have made sure that 
protests did not drag on for too long.  In many cities, small groups of protesters were 
dispersed by the police after an hour or so (Lam, 2010; and Buckley and Master, 
2010). 
 
Finally, it can also be argued, as long as Beijing were able to manage this round of 
protests, and minimise the negative impact, it might be used diplomatically to place 
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more pressure on Japan to release the captain. Carefully contained nationalist protests 
might be instrumentalised in the negotiation for captain Zhan’s release. This is 
because, Beijing could use this to argue that despite efforts had been made protests as 
small as possible, considerable public outrage about the detention still existed.  
Consequently, Beijing could say diplomatic manoeuvrability was rather limited, its 
hands were tied, that only the release of Zhan Qixiong could ease tensions between 
the two countries, hence essentially resolve the incident. What has to be emphasised is 
that the fundamental precondition for CCP leaders to use nationalism to rally support 
in diplomatic negotiations is that they must be sure that “nationalist sentiments do not 
jeopardise the overarching objectives of political stability and economic 
modernisation” (Zhao, 2009: 240). As well as avoiding social instabilities, it is 
certainly not in CCP leaders’ interest to let Chinese foreign policy be dictated by the 
emotional, nationalistic xenophobic sentiment on the street.  Beijing’s ultra-cautious 
approach to the protests on 18 September illustrated how the leaders attempted to 
balance nationalism in-between maintaining domestic stability by letting out 
necessary anger, but not getting out of hand, and foreign policy by securing the 
release of captain Zhan.  
	  
“Inward	  Outcry”	  Syndrome	  
The “inward outcry” syndrome, this work argues, occurs when dissatisfaction on 
domestic issues is included in the criticism directed at CCP’s foreign policy. In other 
words, disappointment in government’s foreign policy is used as an opportunity to 
vent out disapproval in its domestic politics. Here, criticism of government on foreign 
policy transfers inwardly into criticism of government’s handlings in domestic issues. 
Typically in China, this means contrasting leaders’ perceived soft posture in 
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international affair with CCP’s rather hard, if not bullish posture in domestic affairs. 
Events following the release of captain Zhan Qixiong exemplified the development of 
this condition.  
 
When captain Zhan was eventually released on 24 September, his arrival from Japan 
by a government chartered flight received extensive media coverage in China. Zhan 
Qixiong was given a high profile hero’s welcome, with the deputy governor of Fujian 
Province (Zhan’s hometown) and the assistant to Foreign Minister meeting him at the 
airport. At home, he was regarded a hero for resisting against Japan (抗日英雄) by 
Chinese media and the public, a title more commonly associated with men and 
women who gave lives fighting against the Japanese during the War of Resistance 
(1937-1945). Moreover, his words in an interview soon after the arrival had become 
widely quoted in Chinese cyberspace, with nationalists making up an extremely 
popular online catchphrase showing their appreciation for Zhan’s bravery, and 
support for China’s position on the Diaoyu Islands issues. When asked by media 
about his view of the whole incident, Zhan replied:  
 
“Diaoyu Islands is Chinese territory, of course I can go fishing there…they [the 
Japanese] repeatedly ask me to admit making mistake, but I would say Diaoyu Islands 
is China’s till I die…I just want to get back fishing at Diaoyu Islands, and I will go 
back there…I won’t fear [the Japanese], as Diaoyu Islands is Chinese land” (CNR140, 
2010). 
 
Chinese netizens picked up his words “go back fishing at Diaoyu Islands” (回钓鱼岛
打渔) together with “Diaoyu Islands”, which literately means “the fishing island” in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 China Network Radio (中国广播网). 
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Chinese, to create a catchphrase “go fishing at Diaoyu Islands” (去钓鱼岛钓鱼). The 
catchphrase was not only used to express the eagerness of the user wanting to “defend 
the Diaoyu Islands”, but more worrying for the leaders perhaps, it was soon connected 
with an ongoing social problem and increasingly used in sarcastic criticisms.  
 
Months before the boat collision incident, Chinese netizens exposed several cases of 
local law enforcement agents using entrapment to catch victims and boosting their 
incomes from fines. These cases first drew great attention from the online community, 
then as public interest grew, they were followed closely by traditional media in China. 
The profile of these cases moved quickly from Internet forums to newspapers and 
then to television debates. Wide spread criticism were voiced against this so-called 
“fishing/hooking then enforcing law” (钓鱼执法), hence the phrase had soon become 
one of the hottest tags online.141 At the height of the diplomatic tension following the 
boat collisions, a popular Chinese newspaper published a highly outspoken editorial-
style article, which played with the two phrases, Diaoyu Islands and entrapment, 
presented a sarcastic criticism at the CCP leadership. The article appeared on 
Southern Weekend (南方周末), a weekly newspaper renowned for its straight-talking, 
liberal (by Chinese standard) reporting style, which is popular amongst urban 
intellectuals in China. It was titled controversially, “Can ‘fish and then enforce law’ 
domestically, but can’t enforce law at Diaoyu Islands”. From the title it is perhaps not 
difficult to grasp the gist of the article, not only did the article criticise the leaders for 
failure to maintain law enforcement at Diaoyu Islands, it also questioned the 
government’s choice to block the word “Diaoyu Islands” from online search results 
and weibo (微博 or Microblog) entries, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter (Lin, 2010). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 For an English report on “hooking then enforcing law” cases in China, see Richburg (2009). 
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Again, the article was an instant hit with Chinese web users, the same group of 
netizens who had been exchanging nationalistic and anti-Japanese comments online. 
The article was quickly copied and cross-posted across China’s cyberspace before it 
was suddenly removed from the Southern Weekend’s website.  
 
During the China-Japan diplomatic row, not only did this “inward outcry” syndrome 
occur in cyberspace, it also happened in real world. After captain Zhan’s release, 
focus of the issue appeared to have turned from a diplomatic contest to a nationalist 
battle between China and Japan. Prior to Zhan’s release, Tokyo explained the reasons 
for making this decision, citing fear of possible worsening of Sino-Japanese relations, 
and therefore, continually detaining Zhan would not be appropriate (BBC News 
Online, 2010d). Consequently, many Japanese felt their government’s handling of the 
incident was also “weak-kneed” (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2009). Japanese nationalists 
blamed Tokyo for voluntarily releasing the captain, as they saw Japan “twisted” first 
in the bilateral standoff. In days after the release, as well as anti-Chinese 
demonstrations taking place across Japan, China’s diplomatic establishments in Japan 
were also attacked, either directly or by threatening letters (Tong, 2010; and Wang, 
H., 2010). In response, a second round of anti-Japanese demonstrations took place in 
mid October.  This time the scale was much larger and more widespread than the 
previous round discussed above. As well as the usual suspects such as Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing, protests were held in some medium-sized cities 
further inland. It was in these less prosperous places, nationalist protests turn inward, 
with banners about “soaring house price”, “promoting multiparty rule”, and “anti-
corruption” featured alongside with the usual anti-Japanese slogans (BBC Chinese, 
2010). Moreover, the online community responded to the inward criticisms shown in 
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the protests by mocking the government’s domestic performance with the Diaoyu 
Islands issue. For example, a particular cartoon started to appear across China’s cyber 
communities following the latest round of anti-Japanese demonstrations. It featured a 
conversation between two men about the ongoing protests; 
 
“Why’s it so noisy out there, could it possibly be another demolition?” 
“No, it’s a group of angry youth [愤青] who are protesting in front of the Japanese 
embassy.  They want Japan to hurry and give back the Diaoyu Islands.” 
“Hey, I hear that of all countries China has the most land disputes with its 
neighbours.  Is that true?” 
“I don’t know, but of all countries China is definitely involved in the most land 
disputes with its own citizens!” (China Digital Times, 2010) 
 
This cartoon links Diaoyu Islands dispute with a serious social conflict in today’s 
China, namely forced demolitions.  Driven by rapid economic growth, local 
governments in China increasingly sell land to prospective developers for 
redeployment in return for generous financial rewards. Occupiers are often evicted by 
force, with owners receiving inadequate compensation for their demolished 
properties. While this practice is nothing new, in recent years, online revelations of 
several high profile cases, where owners fought against the enforcers right to the 
death (either by violence or suicide), had truly brought the issue to great public 
attention. 142  The cases created enormous shock and outcry in general public. 
Confrontations between the eviction enforcement officers and defying property 
owners have thus become a major source of social unrest in China. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 See for example Wang, J. (2010). 
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The CCP leaders treated these “inward outcries” very seriously, and responded 
quickly and decisively. Access to news about anti-Japanese protests touching 
domestic issues were promptly blocked, and with online news listings later removed 
altogether. To the dismay of the nationalist netizens, sensitive words, such as “Diaoyu 
Islands” and “anti-Japanese protests” were temporarily disabled on Chinese search 
engines. Additionally, in order to contain the ongoing anti-Japanese protests and 
prevent students joining in, strict gate control was put in place in some university 
campuses where the largest scale protests had been held (VOA, 2010c).  
 
5.6	  Evaluation	  	  	  
 
As deliberated in Chapter Two, Chinese nationalism in the post-Cold War ear is not a 
singular tangible concept that has a solid definition. Rather, this work takes the view 
that Chinese nationalism today is a complex system of beliefs and perceptions that is 
constantly shaped by experiences in both domestic politics and foreign affairs. By the 
same constructivist token, I have argued, Chinese nationalism is mutually constrictive 
to Beijing’s domestic and foreign policy. Without access to the relevant policy makers 
on the issue, it is of course impossible for one to precisely judge the detrimental 
effects nationalism had on Beijing’s subsequent actions following the incident. 
However, this is not the analytical purpose of this work. Rather, this work has 
intended in using the boat collision case to illustrate the mutually constitutive 
dynamics between Chinese nationalism, domestic politics and foreign policy and how 
Beijing handled this double-edge, dual-directional nationalist effect. This section 
critically assesses the two effects, namely external and internal, popular nationalism 
showed during the boat collision incident and Beijing’s management on the Diaoyu 
Islands dispute. 
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5.6.1	   External	  Effects	  
The Diaoyu Islands dispute is one of few real-world issues143 between China and 
Japan that attach a great deal of nationalistic sentiment amongst Chinese public. As 
previously stated, from the very beginning, the Chinese Communist Party had 
constructed its political legitimacy on the basis of defeating the Japanese invaders, 
reclaiming lost territory, and establishing independence for the Chinese people. As 
presented in Chapter Two, this legitimacy foundation has heavily been elaborated in 
order to promote a Party-centric national identity. Sovereignty and territorial integrity 
are a matter of political correctness, which yield uncompromisable stance from the 
CCP. They are the red lines of China’s foreign policy (Interview A, 2009; Interview B, 
2009; and China News Network, 2010). The Diaoyu Islands dispute falls into this 
category. Because this form of national identity centred at the CCP’s triumph over 
foreign aggressors, with Japan being the most recent and most brutal one, Japan is 
considered as the “touchstone” for contemporary Chinese nationalism (Interview C, 
2009). Taking an interpretive approach, one can argue that due to the reasons listed 
above, CCP leaders and the Chinese people have had a common share-knowledge on 
the ownership of the islands group, that is the islands undoubtedly belong to China. 
Moreover, following the collision incident, the two groups also shared their 
perceptions on the Japanese actions. As nationalist outrage rose from these two 
collective subjective meanings—the islands are China’s and yet Japan illegally 
detained our captain, the leaders could fully understand the heated emotions 
expressed online. Consequently, it would not be the interest of Chinese leaders to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 I see most problematic issues between China and Japan are emotion-related, such as Yasukuni 
Shrine, Japan’s war apology, and history textbooks. Other real-world issues include the ECS oil and 
gas field dispute, which, for the focus of this study, I treat it being a separate issue from the Diaoyu 
Islands dispute. 
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suppress public anger towards Japan, as doing so would be viewed as if the 
government had shifted from the shared consensus on the Diaoyu Islands issue, hence 
CCP’s own political legitimacy would be questioned. It must be said, in spite of its 
firm stance the Diaoyu Islands issue, prior to the 2010 boat collisions incident, China 
had rarely sent patrol boat to the disputed area in order to confront the Japanese. Most 
interceptions made by the JCG vessels were civil boats such as trawlers. This time, 
nevertheless, amid strong “soft-knee” criticisms, and significance of the diplomatic 
quarrel, Beijing had to prove to the nationalist critics that it would not succumb under 
the perceived Japanese provocation. Despatching patrol ships to the disputed waters 
could be interpreted as a rather effective way to satisfy the nationalist critics, as direct 
actions were called for. With nationalists’ approval, not only did Beijing strengthen 
its patrol force in the area by China’s brand new most advanced patrol ship after the 
diplomatic row, it also declared that its maritime surveillance vessels would establish 
routine patrol and maintain a regular presence off the Diaoyu Islands (Li, 2010; and 
Southern Daily, 2010).  
 
Here, nationalist fury originated from an issue in foreign affairs (external), namely 
confrontation with Japan over Diaoyu Islands. Regardless, whether the nationalist 
criticisms were directed at Tokyo or Beijing, they nonetheless did not deviate away 
from the issue. On this level, the dynamic between nationalism and foreign policy 
flows in the following way. 
 
First, the boat collisions (external issue) infringed Beijing’s core foreign policy 
principle, namely sovereignty and territorial integrity, created a diplomatic crisis.  
Second, the revenue-driven media seized this opportunity with front-page headlines 
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and sensational reports. Ordinary citizens, who shared the same stance with the 
government, filled the online space with nationalistic sentiments and criticisms for 
Beijing’s usual “weak-knee” response. At this point, foreign policy makers were 
placed under great pressure. Adherent to the standpoint of Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA), foreign policy directions are rooted in beliefs and perceptions of the decision 
makers, which in turn are shaped by subjective meanings from domestic sources, such 
as culture, education, history and national identity. Domestic sources thus provide 
both inputs and constraints to foreign policy. Therefore, feedbacks from public 
opinions on a particular issue in foreign affairs is vitally important for decision 
makers in making policy choices. On this occasion, neither its fundamental principles 
nor strong public reactions offered much leeway for Beijing in responding to the crisis. 
With captain Zhan’s detention at steak, Beijing simply had to back up its solemn 
words with some adequate actions. In order to press for Zhan’s freedom, apart from 
despatching patrol ships, a series of unprecedented hard-line measures were also 
adopted against Japan, including suspend ministerial-level contacts, cancellations of 
planed meetings and official visits, discouraging Chinese tourists to Japan, the alleged 
halt of rare earth exports to Japan, and detentions of four Japanese nationals in 
Northern China.144 Indeed, as discussed above, these efforts did lower the voice of 
“weak knee” criticisms on the Internet and earned Beijing some much-needed credit 
from popular nationalists online. Particularly, the “half-hearted” release of Zhan 
Qixiong by Japan was regarded by Chinese public as a victory for China, as Japan 
seemingly backed down to save the worsening bilateral relations (Takahashi, 2010).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 China nevertheless denied the arrests were in any way linked with the collision incident, but 
accusing the Japanese violating Chinese law relating to military establishments. See Reuters (2010). 
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On balance, Beijing treated the “weak-knee” criticism very sensitively. Beijing’s 
management of this type of nationalist criticism can be best explained by a pressure 
cooker analogy.  Japan’s prolonged detention of captain Zhan can be seen as the fire 
under the nationalist pressure cooker that was heating up rapidly. Beijing had two 
ways to ease the building-up pressure. First, it had to put up the pressure valve by 
cautiously allowing several small-scale street protests, in order to vent out some 
nationalistic steam. Second and ultimately, the heat source has to be turned down to 
effectively solve the problem. To achieve this, Beijing employed a set of hard line 
action to Tokyo; and in turn, transferred some of the pressure to Tokyo on Zhan’s 
detention. Under the pressure, Tokyo eventually turned off the heat by reluctantly 
releasing captain Zhan, hence the nationalist pressure cooker in China cooled down. 
In short, the boat collisions incident demonstrated that when popular nationalism is 
directed at Japan or at its own handlings of principal issues in foreign affairs, such as 
Diaoyu Islands, Chinese leaders had to respond in a way, that would, if possible, both 
diplomatically resolve the issue to China’s favour, and emotionally relieve the 
nationalist anger. 
 
5.6.2	   Internal	  Effects	  
In contrast to the external dynamic above, the internal dynamic effects of nationalism 
are more volatile and less predicable. This is because nationalist sentiments originated 
from an external source (e.g. boat collisions incident) transferred inwardly into 
criticisms about internal issues (e.g. entrapment; corruption). This is certainly a more 
serious matter for the CCP leadership. Whilst for foreign policy, Beijing is able to use 
various tools at its discretion to bring the shared believes and perceptions inline with 
that of its own, it cannot guarantee same achievement in domestic affairs. Despite the 
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“reform and opening-up” policy, and in spite of rapid economic growth, it is still 
relatively difficult for majority of Chinese people to travel abroad. As a result, 
perceptions towards foreign countries are largely constructed by subjective history 
(e.g. old friends or foes), and by information filtered through CCP’s powerful 
censorship system. It is therefore comparatively easier for the leaders to synchronise 
media reports on major foreign policy issues, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the United 
States. In contrast, the CCP has much less control over public opinions on domestic 
issues. These issues relate directly to one’s day-to-day life, thus can be witnessed 
from one’s own eyes. Especially in the age of Internet communications, any web user, 
as noted in the Chapter Three, can use the Internet to break news to a wide public. 
Thanks to the social network, news can be spread out and reproduced in a very short 
time, which the traditional forms of media simply cannot match. Hence, even with 
sophisticate online censoring technology, it is nearly impossible for the CCP to 
maintain absolute top-down control over domestic information.  
 
The most critical aspect in this effect is that, whilst the public and government by and 
large have “shared knowledge” on international issues, Due to conflicting interests, 
the public may not share common ground with local authorities on many domestic 
issues. Difference in subjective knowledge leads to different perceptions and 
contrasting opinions. The core assumption of this work has been that nationalism, 
domestic policy and foreign policy are all mutually constitutive. Adherent to this, I 
may present a three-stage process of this internal dynamic of nationalism.  First, the 
boat collisions incident brought out nationalist rage from the public. Beijing’s initial 
responses towards this crisis were not convincing for popular nationalists. The 
generally negative opinions towards Japan combining with firm stance on the 
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sovereignty debate, constituted nationalist attacks on the authority. Second, 
disappointments and disapprovals of Beijing’s early weak reactions in the diplomatic 
row together with other ongoing social issues where the public were in frustration 
with the actions of the authority, constituted netizens’ critical commentary on 
domestic issues as well as on foreign policy. Finally, this two-level criticism placed 
the authority under massive stress, as it had to consider the separate responses for 
foreign policy and domestic issues. Evidently, the CCP leaders showed more 
intolerance towards this internal effect of nationalism than it did towards the external 
effects. As critical as the Diaoyu Islands comments may be, the leaders and the public 
in principal hold the same position on the dispute issue. The same assertion however, 
cannot be made with criticisms on social problems, where a clash of interests between 
the authority and the public resulting in opposing stances and positions. As a result, 
the authority promptly adopted whatever means available to block and wipe out these 
type of messages either online or on street.  
 
It is clear that the two set of nationalism dynamics originated on same point of 
departure, namely anti-Japanese sentiment. What splits them is the transfer from 
criticism on an international issue to criticism on domestic issues. But, what catalysed 
this transfer? And, under what circumstance would the transfer take place? Although, 
the exact details of criticism maybe different from one issue to another, one can 
certainly draw some observations from the boat collision case.  
 
First, the internet is an open communication platform that has very “low barrier of 
entry and risk of use” for anyone with a connection to access and provide information 
(Xiao, 2011: 209). Expressing dissatisfactions with the authority online is surely less 
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risky than do it on the street. Moreover, anti-Japanese comments and opinions are 
normally left unchallenged in China, as one Chinese scholar revealed, “many issues 
concerning Japan are matters of political correctness, anti-Japanese feelings among 
the public are both genuine and valid, thus, for most times, anti-Japanese sentiment is 
unrestricted” (Interview B, 2009). Consequently, as one saw during the 2010 boat 
collision incident, the Chinese public might mix anti-Japanese clichés with critical 
commentary on certain domestic issues to even further minimise the risk. 
 
Second, it is arguable that the directional shift in criticisms is more likely to happen 
when a single issue remains unresolved for relatively long period of time with not 
much development in the middle. If one compares protests following the boat 
collisions with the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations studied in the previous chapter, 
the 2010 protest is on a much smaller scale of that in 2005. During the 2005 protests, 
nonetheless, there were no banners or slogans about social problems. The 2005 
demonstrations were triggered by several issues in Sino-Japanese relations, such as 
textbook controversy, Yasukuni Shrine, and Japan’s membership in United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). It can be asserted that the popular nationalist pressure, 
accumulated over the previous years, was so high that the government allowed the 
public to fully vent their anger, thus the popular nationalists did not need to turn 
inwards. Additionally, the 2005 anti-Japanese public demonstration maintained 
intensity for more than three weeks, with nation-wide protests taking place at nearly 
every weekend and other public holidays. It did not give the Chinese public an 
opportunity to shift their focus elsewhere. In comparison, the 2010 anti-Japanese 
movements were rather more sporadic, with only two recognisable rounds of street 
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protests across China taking place in a month. It is therefore possible for the anti-
Japanese focus to drift away in between events. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that only in the past five years or so, “mocking culture” or 
“kuso” (恶搞文化) has become a new Internet phenomenon in China. New words, 
phrases, expressions created by netizens have become an “internet language” that is 
used exclusively in China’s online community. The language is often used as parodies 
to mock, comment on a person, an event or a phenomenon in a sarcastic manner.145 
Active web users compete one another to invent the most popular phrases and the best 
ridicules in order to gain popularity and frame in the online community. It is therefore 
conceivable to argue that the motivations for making up the two mocking cases on 
entrapment and forced eviction were not entirely to highlight social problems, but 
rather, to raise the creator’s online profile. 
 
5.7	  Summary	  
	  
The main objective of this chapter has been using the Diaoyu Islands dispute case to 
display the dynamic impacts of nationalism in Beijing’s foreign and domestic policy 
considerations. The chapter has begun by highlighting the important values of Diaoyu 
Islands dispute for China and its people, from both foreign policy perspective and 
emotional perspective. It has presented why this nationalistically charged issue lies at 
centre of Chinese foreign policy principles. The chapter then moved on to explore one 
of the most serious diplomatic standoff between China and Japan on the dispute. By 
looking closely at China’s official actions and popular nationalist responses, the study 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 For more information on the rise of “Internet mocking”, please see an article in China Comment 《
半月谈》, a political commentary magazine affiliated to CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, Yuan 
(2010). 
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demonstrated that multidimensional characteristics of popular nationalism. For 
analytical clarity, I have peeled off the multiple layers nationalist impacts by grouping 
them into two interlinked syndromes or group of effects, namely “weak knee” 
syndrome and “inward outcry” syndrome. For each syndrome, detailed analyses were 
then carried out on how nationalism in-turn influenced Beijing’s foreign policy 
actions and domestic politics during the different phases of the boat collision incident. 
It is worth noting that by separating the direction of which popular nationalism is 
aimed at does no indicate that nationalist comment directing issues in foreign affairs 
may only affect foreign policy, and vice versa. The “mutually constitutive” 
assumption from mainstream Constructivism has been critically adopted to explain 
the core reason, namely difference in shared knowledge, for anti-Japanese nationalist 
sentiments to “split” two ways. Finally, an interpretive analysis is adopted to 
speculate the catalyses for the split and the conditions under which the split is more 
likely to occur.  
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Chapter	  Six:	  Conclusions	  	  
 
This thesis has embarked on a journey to critically assess popular nationalism’s role 
and prominence in shaping China’s Japan policy in the post-Cold War era. It has set 
out with two important research questions that required investigation to ascertain 
popular nationalism’s influence in China’s Japan policy vis-à-vis domestic policy. 
From the very beginning, the research journey has carried with a Constructivist 
baggage in taking a theoretical position that the three core elements in this study, 
namely, popular nationalism, foreign policy and domestic politics, are all mutually 
constitutive. The research has treated “popular nationalism” as a system of 
nationalistic believes, which originated at the grassroots level and is subsequently 
reproduced, reformed, and spread at the same level. In order to open up the “black 
box” of popular nationalism, and that of foreign policy, and not treat them as 
“superficially given”, the thesis has introduced the notion of popular nationalism 
dynamics to denote this multi-dimension and mutually constitutive role of popular 
nationalism.  In addition, this research has also adopted the two-way dialectical 
paradigm from Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to view the interactive relations 
between nationalism, foreign policy and domestic politics. In this view, as the thesis 
has presented, popular nationalism travels both upwardly, as a determinant and 
downwardly, as an instrument. Upwardly, nationalist public opinion not only places 
pressure on the state in international setting, it also affects social stability and political 
legitimacy in domestic setting. Downwardly, the state manages (promote/restrain) 
popular nationalism to serve its foreign and domestic objectives.  
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This chapter attempts to firstly, evaluate the empirical findings from the case studies 
of the 2005 anti-Japanese protest and the Diaoyu Islands dispute, by revisiting them 
with the research questions, and identifying the commonalities and differences 
between the two cases, in terms of the potency of popular nationalism, and the state’s 
responses to it. This is followed by an overall assessment on the scope of limitations 
of this research. From the basis of this thesis, the chapter concludes with a brief 
outline of the prospects for the future research in the field of Chinese popular 
nationalism and foreign policy. 	  
6.1	   Empirical	  Findings	  	  
The analysis of the 2005 anti-Japanese protest and the Diaoyu Islands dispute reveals 
a number of empirical commonalities and differences, with regard to the dynamics of 
popular nationalism in China’s Japan policy. This section uses the two central 
research questions to group the empirical findings into two interlinked categories. As 
a reminder, the two principal research questions are: 1) how has popular nationalism 
been instrumental in China’s Japan policy vis-à-vis domestic politics? 2) How and to 
what extent Chinese government has managed popular nationalism in respect of 
foreign and domestic policy practices?  
	  
6.1.1	   The	  Instrumental	  Impact	  of	  Popular	  Nationalism	  
In both cases, the study has found popular nationalism, demonstrated by rhetoric 
writings, and public protests, did to some extent affect/reaffirm the Chinese 
government’s policy choices. In the 2005 anti-Japanese protest case, for instance, the 
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government initially supported the anti-Japanese mass petitions. The enormous 
number of signatures, by people in China and overseas, was considered by Beijing a 
convincing evidence of opposing Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council (UNSC). Beijing hoped this evidence would present a 
persuasive case to the UN to prevent Japan’s bid to succeed, thus reaffirming China’s 
policy position, namely no permanent membership for Japan. In the Diaoyu Islands 
dispute case, however, pressure from popular nationalist movement actually restricted 
Beijing’s policy options. In the immediate aftermath of the 2010 boat collisions 
incident, although Beijing had repeatedly denounced the detention of Zhan Qixiong, 
captain of the Chinese trawler involved in the collisions, it did not take any hard-line 
actions at first. The Chinese government merely adopted the usual tactics on a 
diplomatic row, namely diplomatic protests followed by suspension of bilateral 
exchanges. Nonetheless, when popular nationalists turn the outward anti-Japanese 
rhetoric into inward criticism of Beijing’s soft approach (soft-knee syndrome), the 
scope of Beijing’s policy choice became limited. As the position on the sovereignty 
question over the Diaoyu Islands being unequivocal, Beijing had to respond to the 
popular nationalist criticism. If it did not, popular nationalists would seriously 
question Beijing’s determination on the sovereignty issue of the islands, thus 
potentially threaten its domestic political legitimacy. As a result, Beijing soon 
hardened its handlings of the issue, by sending routine patrol boats into the disputed 
area, and halting the export of Japan much-depended rare earth. Not only did the 
actions pressurised Tokyo into eventually releasing Zhan without charge, they also 
received praises from Chinese popular nationalists on the Internet. 	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6.1.2	   On	  Managing	  Popular	  Nationalism	  
 
As well as affecting Chinese government’s foreign policy prescriptions, both cases 
have illustrated that popular nationalism also has implications to China’s domestic 
politics. Domestically, ever since Tiananmen crackdown, the fundamental objective 
for the CCP government has been maintaining social stability, with the slogan 
“stability above all” (稳定高于一切) frequently appearing in state-run media and 
official speeches.146 Hence, for Beijing, one of the most worrying aspects in popular 
nationalism dynamics is the potential of causing public disorder, and social instability. 
In the 2005 anti-Japanese protest case, initially, Beijing reluctantly allowed anti-
Japanese protest to take place to vent out some built-up nationalist steam, fearing 
failure to do so popular nationalists might challenge its political legitimacy. However, 
again for domestic reasons, Beijing started to concern about public order when 
peaceful petition turned into spontaneous mass public street marches in multiple cities 
that vandalised shops and buildings. In response, as well as employing large numbers 
of riot police to contain the crowd, Beijing also forbade news reporting on the protest 
and attempted to persuade university students not to participate.  
 
Conversely, the investigation on the Diaoyu Islands dispute case revealed a new 
direction in which popular nationalism affecting domestic politics, namely the 
“inward outcry” syndrome. Under normal circumstance, popular nationalist sentiment 
is directed at either an out-group subject (“Other”), or the state’s handling of the 
Other (foreign policy). During the nationalist movement following the boat collisions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Since 2005, this slogan gradually subsided, with the CCP favouring a new one,  Hu Jintao’s 
“building a harmonious society” (建立和谐社会). Harmonious society is based on stability, but further 
it requires smoothing out the unwanted critical voices. See Lam (2006: 251-253); and  
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incident, it appeared, to some extent nationalistic anger was transferred from rage 
against Japan, disappointment of Beijing’s soft action, to showing discontent towards 
domestic social issues. From state’s perspective, this is the most dangerous strain of 
nationalist dynamics in respective to social stability, because problems outside in 
foreign affairs has now compiled with problems inside. Facing this new challenge, 
Beijing toughened up its strict censorship on the Internet, blocking words relevant to 
the Diaoyu Islands issue, and deleting any threads and messages showing displeasure 
on social issues. 
 
Under what condition does this strain of popular nationalism exhibit? Why did it not 
show in the 2005 anti-Japanese protest, but did in 2010 protest? Several attributions 
are believed to be able to explicate these questions. First, there was a difference in 
terms of general status of Sino-Japanese relations between 2005 and 2010. In 2005, at 
height of the “frozen period” in bilateral relations, anti-Japanese sentiment had been 
rising for several years. Therefore, when anti-Japanese movement was triggered by 
Japan’s bid for permanent membership, the eruption popular nationalism was much 
larger and wider than that of 2010, hence a much “richer” anti-Japanese sentiment. 
Second, in the 2005 case, several issues along side with Japan’s bid, were protests 
against, whereas in 2010, only one issue was opposed, namely the Diaoyu Islands 
sovereignty. Therefore, it may be able to argue that the negative feeling towards was 
so strong and the Chinese government had to let the public to fully vent out their 
popular nationalist steam. Hence the nationalist fury was able to focus solely on the 
external issues regarding with Japan. Finally, thanks to the development of the 
Internet communication technology, and the increase of civilian reporting had made 
more and more social issues exposed to the Chinese public. Weblogs, Bullet Board 
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System (BBS) forums, social networking sites only exploded in China in the past few 
years, therefore, although many social issues existed in 2005, information about 
which might have remained unreported or not as widely spread due to government’s 
media control. 
 
Overall, the evidence from both case studies shows that popular nationalism is a 
paradoxical ideational determinant in China’s Japan policy, one that Beijing needs to 
treat very sensitively. Whilst popular anti-Japanese sentiment may be instrumentally 
used to achieve Beijing’s foreign policy objectives, its implications to domestic 
stability cannot be underestimated. Concurrently, this concern about domestic 
stability and political legitimacy also affect its instrumental role in foreign policy. In 
short, the two cases have shown Beijing constantly attempts to balance popular 
nationalism’s instrumental role with its implications.  
 
6.2	   Implications	  and	  Prospect	  for	  Future	  Research	  
 
By taking a Constructivist theoretical stance, this thesis has demonstrated the dynamic 
and mutually constitutive relations between Chinese popular nationalism, China’s 
Japan policy and domestic politics. Due to the limited scope of this research, there are 
however noticeable caveats to this modestly defined study.  
 
First of all, from theoretical perspective, critics may argue although the thesis opened 
the “black box” of popular nationalism and foreign policy, the influence of ideation 
factor, like nationalism, over-elaborated. Moreover, the “mutually constrictive” 
assumption was taken as “given”, without theoretically bridging the gap between the 
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thinking mind of the decision makers and that of the popular nationalists. In other 
words, without knowing the real intentions/motives to a specific policy outcome, it is 
difficult to affirmatively asserting nationalism influences. Indeed, this critique is valid, 
as it is difficult to validate the claim. This is because, to validate it, one needs to know 
the inner workings of foreign policy decision making, and the thinking of the decision 
maker(s). This is simply unattainable in the case of China, for such sensitive subject, 
popular nationalism, and such concurrent issue, Sino-Japanese relations. Even if this 
was possible in other cases, a completely new theoretical framework needs to be 
constructed incorporating theories on decision making dynamics and leader’s 
personality and psychology. This is well beyond the technical constraints of this 
research. 
 
Second, critics may argue that the interpretive methods used in this research may not 
accurately measure the nationalist influence both externally and internally. A more 
sophisticated quantitative-combined content analysis, applying word coding to 
relevant texts and documents may able to product more tangible evaluation on 
popular nationalism’s impacts and implications to foreign and domestic policy 
decisions. However, in China’s case, not many official papers can be found regarding 
contemporary issues in nationalism and Sino-Japanese relations, as most of them 
would be inaccessible to the public. This research has drawn a vast amount of 
materials in both English and Chinese. Therefore, to do a content analysis all Chinese 
writings would have to be expertly translated into English before putting through the 
word coding software. It would not only be time consuming, the “lost in translation” 
effect might also disturb analytical results. Having said this, it may be interesting for 
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researcher in the future to conduct a quantitative base exercise on this subject and 
then compare the findings with this study.  
 
Finally, from a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) perspective, critics may point out, this 
study has only focused on policy outcome, but neglected the process of which is made. 
In other words, this study worked backwardly from policy outcome to interpret the 
motives and intentions. The critics may argue the foreign policy decision-making 
(FPDM) dynamics is as influential as popular nationalism dynamics in shaping final 
policy decisions. To respond, it is worth stressing that the primary subject of this 
thesis is the popular nationalism dynamics, not foreign policy. Consequently, 
diverting ink to FPDM dynamics would dilute the analytical focus hence loose the 
research objectives. Nevertheless, there is a promising prospect for future research to 
include other factors and determinants in foreign policy vis-à-vis popular nationalism. 
 
For the foreseeable future, barring dramatic changes of political landscape in China 
and Japan, the anti-Japanese sentiment in Chinese popular nationalism will stay. The 
unsolved issues in Sino-Japanese relations will still occasionally cause bilateral 
diplomatic friction and eruption of nationalism in both China and Japan. This means, 
the Chinese government, has to constantly keep a close eye on the popular 
nationalism pressure cooker. It has to relentlessly homing its heat management skills 
in facing new challenges, in order to maintain an optimum temperature of the popular 
nationalism pressure cooker, to best suit China’s ever-evolving external and internal 
environment.  
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See: MOFA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/treaty78.html. Accessed 
02/12/2010. 
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  Building	  a	  Partnership	  
of	  Friendship	  and	  Cooperation	  for	  Peace	  and	  Development	  
 
26 November 1998 
 
See: MOFA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/visit98/joint.html. 
Accessed 02/12/2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX	  IV:	  Joint	  Statement	  between	  the	  Government	  of	  Japan	  and	  
the	  Government	  of	  the	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China	  on	  Comprehensive	  
Promotion	  of	  a	  “Mutually	  Beneficial	  Relationship	  Based	  on	  Common	  
Strategic	  Interests”	  
 
Issued in Tokyo on 7 May 2008 
 
See: MOFA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html. Accessed 
02/12/2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  APPENDIX	  V:	  Chronology	  of	  Political	  Exchanges	  between	  PRC	  and	  
Japan	  since	  19901	  
	  
Aug 1991 Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki visits China, first Western 
leader to do so after Tiananmen Square crackdown. 
Apr 1992 Secretary General of CCP Jiang Zemin visits Japan, presents formal 
invitation for the imperial visit to China. 
Oct 1992 Emperor Akihito and Empress Michito state visit to China, first 
imperial visit by Japanese Emperor. 
Mar 1994 Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro visits China. 
May 1995 Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi visits China, first 
incumbent Prime Minister of Japan to visit the China War Resistance 
Against Japan Memorial Museum and the Macro Polo Bridge. 
Nov 1995 President Jiang Zemin meets Prime Minister Murayama during the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Osaka.   
Sep 1997 Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro formal visit to China, first 
incumbent Prime Minister of Japan to visit Northeast China 
(Manchuria). 
Nov 1997 Premier Li Peng visits Japan, put forward “Five Principles of Sino-
Japanese Relations”, namely mutual respect and non-interference in 
each other's internal affairs; seeking commons while setting aside 
difference; handling disputes properly, increasing dialogue and 
understanding; mutual benefit, deepening economic cooperation; and 
being forward-looking and carrying on friendship from generation to 
generation. 
Nov 1998 President Jiang Zemin makes an official state visit to Japan, first of 
such to Japan by Chinese head of state.  Two sides issue ‘Japan-China 
Joint Declaration’ (see Appendix III), the 3rd important political 
document in Sino-Japanese relations. 
Jul 1999 Reciprocal visit by Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo to China. 
                                   
1 Political exchanges here indicate mutual visits by governmental leader (Japanese Prime Minister; 
Chinese Premier), head of state (Japanese Emperor, Chinese President), and foreign ministers. 
May 2000 Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visits Japan. 
Aug 2000 Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Yohei visits China. 
Oct 2000 Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji makes an official visit to Japan. 
Oct 2001 Working visit by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to China, 
including a visit to the China War Resistance Against Japan Memorial 
Museum. 
Oct 2001 President Jiang meets Prime Minister Koizumi at the APEC Forum in 
Shanghai. 
Sep 2002 Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko meets President Jiang in 
Beijing. 
Apr 2003 Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko visits China. 
Aug 2003 Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visits Japan. 
Apr 2004 Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko visits China. 
Apr 2005 Japanese Foreign Minster Machimura Nobutaka visits China. 
Oct 2006 Official visit to China by Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shizo, first 
such visit by either side in five years.  A significant event for the 
reconciliation of Sino-Japanese relations after the Koizumi regime, and 
is coined as “破冰之旅”(Ice-breaking Tour).  Both sides agree to 
establish mutually beneficial strategic partnership. 
Feb 2007 Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visits Japan, political 
preparations for the upcoming visit by Premier Wen Jiabao. 
Apr 2007 Premier Wen Jiabao visits Japan, termed as “融冰之旅”(Ice-melting 
Tour).  Two sides confirm the basic frameworks for mutually 
beneficial strategic partnership. 
Dec 2007 Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko visits Beijing to prepare 
Prime Minister Fukuda’s official visit. 
Dec 2007 Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo officially visits China, coined as 
“迎春之旅”(Spring-herald Tour) by media.  Fukuda makes a speech 
at Peking University and visits Qufu, Shandong Province, the 
hometown of Confucius. 
Apr 2008 Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi goes to Japan, making final 
political preparation for President Hu Jintao’s upcoming state visit. 
May 2008 President Hu Jintao to Japan completes an official state visit to Japan, 
which media describes as “暖春之旅”(Warm-spring Tour).  Both 
sides sign a joint statement on ‘Comprehensive Promotion of a 
Mutually Beneficial Relationship based on Common Strategic 
Interests’, the 4th political document between China and Japan since 
the normalisation of bilateral relations (see Appendix IV). 
Aug 2008 Prime Minister Fukuda attends the Opening Ceremony of Beijing 
Olympic Games, and meets with President Hu and Premier Wen. 
Oct 2008 President Hu and Premier Wen meet with Japanese new Prime 
Minister Aso Taro, who is attending the Asia-Euro Summit in China.  
Oct 2008 Premier Wen travels to Fukuoka, Japan, to attend Japan-China-
Republic of Korea Trilateral Summit. 
Apr 2009 Prime Minister Aso visits China and talks with Premier Wen and 
President Hu.  
 
 
Source: Compiled by author with information collected from Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of China (MFA), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/yz/1206_25/sbgx/. 
Accessed 29/11/2010. 
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Map I 
See: BBC Image, 
http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/50005000/gif/_50005270_chunxiao_gas_464
x386v2.gif. Accessed 11/04/2011. 
 
Map II 
See: Drifte, Reinhard (2009) ‘Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea—from 
Missed Opportunities to Negotiation Stalemate,’ The Asia-Pacific Journal. 22, 1 
June. http://www.japanfocus.org/data/map_of_china.jpg. Accessed 11/04/2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
